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Summary
Introduction
This study was commissioned to explore how other Public Employment Services (PES) 
across Europe use performance measurement in support of their organisational 
objectives in order that Jobcentre Plus can learn from this when considering future 
improvements to its performance measurement regime.
Approaches to performance management
Performance management and measurement are closely associated with the 
rise of interest in Management by Objectives (MBO) from the 1950s onwards. 
MBO involves senior managers setting indicators and targets in relation to desired 
outcomes but allowing local managers the autonomy to innovate to achieve these. 
However, more contemporary authors suggest that performance measurement is 
often used to insert more rigid controls over organisational processes to standardise 
delivery and improve efficiency. Integrating performance measurement with 
organisational learning provides an opportunity to learn lessons from previous 
delivery, confirming or denying underlying assumptions which act as a guide to action.
Performance measurement in the public sector has been implemented generally 
in the context of increasing privatisation of public services and as a mechanism to 
ensure that contractors or public sector arms length delivery organisations act in 
the ways that the purchaser of services would want. Other prominent objectives 
underpinning performance measurement in the public sector relate to the potential 
to use performance data to aid public and political accountability.
Performance measurement systems take different types of performance indicators 
and attempt to link them together, particularly to show the relationship between 
inputs (the resources devoted to a particular issue), outputs (the immediate results 
of activity, such as the number of interventions completed) and outcomes (the 
ultimate effects of interventions). Example performance measurement systems 
include ‘Balanced Score Cards’ and ‘Performance Prisms’.
2Performance measurement does though have some acknowledged problems; 
notably the diversion of resources into data collection and measurement as opposed 
to delivery and so called ‘perverse incentives’ where individual or organisational 
behaviour is diverted away from the ultimate objectives of the organisation.
Performance measurement in Public Employment Services
The role of the PES is to facilitate the bringing together of the supply and demand 
for labour, through both ‘passive’ and ‘active’ measures. Research on the use of 
performance measurement in PES suggests that it is widely used but that there 
have been many instances of common problems including perverse incentives 
to encourage ‘creaming and parking’ behaviour where easy to place clients 
are prioritised over those requiring more help and who are arguably a more 
appropriate focus for PES attention. There is also a concern in the literature to 
avoid incentivising PES and their contractors to promote short-term rather than 
long-term outcomes, with some suggesting that longer-term measures of the 
sustainability and/or quality of employment gained as a result of PES interventions 
are needed to address this concern. The last decade has also seen a number of 
different initiatives in Europe to compare performance, for instance through the 
European PES Benchmarking Project. 
Commentary on an international review of  
performance measurement
The review of performance measurement in comparative PES in Europe, North 
America and Australia showed that a wide range of approaches to performance 
measurement are used. The core components of these are set out below in relation 
to input, output, intermediate outcome and final outcome measures.
Input measures relate to the presentation of resource information (e.g. budgets, 
staffing) alongside achieved performance, so as to enable a comparison of the 
relationship between resources and performance. While this is not widespread, 
some countries do adopt these measures and they are incorporated in the European 
PES Benchmarking Project and the European Employment Strategy (EES) approach.
Output measures count the volume and quality of activity and interventions 
undertaken by the PES. Common indicators in PES performance measurement 
systems include:
• vacancy registrations – this commonly refers to the vacancies registered by 
employers with the PES and acts as a measure of the role of the PES in providing 
a passive information-based function in the labour market. Some variants go 
further to identify measures of the quality or type of vacancies that they register;
Summary
3• interventions – interventions related to the more active measures used by PES 
on the supply-side of the labour market, usually (though not exclusively) with 
unemployed job seekers or inactive benefit claimants. These include measures 
of:
– activation interviews;
– referrals to particular employment or support programmes, including training 
and development programmes;
– work trials/intermediate employment programmes;
– individual plan completions setting out mutual expectations, labour market 
aspirations and the support needed to achieve these;
– sanctions – reductions in benefit payments as a result of not actively seeking 
employment;
• penetration measures – these measure interventions in relation to a particular 
group of clients (e.g. the proportion of lone parents who have been provided 
with child care advice);
• process quality measures – these tend to be less numerical and include 
qualitative checks on the quality of interviews undertaken, the plans completed 
for individual job seekers or the use of feedback from customers on the quality 
of service delivery.
Outcome measures can be divided into two categories: Intermediate and Final 
outcomes. Intermediate outcomes measure those effects that result directly from 
the activities of the PES. Final outcome measures incorporate assessments of 
the overall and often long-term desired outcomes of PES activity. Widely used 
intermediate outcomes include:
• general off-flows from benefits – these measures are common and tend just 
to record where individual benefit claimants terminate their claims. A focus only 
on general off-flows can be misleading as the reasons for a claim termination 
include transitions into the informal economy, to another benefit, migration, to 
prison or even death, in addition to employment;
• specific off-flows from benefits – these measures include a consideration of 
the destination of people leaving the unemployment register or benefit claimant 
count. Destinations commonly include some indication that this includes formal 
employment, but might also go further to measure separately different types or 
quality of employment achieved with a view to assessing the quality of outcome 
achieved by PES activity. They also commonly ensure a link back to a particular 
intervention to enable comparison of what sorts of interventions are most 
successful, and in what way, for particular groups of job seekers;
• penetration – penetration measures again focus on the outcomes for specific 
groups of job seekers or inactive claimants;
Summary
4• benefit duration – benefit duration measures focus on how quickly the PES 
is able to help people return to work from unemployment, and are sometimes 
referred to as rapid re-employment targets. In one PES, there is also an indicator 
of how quickly individuals return back to the unemployment system.
Final outcome indicators typically focus on overall objectives, such as increasing 
the employment rate or reducing the rate of claiming particular benefits. They are 
often, though, quite difficult to link back to PES interventions because of the wide 
range of other influences that act on them and therefore, are not often associated 
with a particular target.
Conclusions
The conclusions drawn from the evidence review, consultation and case studies 
suggest that some general principles are important in designing performance 
measurement systems:
• performance measurement should be based on robust data;
• decision-making requires data which is both comprehensive and timely;
• the collection of performance data should be assessed against its relative cost 
and benefit;
• performance measurement needs to avoid generating perverse incentives; 
• the incentive effects of performance measures may vary at different 
organisational levels. 
The review also suggests that performance measurement approaches need to be 
aligned with the predominant approach to management. In organisations and 
systems where there is strong centralised process control, it is appropriate that 
performance measures focus on and set targets for inputs, processes and outputs. 
In organisations and systems where there is more local or operational autonomy 
over processes it is more appropriate to focus performance measures on outcomes. 
In the latter case it may still be appropriate to monitor inputs, processes and 
outputs, in order to learn from successful practice, but targets should be focused 
only on outcomes.
The theoretical literature suggests that performance measures should be organised 
in performance measurement frameworks. These frameworks help to establish 
causal connections between inputs, outputs and outcomes. Some PES use such 
frameworks and the EES has a framework for organising and benchmarking 
performance between PES in Europe. In developing such frameworks it is desirable 
to establish links between inputs and specific types of outputs and outcomes 
in order to learn from practice in relation to what works for particular types of 
jobseeker. The latest thinking suggests that intangible outcomes might also be 
incorporated in approaches to performance measurement. This might be achieved 
by differentiating between ‘intermediate’ and ‘final’ outcomes.
Summary
5Finally, performance measurement data alone can be easy to misunderstand and 
its suitability as the basis for decision-making might be improved by linking it to a 
broader explanatory commentary that can draw on a range of additional evidence 
such as that arising from research and evaluation. Such a commentary might be 
prepared on an annual basis and to link to policy objectives and review periods.
Summary
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1 Introduction
Since its creation in 2002, Jobcentre Plus has been set an annual target for 
helping customers into work. The overall structure of the target, based on an 
explicitly weighted points system, has remained broadly the same each year with 
only minor incremental improvements. However, the measurement regime on 
which the points target is based was changed radically for 2006/07 when the 
Job Entry Target (JET) was replaced with the Job Outcome Target (JOT), which 
makes use of job start data obtained from Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs 
(HMRC), following extensive piloting of the new measure. While the JET was 
seen to provide a strong set of operational incentives, research showed that the 
JOT improved on these, was less costly to administer and recognised that many 
customers are helped into work by Jobcentre Plus ‘self help’ channels such as the 
vacancy search services available through the organisation’s website, telephone 
contact centres and computer terminals in Jobcentre Plus offices (Johnson and 
Nunn, 2005; 2006; Nunn et	al., 2007a). However, more recent research suggests 
that the measurement of job outcomes could be further improved (Adams et	al., 
2008; Anon., 2008) in the future and that improvements of this nature might 
strengthen the ability of managers to use outcome performance information in 
making operational decisions (Nunn et	al., 2007b). 
Jobcentre Plus Performance Measurement and Analysis Division (PMAD) 
commissioned the Policy Research Institute at Leeds Metropolitan University 
to undertake a review of approaches to performance measurement in Public 
Employment Services (PES) around the world. The review is intended to inform 
discussion about the development of performance measurement policy and 
practice in Jobcentre Plus and the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP). 
The review was undertaken between December 2008 and February 2009 and 
included a review of the academic and policy-related literature; an in-depth focus 
on a large number of European and other PES; an online consultation with PES 
officials in Europe; and noted experts and finally a small number of supplementary 
interviews with respondents in relation to five ‘case study’ PES performance 
measurement systems.
8The results of the review are summarised in Chapters 3 to 5. A fuller discussion 
of these findings is given in the Appendices. Chapter 6 provides a summary of 
the discussions in case study PES. Chapter 7 discusses conclusions drawn from 
the review and case studies and makes suggestions for how the performance 
measurement framework for Jobcentre Plus might be developed in the future.
Introduction
92 Methodology
The purpose of the research was to identify what approaches to performance 
measurement are used generally in the public sector and specifically in relation to 
performance measurement around the world. Where possible, evidence on how 
private sector organisations use performance measurement was also sought.
The main aim of this review was to understand existing labour market targets and 
whether these would be appropriate for Jobcentre Plus.
This aim is underpinned by a number of objectives:
• to determine what labour market targets other Public Employment Services 
(PES) use to measure their performance of moving people into work;
• to understand whether other PES use off-flow measures;
• to determine what evidence exists to demonstrate why these targets are used 
in other countries, i.e. how they help move people into work; 
• to investigate whether there are other organisations who have labour market 
targets and what these targets are;
• to understand if there are differences between public, private and voluntary 
sector targets where appropriate.
The research involved two phases of work: The first was concerned with a general 
review of practice elsewhere, based primarily on a literature and practice review, 
and incorporated an open literature search using the following databases:
• the IDOX Information Service;
• Social Science Citation Index;
• International Bibliography of Social Sciences;
• Applied Social Science Indexes and Abstracts;
• Sociological Abstracts;
• British Library Inside;
Methodology
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• the Copac National, Academic, and Specialist Library Catalogue; and
• Internet searches using Google and Google-Scholar.
Search strings were developed to reflect the main themes of employment services, 
performance/targets/benchmarks and systems/strategies/policies. Further strings 
related to specific measures such as off-flows or contexts such as public/private 
sector. These searches helped to identify approximately 2,700 references. These 
were then augmented using ‘snowballing’ techniques; following appropriate 
references in reviewed documents to identify additional sources.
In addition to these open searches, a detailed review of a structured range of 
sources was undertaken in relation to the performance measurement approach 
used in each country in the European Union, similar European countries outside 
of the Union, and other similar non-European countries such as the United States 
of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The sources used to undertake 
this element of the research included:
• European Employment and Lisbon Strategy documents such as National Reform 
Programmes or Joint Employment Reports;
• PES Annual Reports and Performance Reports;
• reviews and publications by organisations like the OECD, European Employment 
Observatory, the European Mutual Learning Network and World Bank;
• other material available on the internet or from the general searches.
To augment the literature review, a rapid online consultation survey was undertaken 
with all Directors of PES in the European PES Directors network and with SYSDEM 
network1 country experts. This consultation was open for one month between 
mid December 2008 and mid January 2009. Despite being in the field for a very 
restricted time period which incorporated Christmas holidays, the survey received 
25 responses from PES Directors (21 completed from 23 countries) and 16 
responses (11 completed) from the SYSDEM network.
Phase 2 of the project involved more in depth research in five case study countries 
which were selected because of a range of factors including labour market or 
institutional similarity to the UK context (now or in relation to current reforms) 
as in the case of Denmark/Germany/Netherlands or because of an apparently 
innovative approach to performance measurement as in the case of Austria/
Switzerland. These case studies included telephone interviews with key individuals 
in the PES and stakeholder communities (e.g. knowledgeable researchers) to 
1 The SYSDEM network is a network of independent labour market experts 
which operates within the European Employment Observatory. Its aim is to 
report on employment and labour market policy developments and statistical 
trends and to provide research and evaluation services to the European 
Commission. More information is available at: http://www.eu-employment-
observatory.net/en/about/abt03_01.htm.
Methodology
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identify in more detail the ways in which performance measurement systems 
operate, how they are underpinned by data systems, the construction of targets, 
how decision making procedures use performance information and any strengths 
and weaknesses of approach. While up to five interviews were attempted in each 
Phase 2 case study, a combination of the timescales involved and respondent 
workloads meant that only single interviews were possible for this phase of the 
work. The interviews were conducted in English and in one of the case studies 
this may have been an additional barrier to participation. The topic guide for these 
interviews is presented in Appendix E. 
This report presents findings from both phases of the project. 
Methodology
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3 Approaches to 
 performance       
 management
3.1 Definitional issues: What is performance 
 measurement?
Performance measurement is closely associated with performance management 
(Audit Commission 2000a: 5) and the central focus of this review is the intersection 
between the two. While performance management might include a range of 
management responsibilities, down to managing the performance of individual 
members of staff through very soft and arbitrary collection of information (such 
as unstructured observed performance in the workplace) (Treasury 2001; Centre 
for Business Performance 2006: 3), the focus here is on the measurement and 
management of whole organisation performance.
Whilst some approaches, such as the DuPont Pyramid2, extend back to the 
development of major modern industrial corporations, performance measurement 
is particularly associated with the notion of Management by Objectives (MBO) 
first put forward by Drucker (1955) in the 1950s. The essence of MBO is that 
senior management set objectives to be measured by quantitative targets, with 
associated performance indicators designed to ensure that these are achieved but 
allow considerable operational flexibility and autonomy over the ways in which 
2 The DuPont Pyramid is a model developed by the DuPont Corporation in 
the early years of the 20th century to organise various aspects of corporate 
financial performance into a hierarchical and complex system of financial 
ratios. While it is recognised as being important in historical terms, it is often 
criticised by modern business commentators for being overly focused on 
retrospective measures of financial performance, encouraging short-termism 
and not offering insight into future trends (Kennerley and Neely, 2001:146).
14 Approaches to performance management
organisational units, teams and individuals attempt to achieve these goals (Mosley 
et	al., 2001:3-4).
There are three distinct ways in which the performance management process can 
be approached (Neely et	al., 1995): First, it can be approached from the perspective 
of individual measures which indicate performance on a single set of criteria, 
often on the basis of product or service quality, time, cost or throughput. Second, 
it can be approached from a more systemic perspective where individual measures 
are placed in some form of analytical framework designed to understand the 
relationship between different types of information. The most famous example 
of this sort of systemic perspective is the widely adopted Balanced Scorecard3 
approach (Kaplan and Norton, 1992). Third, performance measurement can be 
understood from the point of view of how the performance measurement system 
(e.g. a balanced scorecard) interacts with the wider context, whether that be an 
internal organisational context, an external stakeholder or market context. 
3.2 Designing performance measures
There is a variety of guidance and good practice style guides available for 
establishing and designing performance measures and indicators (see, for 
example, Audit Commission, 2000b; 2000a; Kennerley and Mason, 2008). Such 
guides frequently include a large number of criteria which can be used to establish 
robust performance indicators and targets. Typically, these include relevance to 
strategic objectives, clarity of indicators and their definitions to ensure ease of 
use. The Commission also suggests that indicators need to provide timely and 
useable information and avoid several common pitfalls. These include avoiding 
generating perverse incentives and ensuring that indicators provide information 
that is attributable to those who are responsible for the relevant activity. In 
common with others, the Commission also recommends that targets which 
are associated with particular indicators are Specific, Measurable, Achievable, 
Relevant and Time-bound or ‘SMART’ (Audit Commission, 2000a; 2000b). The 
2001 joint Treasury, Cabinet Office, Audit Commission, National Audit Office and 
Office for National Statistics publication, Choosing	 the	Right	 Fabric, suggested 
that performance measures should be relevant, attributable, well-defined, timely, 
reliable, comparable and verifiable (Treasury, 2001).
3 The Balanced Scorecard presents a range of financial and other measures of 
performance in an established four-part framework focusing on customers, 
internal processes, and innovation and learning (Kaplan and Norton, 
1992:72).
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3.3 Performance measurement frameworks and 
 understanding causality
Much of the literature on performance management highlights the importance of 
using performance management and measurement to better understand causal 
chains and linkages (Centre for Business Audit Commission, 2000a; Centre for 
Business Performance, 2006: 11). This has led to the establishment of a variety 
of tailored and ‘off the peg’ frameworks which attempt to structure the process 
of generating an holistic set of performance measures to assess organisational 
performance (Kennerley and Neely, 2001:145-155; Rouse and Putterill, 2003:791-
5). Among these, perhaps the Balanced Scorecard is the most widely publicised, 
though this itself emerged from a critique of earlier attempts at mostly financially-
oriented performance measurement frameworks such as the ‘DuPont Pyramid’ 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1992:71; Kennerley and Neely, 2001:146; Paranjape et	al., 
2006:5). The Balanced Scorecard presents performance information representing 
four dimensions of organisational performance which incorporate financial 
and cost measures but also include a range of additional measures related to 
customers, internal processes and innovation and learning, which are typically 
expressed collectively as four sets of questions (Kaplan and Norton, 1992:72):
• How do customers see us? (Customer perspective).
• What must we excel at? (Internal perspective).
• Can we continue to improve and create value? (Innovation and learning 
perspective).
• How do we look to shareholders? (Financial perspective).
3.4 Problems with the use of performance management 
 and measurement
3.4.1 Perverse Incentives
Bouckaert and Peters (2002) identify a range of perverse incentives that might 
arise from poorly designed performance measurement. Performance measures 
can sometimes generate inappropriate behaviour because of the way that they 
are linked to formal or informal incentive structures (Grizzle, 2002). For instance, 
where capturing performance is dependent on the existence of an intervention, 
individuals and organisations have an incentive to generate unnecessary 
interventions in order to claim performance ‘points’. This was the case in the Job 
Entry Target (JET) system in the UK Public Employment Service (PES), which was 
replaced in April 2006.
The way in which performance measurement is linked to incentive structures can 
produce behavioural results known as ‘creaming’ and ‘parking’. Here incentives 
linked to performance data create a pressure to focus attention on ‘easy wins’ 
while ignoring more challenging and pressing problems. There are noted examples 
16
of this sort of behaviour in PES where incentive structures associated with 
performance measures lead easy to place customers to be the focus of attention 
(i.e. creaming) while more difficult to place customers are effectively ignored (i.e. 
parking) (Bruttel, 2004:16-17; Bruttel, 2005). Creaming and parking are generally 
thought to be more important dangers where contracts with private or other 
providers emphasise payments for results (Struyven and Steurs, 2005).
3.4.2 Costs
Bouckaert and Peters (2002) argue that the costs associated with producing 
performance information are often opaque and are infrequently cited in discussions 
of performance measurement. However, they draw attention to the fact that the 
costs associated with performance measurement are often immediate while the 
benefits of it are reaped only over the longer term and are frequently uncertain or 
unquantifiable in advance.
3.4.3 Negative externalities
Demand for services or outputs are not always determined by levels of supply. 
Performance indicators, targets and incentives may generate supply of services 
above the level of demand, simply resulting in costs associated with producing 
them and with measuring them without any additional benefit arising (Grubb 
2004:363).
3.4.4 Balance and breadth
Neely et	 al., (1997:1113-1135) argue that perverse behaviour is not always 
generated by inappropriate performance indicators but by a lack of forethought 
about the behavioural implications that might result from particular indicators, 
benchmarks or targets. Rather, they argue that it is important to ensure balance 
in the design and range of indicators used and that definitions and methods of 
calculation and levels of target are important in generating specific outcomes.
3.4.5 Joint measures and targets
It is widely noted in the literature that it is often difficult for organisations to develop 
performance measures and targets that apply to more than one organisation 
(Mackie 2008:7). Indeed research with central Government departments has 
indicated that they have found it difficult to negotiate Public Service Agreement 
targets which are contributed to by more than one Government department 
(National Audit Office, 2001:2). 
3.4.6 Poor use of performance information
Other critics suggest simply that one of the pitfalls of performance measurement 
is that its results are inappropriately or insufficiently used in the policy-making, 
implementation and management process. For instance, Hatry (2002) suggests 
that performance information is frequently not well integrated into the decision-
Approaches to performance management
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making and planning process and that management tools are insufficiently used 
or used in a confused manner. 
3.5 The role of performance management in  
 the public sector
It is acknowledged that the role of performance management in the private sector 
differs to that in the public sector where there is no financial bottom line to act 
as an outcome measure (Micheli and Kennerley, 2005:125). In the public sector, 
performance management is linked to the application of new management 
techniques, such as the New Public Management (NPM) (Dunleavy, 1994; OECD, 
1994), which have been widely applied in developed countries over the last two 
or three decades.
In this context, performance management and measurement has been both a 
means of achieving reform and itself an objective of that reform (Osborne and 
Gabler, 1992). The application of the NPM has largely coexisted with attempts by 
the State to reduce its responsibility for the direct provision of public services and 
the increasing reliance, instead, on ensuring that these services are provided by a 
range of arms length agencies and contractors (Sanderson, 2001: 297-9).
3.6 The importance of context in designing 
 performance management systems
The institutional context for performance management of employment services 
is important because it sets the parameters for the design of performance 
management and it also helps to identify and understand the purpose to which 
performance management might be put.
Since 1998, the overall approach has used a number of layers which cascade 
central government policy objectives established as part of the Comprehensive 
Spending Review (CSR) process down to individual Government departments, and 
then from them down to their Departmental Public Bodies, contractors and local 
delivery organisations. Public Service Agreements set out overall Government 
policy objectives which are funded as part of the CSR-Public Service Agreement 
(PSA) process over a three year period. In relation to the Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP), these currently include employment opportunity and well-being 
in later life. The performance management framework used by Jobcentre Plus 
must, therefore, respond to these PSAs. Various guidance documents published 
by central government and its agencies advocate that performance objectives 
starting with PSAs be cascaded not just to organisations but down to individual 
level through individual performance and development appraisals and reviews 
(Treasury, 2001:7).
Approaches to performance management
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A second part of the institutional context relates to the policy approach to service 
delivery. There has been a gradual shift toward increasing the role of the private 
and voluntary sector in delivering employment services in the UK, whether this be 
specific aspects of contracted provision or the more comprehensive approach to 
the use of the private sector in pilot programmes such as Employment Zones or the 
new Flexible New Deal. Importantly, the extent of direct delivery on the one hand 
or contracted delivery on the other will determine the roles to which performance 
management is put. In the case of direct delivery, performance management is 
about an internal management process, whether this be management by control 
or MBO. Different performance management regimes are currently in place for 
Jobcentre Plus and for external providers contracted by DWP, reflecting the different 
relationships between these delivery arms and the Department. It is important to 
note, however, that outcomes from external provision will also be captured by 
Job Outcome Target (JOT). For this reason, and given the Department’s role in 
managing external contracts, accountability for delivering JOT is shared between 
the Department and Jobcentre Plus. It is important to the successful delivery of 
DWP’s welfare to work policies that Jobcentre Plus and external partners and 
providers work effectively together. Any future labour market measures must 
support this. 
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4 Performance       
 measurement and Public 
 Employment Services
4.1 The role of Public Employment Services in the  
 labour market
Public Employment Services (PES) perform several important roles in the labour 
market: First, they help to bring labour supply and demand together through 
registering and advertising vacancies. Second, they tend to adopt progressively 
more ‘active’ strategies to expand effective supply in the form of unemployed 
workers being supported to access job opportunities that would be beyond them 
without the intervention. This can include simply channelling particular individuals 
towards vacancies as well as working with unemployed people more intensively 
to overcome their ‘barriers to work’, including through the purchase of specialist 
help. The adoption of Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) over recent decades 
by PES throughout the world is generally thought to have helped to improve the 
functioning of the labour market. However, estimates of their impact vary widely 
(Boone and Van Ours 2004, Tergeist and Grubb, 2006; Koning, 2007) and it may 
be that they are more effective in the context of increasing economic growth 
rather than recession.
4.2 Cross-country studies of performance measurement 
 in Public Employment Services
There are relatively few cross-national studies of performance measurement in 
PES. Among the most prominent are studies by Mosley and Grubb as well as 
several European benchmarking projects.
Mosley et	al., (2001) undertook a study of all 15 members of the (then) European 
Union and Norway to assess the extent and nature of take-up of Management 
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by Objectives (MBO). The results suggested that take-up of MBO was widespread 
throughout Europe. They also found that prerequisites for successful MBO included 
a strong level of senior management and political commitment and some degree 
of relative organisational autonomy of the PES from political control. Examples 
of problems caused by a lack of this autonomy included the British case study 
where frequent introduction of new initiatives outside the performance planning 
cycle hampered the success achieved by MBO. The study also found that MBO is 
not easily compatible with strong centralised controls. The study suggests that 
MBO needs to be consistent with the overall management approach and that 
attention needs to be given to ensuring appropriate design, taking account of the 
costs of data collection and the timescales associated with delivery, measurement 
and feedback. They also suggest that quantitative assessment through numerical 
targets needs to be mixed with qualitative assessments and evaluation.
Grubb (2004) presents a detailed analysis of a variety of different approaches 
and places emphasis on four main possible institutional settings including: (1) 
traditional hierarchical management using centralised command and control with 
in-house service delivery; (2) continuous recontracting with competing providers, 
including potentially arms-length public service delivery and where payments are 
set over the lifetime of a contract; (3) payment for results where payments are 
determined by levels of performance (volume and quality) over the course of the 
contract; (4) purchase of services directly by clients who exercise market choice.
Grubb pays particular attention to the role of marrying outcome performance 
indicators to social welfare. However, he is critical of both placements (e.g. off-flows 
from benefits where there is some evidence of a PES interaction) and employment 
spell data (e.g. average time on benefits) because, he argues, they both create 
perverse incentives, either to generate short-term placements into employment or 
for ‘creaming’ and ‘parking’ behaviour. Even attempts to control for this through 
using job sustainability indicators, for example, can be problematic and are often 
set rather arbitrarily. In response to this he suggests the use of long-term outcome 
indicators such as achieved per-hour income over a period of up to five years is 
a better measure of the social and private welfare attributable to PES/contractor 
interventions. He also suggests that this helps to ensure that interventions are 
tailored toward more long-term rather than short-term outcomes. Finally, Grubb 
also argues against the use of weights in performance measures to prioritise 
particular social groups in service delivery. This, Grubb argues, is because there 
are already in-built incentives into payment for results type structures which result 
from the fact that easy to place clients will flow into the labour market in any 
event, leaving the variable element of performance to be determined by those 
that need assistance to move into work. 
However, Grubb’s arguments in relation to different priority groups are in 
contradiction with widely shared assumptions about performance measurement 
and payment structures, even where disproportionate rewards are applied to those 
who genuinely need additional help (for e.g. see Bruttel, 2004; 2005; Struyven 
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and Steurs, 2005). Indeed, some private contractors have adopted the practice 
of passing structured incentives on to clients in order to reward them for finding 
work unassisted where this is possible (Bruttel, 2005:397).
The European PES Benchmarking programme has incorporated several projects 
partners (Lehner et	 al., 2005; Synthesis Forschung and OSB Consulting 2005; 
2007) in which research has been used to identify and refine a list of benchmark 
indicators on which participating PES can be measured. These include measures 
such as off-flows, benefit duration, the influence of interventions on achieving 
off-flows from benefits and indicators related to the job mobility in potential 
redundancy situations (OSB Consulting and Synthesis Forschung, 2007). The 
benchmark list also includes both internal and external contextual indicators such 
as inputs and labour market indicators to allow the adjustment of benchmark 
output and outcome performance (Synthesis Forschung and OSB Consulting 2008).
The PES benchmarking project is also linked to the European Employment Strategy 
(EES) Indicators which have been under continual development since 2002 to fit 
the changing requirements of the EES. The EES indicators consist of a wide range 
of final outcome indicators concerned with wider labour market trends and direct 
PES activity, including measures which incorporate output and outcome indicators 
in relation to specific interventions and activities. Other measures incorporate input 
indicators such as PES staff numbers. The measures also incorporate indicators of 
the quality of employment such as off-flows to work into different pay bands or 
contract types (European Commission, 2007b; 2008b). 
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5 Commentary on an    
 international review of  
 performance 
 management systems
5.1 Overview of performance measurement approach
While the nature of the consultation does not lend itself to presentation in 
numerical survey form, it is nonetheless worthwhile discussing an overview of the 
general findings from the exercise. The Public Employment Services (PES) from 
the following 20 countries responded to the consultation, with some of them 
responding twice:
1 Portugal;
2 Spain;
3 Romania;
4 Turkey;
5 Sweden;
6 Cyprus;
7 Switzerland;
8 Finland;
9 Denmark;
10 Germany; 
11 Belgium;
12 Malta;
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13 Estonia;
14 Slovenia;
15 Ireland;
16 Czech Republic;
17 Austria;
18 Luxembourg;
19 Norway;
20 Iceland.
Most but not all responding organisations use some form of headline performance 
indicator. Those that do, see the primary function of this as being simply to measure 
organisational performance and to manage organisational activities. Other uses 
for performance information, such as to provide information to politicians or 
Government, were also seen as important, while providing information to the 
public, managing contractor performance or following labour market trends were 
seen as less important.
Those that do have headline performance measurement indicators tend also to 
have some form of target associated with this. These take a number of forms but 
the most frequently cited type of indicator used relates to outputs rather than 
inputs or outcomes. Nevertheless, around half of those that suggested that they 
have a headline indicator had outcome indicators, with slightly more of these 
having a levels-type off-flow measure than a duration on employment measure. 
The nature of both these types of indicator vary widely though. In some cases, 
for instance, off-flow levels are measured as a proportion of another indicator 
such as the overall unemployed stock or the particular segment of it. In relation 
to benefits-duration indicators and targets some are simple averages while others 
are specified for particular customer segments and are again proportional (see 
Section 5.3 for more details of types of outcome indicator used). The types of 
output indicator cited also vary widely but tend to count the proportion of the 
unemployed stock or particular proportions of it that have received various types 
of activation intervention or training.
Respondents were asked a series of questions about the strengths and weaknesses 
of the performance measurement systems that they use and detailed information 
about what features of the performance measurement system led them to be 
effective or ineffective was also asked for. These questions revealed several 
common themes. Where strengths were identified these tended to relate to the 
integration of performance indicators with organisational strategic objectives 
and clear political goals. Strategic fit with contextual features such as labour 
market context were also mentioned, as was the maintenance of a balanced set 
of indicators reflecting the full range of organisational goals. Finally, the ability 
to compare performance between organisational units (for example, on a sub-
national basis) was also raised as a strength where it was present.
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Where respondents identified weaknesses in the performance measurement 
approach used these were overwhelmingly related to the difficulty of attribution 
of trends in the data to organisational activity rather than a range of alternative 
labour market trends. A failure to reflect workload pressure and the administrative 
burden created by performance measurement were also raised. 
5.2 Output measures
5.2.1 Types of output measure
The evidence reviewed and responses to our consultation suggested that it is 
possible to group the types of output measures used in six broad categories.
Vacancy	registration
Vacancy registration may have declined in importance in the portfolio of PES roles 
as they first have taken up a greater focus on activation and second, since the 
advent of the internet and introduction of private free-to-use vacancy registration 
services. Nevertheless, most PES continue to register and advertise vacancies as 
part of a job broking and matching service. The review also suggests that a wide 
number of PES continue to see this as an important part of their role that needs 
to be subject to performance measurement. Vacancy registration in some form is 
therefore a prominent output measure (Cyprus: p84; Estonia: p92; France: p97; 
Lithuania: p112; Portugal: p120). Austria (see p79), Belgium (p82) and Hungary 
(p104) go further than simply measuring the number of vacancies and use 
indicators of the relative quality of vacancies, with these structured according 
to skills level required in the case of Austria and indicators of permanency in the 
latter two.
Activation	interviews	completed
Several PES appear to measure outputs in relation to the number of ‘interviews’ 
completed with beneficiaries overall and particular groups of beneficiaries (France: 
p97; Ireland: p108; Norway: p132). While the nature of the interviews completed 
is not entirely clear, the prominence of such interventions in the performance 
regime suggests that these can be regarded as ‘activation’ interviews similar to 
the Work Focused Interview (WFI) interview in the UK where the emphasis is on 
job search coaching, confidence building and the promotion of active job search, 
for instance through the provision of Better off in Work Calculations. In Norway 
a target is established for this indicator and in France the measure is an ongoing 
one of whether these are undertaken on a monthly basis.
The measurement of such interviews helps to establish a number of reference 
points for management interpretation of performance. To the extent that such 
interviews are regarded as important in ensuring and promoting active job 
search and transitions into employment and they are the subject of substantial 
organisational investment then their measurement is a central indicator of whether 
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the organisation is undertaking the work activity required of it. To the extent that 
this data can be linked to sub-national off-flow or other outcome data, then it 
may be reasoned that causal assumptions of what types and volumes of activity 
help to generate desirable outcomes. Measurement of such interventions can also 
serve as an indicator of workload pressure on the organisation and therefore may 
provide contextual information which might help to accurately interpret outcome 
trends. In Great Britain, the Interventions Delivery Target (IDT) is intended to work 
in conjunction with Job Outcome Target (JOT), with the former measuring the 
timeliness of work-focused interventions and the latter providing a form of quality 
check of the effectiveness of those interventions. However, with other exogenous 
factors influencing the level of job outcomes that flow from interventions, 
there is a need to support this model with other ways of measuring quality and 
effectiveness.
Referrals	to	training/activation	provision	or	other	support
Referrals to training, external provision or other support to overcome barriers 
to work is a central aspect of active labour market programmes (ALMPs). It is, 
therefore, unsurprising that many PES measure this activity as an output indicator. 
These include Belgium (LeForem) (p82); Czech-Republic (p87); Denmark (90) 
Estonia (p92); Germany (p100); Hungary (p104); Ireland (p108); Lithuania (p112); 
Norway (p132); Portugal (p120); Slovenia (p126); Sweden (p130). In some cases 
these include a rapidity indicator (e.g. Sweden) and in other cases they are specified 
to particular benefit groups (as in the case of Norway and several indicators and 
targets related to interventions for lone parents). In several of these cases there is 
also a differentiation between different types of ALMP referral.
Referral to programmes is a useful indicator for many of the same reasons as 
interview completion – it helps to understand the volume and nature of activity 
and support being provided to job seekers. It also helps to contextualise off-flows 
and specifically off-flows after particular types of interventions and, where it is 
possible to combine this information with off-flow indicators and to disaggregate 
this information between different types of programme then this can help to 
understand the different success rates of different types of intervention. Again 
though, volume measures don’t provide a complete picture and the quality of 
referrals plays an important part in the success of the process and the different 
programmes and interventions.
Penetration	measures
In some cases referrals to provision or other types of intervention were measured 
as a proportion of some other population or over a particular time period to 
constitute a penetration indicator. 
Individual	plan	completion
Several PES use output performance measures related to the completion or 
processing of individual statements/plans: Though the precise nature of these were 
not clear they appeared to take two forms. The first was a portfolio of information 
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which appeared to relate to either benefit claim processing or referral to private 
sector provision (e.g. in the Netherlands). In other places this appeared to be 
similar to Jobseekers Agreements (JSAg) which set out work-related aspirations 
and planned activity and support that job seekers will take/require in order to fulfil 
these (as in Portugal: p120; Slovenia: p126; Spain: p129; Sweden: p130). Again, 
like referrals and interviews, where individual action plans are part of the package 
of ALMP interventions assumed to make a difference there is some rationale for 
monitoring data on their timely completion.
Placement	into	work	trials	or	subsidised	employment
In three countries placements into work trials or subsidised employment appear 
to be monitored as performance indicators in a similar way to referrals to training 
and external provision (Estonia: p92; Slovenia: p126; US: p140). What is important 
to note in both of these cases is that these indicators are both used as part of a 
package of other indicators.
Sanctions
Despite many of the PES in our review apparently applying more rigorous 
expectations of benefit recipients and a more activation-oriented approach with 
sanctions and conditionality, only Slovenia appeared to be tracking sanctions as a 
performance indicator. 
Process	quality	measures
Several countries match output measures with more qualitative measures of 
process quality. These are presented here under output measures as they are 
closely related to outputs. For instance in some PES (e.g. Netherlands: p116) 
process quality measures are directly related to output measures such as the 
comprehensive completion/quality of individual dossier/plans or the timeliness of 
the delivery of key interventions as discussed above. A further category of process 
quality measures relates to ‘customer feedback’, whether this be from individual 
job seekers/benefit recipients or from employers, usually gathered in survey form 
(Netherlands: p116; Sweden: p130; US: p140), though in at least one case this is 
matched with a system of quality standards (Norway: p132).
5.3 Types of outcome measure
5.3.1 Final outcome measure
Final outcome measures are distinguishable from intermediate outcome measures 
because they relate to final social conditions which organisational activities aim to 
influence. In this instance the relevant social indicators relate to the static (stocks) and 
dynamic (flows) performance of the labour market. Example indicators therefore 
include the overall rate of employment and unemployment, the employment rate 
for particular groups in the population and potentially other broader economic 
indicators which are related to labour market performance such as productivity.
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Many PES track some form of final outcome indicator, though this is often reported 
in high level strategies (for instance long-term economic or labour market plans 
or documents required under the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) in the 
European Union Lisbon Strategy process such as National Reform Programme 
documents). In these instances it is not clear what managerial or operational 
use is made of performance data against these indicators. So for instance, the 
consultation response from the Estonian PES was that the organisation does not 
use headline performance indicators but the organisation’s annual report does 
offer a qualitative narrative on performance which draws on general labour 
market information such as the employment and unemployment rate and this 
information is also broken down for specific target groups (see p92). In other PES 
this information is turned round in monitoring the employment position of specific 
groups – i.e. a commentary and supporting data is produced on the position of 
specific social groups, including the use of employment/unemployment data. An 
example here is the Polish PES which also reports on productivity through an 
indicator on GDP per capita. The Polish PES is also an example where specific 
targets are used in relation to final outcome indicators, for instance in the form of 
a target for quarterly employment rates (see p119).
5.3.2 Intermediate outcome measure
Again, the PES included in the review used a very wide range of different types of 
intermediate outcome indicator. These are categorised below under the following 
five headings, but even when grouped in this way it should be noted that there 
are differences in the construction, expression and calculation of the measures. In 
the discussion below examples are given. However, these are illustrative and do 
not necessarily represent an exhaustive list of all those PES where these types of 
measures are used.
General	off-flow	measures
General off-flow measures focus on the numbers of people who move out of 
unemployment into some other employment status. While it is not always clear 
from published documentary evidence, some of these measures appear to be 
constructed with a specific destination built into them (e.g. employment) while 
others do not and simply leaving the unemployment/benefits register is enough 
to count as an off-flow (e.g. in some cases in the Netherlands: p116; Portugal, 
p120). It is clearly desirable in these kinds of measures to build in a defined 
destination as off-flows to destinations other than employment may have very 
different social outcomes or interpretations associated with them. For instance, 
reasons other than employment for moving out of unemployment include death, 
migration, movement between benefit status (i.e. to another benefit) or into the 
informal and unregulated economy. From the perspective of PES none of these are 
desirable outcomes. Examples where employment is prescribed as a destination 
include Austria where comments from the PES respondent to our consultation 
stressed the importance of this.
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Specific	off-flow	measures
More specific off-flow measures include those where particular types of off-flow 
are specified in the measure. Again, though, the nature of these varies widely. 
One way of specifying the types of off-flow to be measured and therefore to be 
promoted in PES activity/behaviour, is in relation to specific target groups among 
the unemployed stock as is the case in many European countries.
A second means of specifying particular types of off-flow is in relation to whether 
those moving into employment have received some form of intervention. Such 
measures are preferable to general off-flow indicators because they more accurately 
measure the direct contribution of the PES to labour market trends, though there 
is scope to argue that PES activities contribute to off-flows even where there is 
no direct intervention (see p69). Off-flow measures which specify an intervention 
are widespread and include a wide range of different types of interventions from 
submission activity (e.g. France: p97; Ireland: p108; US: p140) to those which 
specify other interventions such as activation measures, training or other support 
(e.g. Austria: p79; Belgium: p82; Denmark: p90; Germany: p100; Hungary: p104; 
Ireland: p108). Again, assuming that the quality of the data collected against 
these measures is robust, consistent and comprehensive, the more detail that 
can be provided in relation to the type of intervention that is specified the better. 
This is because analysis of such data can begin to address more complicated and 
useful performance-related evaluative questions about what type of interventions 
appear to be successful in specific contexts, and ideally in relation to specific 
groups (for instance by specifying both the type of intervention and the particular 
group of unemployed to which beneficiaries belong). Specificity in the definitions 
being used in these respects is particularly important when comparing between 
different organisational units sub-nationally (i.e. regions or local offices) and 
when attempting to compare or benchmark performance internationally, as in 
the PES Benchmarking Project and the comparative performance indicators in the 
European Employment Strategy (EES). It would also enable national managers to 
pinpoint apparent good and bad practice in order that the precise causal dynamics 
and their transferability can be explored in further detail.
Other means of specifying particular types of off-flow relate to indicators of the 
quality of employment that the previously unemployed are moving into. While 
these types of indicator are less common, where they are used they tend to focus 
on the duration of employment, with this most usually being expressed as a 
threshold such as three, six or 12 months. Such measures are used, for example 
in France (p97), New Zealand (p142), Australia (p144) and in Employment Zones 
in the UK. 
Such measures are useful because they help to overcome perverse incentives or 
negative impacts that might be induced by other types of off-flow measures. For 
instance, where off-flow measures induce PES activity related to volume placements, 
it may be that this activity does not lead to desired aggregate or individual social 
outcomes such as higher or better quality employment or enhanced economic 
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output and competitiveness over the long-term or well-being for the individual 
concerned. This is because volume placements into work might have deadweight, 
substitution and replacement effects or because they may deter employers from 
improving the quality of employment to retain staff because they know that there 
is a ready supply of replacement labour from the PES (especially where activation 
measures are mixed with conditionality and sanction). This, then, may hamper 
productivity and competitiveness because employers have no incentive to invest 
in improvements to process, capital or skills. It may hamper the widely promoted 
social, economic and well-being effects of employment because of low wages 
and/or poor terms and conditions. However, measures of sustainability which 
involve simple threshold indicators have been criticised as unsophisticated and 
arbitrary, thereby not being a reliable marker of quality (Grubb, 2004). Interestingly, 
in some evaluations of ALMP programmes in the US longer-term measures of 
quality such as income are used instead, though the evidence collected on the 
US suggests that these may also have proven problematic (see US; p140). While it 
may prove difficult, it may be that this would be possible using data sources such 
as the DataWarehouse in Austria or the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study 
(WPLS) in the UK. Concerns regarding the quality of data and the integration 
of subsidiary-datasets in these aggregate databases may mean that this is not 
currently technically feasible but it may be desirable as a longer-term objective 
when these problems are addressed.
Further indicators of the quality of employment are used in other countries as 
specific elements in off-flow measures. For instance, in Lithuania, some off-
flow measures are associated with specific types of contractual destination (e.g. 
permanent and temporary employment, p112).
Finally, off-flow measures are sometimes associated with target levels of expected 
performance and sometimes targets are not used. However, this is difficult to 
assess accurately from published data and from consultation responses. The 
consultation responses were sometimes unclear on this issue and published data 
does not always include details of targets, even where there is evidence that these 
are used. For instance, one expert respondent to the consultation suggested that 
they were aware that the PES set specific targets but these were never published or 
released to an external audience. This may therefore be the case elsewhere where 
this information was difficult to access and may be the product of a concern not 
to release details which may in the future appear to show poor organisational 
performance. Examples of where explicit targets are evident include Finland (see 
p94), Norway (p132), New Zealand (p142) and Australia (p144).
Penetration	measures
Other types of intermediate outcome indicators include measures which are 
expressed in some way as a penetration indicator. These include, for instance, 
off-flow measures expressed as a proportion of a specific stock population. 
These include off-flows as a proportion of overall registered unemployment (as 
in Estonia: see p92) or the proportion of off-flows from all those receiving a 
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particular intervention (as in Finland: p944) or the proportion of vacancies in the 
open market filled through the activities of the PES (Greece: p104). The advantage 
of such penetration measures is that they indicate the relative success of activity. 
However, depending on external labour market conditions, there may be reason 
to think that they unhelpfully express this. For instance, in a context of labour 
market contraction use of such an indicator over time or between places where 
the impacts of this are felt unequally, may suggest declining performance, where 
this is not necessarily the case. In addition, measures like those used in Greece 
may incentivise deadweight, substitution and replacement.
Benefit	duration	measures
Benefit duration measures help to understand the impact of PES activities, 
overcoming one of the problems identified with the current off-flow level target as 
it operates in the UK (Anon., 2008) that performance returns to trend regardless 
of how successful interventions are because most of the unemployed flow off 
benefits at some point with or without an intervention. Benefit duration measures 
therefore help to understand the impact of PES interventions on how quickly off-
flows happen. Several countries use these kind of measures (e.g. Denmark: p90; 
Estonia: p92; France: p97; Germany, p100 Netherlands: p116; Lithuania p112; 
Sweden: p130), with some of them referring to them as the ‘re-employment rate’. 
As with off-flow sustainability measures, these tend to be expressed in the form 
of thresholds (e.g. Netherlands; Sweden) but there are also cases where they are 
expressed as averages (Lithuania), including with targets (Denmark) and expressed in 
relation to interventions (Finland). In Switzerland rapid reemployment (measured as 
mean average) counts as a heavily weighted component of the econometric model 
used to assess performance (p134) and measures of transitions into longer-term 
unemployment is another component in the model. Switzerland is also interesting 
because the model contains a further measure which relates to benefit reclaim, 
which is a reversal of the sustainability element attached to some off-flow measures. 
The main benefit of these types of measure other than the issues raised above, 
is in relation to their connection to a major documented cause of longer-term 
unemployment. There is considerable evidence to suggest that periods and more 
importantly duration of unemployment has a ‘scarring’ effect on individuals and 
effects their long-term employment prospects in terms of likelihood of being in 
employment and quality of employment (for example, see Arulampalam et	al., 
2000; Manning, 2000; Arulampalam, 2001; Gregg, 2001; Hogarth and Wilson, 2003).
4 Though it needs to be noted that Estonia’s consultation response suggested 
that no indicators are used and this evidence was drawn from the PES 
annual report which may be produced more for external consumption than 
for management purposes.
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Vacancy	outcome	measures
A number of PES appear to use information which combine outcomes in relation 
to both job seekers and employers. These tend to focus on vacancy-related 
outcomes and are constructed in a number of different ways. For instance, they 
are sometimes expressed as simple numbers of vacancies with proportions of these 
that are filled (e.g. Ireland: p108; France: p97; Germany: p100). In other cases they 
are expressed as the time taken to fill vacancies either as a threshold (France) or 
as an average (Hungary: p104) sometimes with targets attached (Finland, p94). In 
Sweden this is expressed differently again as an indicator of volumes of applicants 
for a vacancy which is sufficient to fill it (suggesting that it may not matter if the 
employer does not fill it). The Swedish case here raises an important issue related 
to skills and suitability of job seekers for available vacancies which has been an 
important issue in many Western European countries, including the UK, over the 
last decade where there have been cases of high labour market demand and 
unfilled vacancies coexisting with long-term unemployment and worklessness.5 
Hybrid	measures
In addition there are several measures used which amount to hybrids of several 
of the intermediate outcome measures described above. For instance, in Sweden 
one performance measure uses a complex calculation of the number of long-term 
unemployed divided by the number of completed months of the year set against 
a target of the average monthly number of long-term unemployed to be below 
50,000 (p130).
5.4 Use of performance information and frameworks
5.4.1 Hierarchical management and autonomy
Several PES operate with very different management arrangements to those used 
in Jobcentre Plus which is highly centralised and utilises top down management 
techniques with a mixture of outcome performance targeting in addition to quite 
rigid process guidelines and controls. At least part of this is the result of the highly 
centralised nature of the UK state. By contrast, and especially in those countries 
with Federal systems, some other PES operate with much more local and regional 
autonomy, with some able to set their own performance measurement regimes 
locally or in negotiation with central agencies and ministries (for example, Belgium: 
p82; Czech Republic: p87; Denmark: p90; Finland: p94; Germany: p100; Italy: 
p110; Portugal: p120; Spain: p110; Canada: p136; US: p140).
5 There are several explanations for this which focus on area-based effects 
(Ellen and Turner, 1997; Atkinson and Kintrea, 2001; Buck, 2001), spatial 
mismatches (Houston, 2005) and skills mismatches (Berthoud, 2003; 
Sanderson, 2007) as well as employer discrimination.
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In both cases, however, there is merit to the maintenance of national performance 
measurement datasets. This is because this would allow comparison of managerial 
approaches between territorial/managerial/governance units to address central 
policy-evidence questions such as ‘what works for whom in what circumstances?’. 
While evidence-based-policy making has made much ground over the last decade 
and a half and certainly there has been considerable investment in research into 
‘what works’ in the delivery and construction of ALMPs, the vast majority of 
this was undertaken at a time of an expanding economy. Previous research on 
unemployment in the last major recession was largely grounded in alternative 
economic policies connected to industrial decline. As such there is a need to 
map contemporary performance measurement into evaluative research to better 
understand what works in changed economic and institutional circumstances. Such 
issues are central to the design of new performance measurement frameworks at 
national level and whether they will continue to be matched to the application of 
rigid process controls. 
5.4.2 Performance measurement frameworks and  
 qualitative assessment
Several countries apply qualitative or interpretative frameworks for the analysis 
of performance information. For instance, in both the Netherlands (p116) and 
Norway (p132), performance information is interpreted via a Balanced Scorecard-
type approach. In Finland (p94) an alternative approach, based on the Performance 
Prism, is used alongside a ‘value driving scorecard’. In other countries (Denmark: 
p90; Estonia: p92; Ireland: p108; Sweden: p130) performance information of both 
a quantitative and qualitative nature is integrated in a more qualitative narrative 
explanation of performance. In Sweden for instance, in the past performance 
has been addressed through ‘County exams’ whereby national and municipal 
authorities assessed performance and developed future plans. In Ireland the 
annual report sets out a case against an over-reliance on quantitative information 
and expresses a preference for, and plan to increasingly use, more qualitative 
information, including customer and stakeholder feedback. In Denmark annual 
performance reviews are undertaken for each jobcentre with input from different 
national and regional state agencies in addition to trade unions and the business 
community. These reviews are then used to formulate annual plans. In Canada 
(see p136), performance reporting is much more qualitatively based with an 
emphasis on both formative and summative evaluation based at sub-national 
level, but incorporating a set list of issues agreed nationally. In Switzerland (p134) 
a variety of information related to return to employment rates, prevention of 
transitions to long-term unemployment and the prevention of re-claiming are 
fed into a complex econometric model alongside a range of contextual data to 
produce locally adjusted performance measures and targets. In Australia a system 
of star ratings, based on outcome performance data, is used to represent the 
quality of external provider services as a means of strengthening incentive effects 
of consumer choice within the quasi-market system.
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5.5 Addressing customer segmentation
As Table 5.1 shows, most PES in the review segment customers into different 
and priority groups. Some of these priorities then become reflected in specific 
targets. For instance, it is common for PES to set specific output or intermediate 
outcome targets for particular priority groups. Austria has a number of measures 
and targets set around age, gender and short- and long-term unemployment. This 
sort of approach is typical though there appear to be few other countries that 
follow the UK example of setting explicit weights for off-flows of specific groups.
In some countries more complex approaches are used to group customers. For 
example, in Germany, Australia and the Netherlands complex profiling systems are 
used to classify customers on initial registration. In Germany, four classifications 
are used (Tergeist and Grubb, 2006: 24):
• ‘market clients’ who need no support since they are expected to find a new 
job rapidly; 
• those who need support with motivation and job-search strategies; 
• those with skills deficits or other obstacles that need specific measures; and 
• clients who are not considered placeable within the next 12 months.
In the Netherlands, a similar approach is used, with job seekers placed in one 
of four ‘phases’ which are associated with an estimation of the time period in 
which job seekers are likely to find work (Tergeist and Grubb, 2006: 24). These 
classifications involve customers being placed in specific groups which have access 
to differential services. It is noticeable that this sort of approach gains sophistication 
in contracted-out quasi-market systems as a means of channelling job seekers to 
the most appropriate provider. In these cases additional payments are provided in 
relation to the placement of the hardest-to-help customers into employment.
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6 Case study Public 
 Employment Services
The case studies in this chapter augment the detailed information presented in 
Appendix C. The case study interviews explored the following additional themes, 
typically through a single interview with an expert or PES official:
• selection and prioritisation of customers;
• data collection methods;
• data analysis and interpretation;
• commissioning of services from external providers.
6.1 case study summaries
Denmark
All aspects of performance, employment measures, and benefit-related 
data are supported through the use of the official web portal, jobindsats.
dk (Hendeliowitz, 2008). Individual jobcentre advisers are responsible for 
inputting relevant standardised customer data into the portal. This information 
can include: an up-to-date CV; information relating to income; details of any 
job seekers ‘agreement’; and any information relating to previous measures 
undertaken or measures needed to help the customer move into, or nearer, 
the labour market. Jobindsats also carries information collected by employers 
on a customer’s previous employment history. 
Individual jobcentres can also use the instructions available via jobindsats.dk 
relating to the preparation of their relevant annual Performance Audit. The 
three employment policy priorities against which each jobcentre must improve 
its performance relate to: the reduction in number of customers unemployed 
for more than three continuous months; an increase in the number of
Continued
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customers from ‘vulnerable groups’ being referred to the ‘New Chance for 
All’ programme; and a reduction in the number of benefit claimants aged 
under 30 (measured by outflows from unemployment). Individual jobcentre 
performance is benchmarked at the regional level.
This customer information is input via a standardised portal ‘form’ and is 
combined with all other information relating to the customer held by jobindsats.
dk. Denmark’s Ministry of Employment is able to take advantage of legislation 
that allows for an administrative combination of different official databases 
(however, the Ministry of Employment is answerable to Denmark’s National 
Registry Authority in respect to the access, use, and purpose of this information). 
In this way, the PES is able to track an individual customer thoroughly – including 
information relating to the amount of resource committed to a customer by 
the relevant municipality in respect to benefits payments, training, or other 
measures. The ability to access comprehensive data relating to an individual 
customer also enables the four Danish Employment Regions to determine the 
performance of a particular jobcentre.
Moreover, utilising Jobindsats ensures that jobcentre staff have no need to 
chase performance, as all relevant data can be gleaned from the portal’s 
access to combined official databases. However, although the system allows 
for determining performance to individual adviser level, this is not currently 
part of the formal performance management process. Individual jobcentres are 
increasingly requesting performance data disaggregated down to adviser level.
All four Employment Regions have reported confidence in jobindsats data 
collection and availability, which has enabled them to gain a detailed 
picture of the relative performance of individual jobcentres for the purpose 
of benchmarking. The Ministry of Employment has also been pleased that 
hitherto political disagreements or issues relating to the reliability of data 
relating to both regional and national performance have all but disappeared. 
All relevant parties acknowledge the comprehensive nature and accuracy of 
the date available from jobindsats.
The Ministry and the Employment Regions have also found that the reliable 
nature of the performance data held by jobindsats has improved both 
the relationships they have with individual jobcentres, and the general 
management process. Subsequently, there is now little disagreement 
concerning the accuracy or interpretation of performance-related data during 
discussions with the jobcentres. The reliability of the data also ensures that 
jobcentres are almost always well prepared when meeting with their relevant 
Employment Region.
Continued
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All individual jobcentre performance information, as well as regional and 
national performance data, is made publicly available via the Ministry of 
Employment websites. As jobcentre performance is benchmarked at the 
regional level, this has resulted in various media reports concerning the 
performance of certain jobcentres compared to others. However, the Ministry 
of Employment has found that the process of gathering and retrieving the 
data from each separate database for the purpose of inclusion into jobindsats 
can be adversely affected by delays in the updating of data in some databases 
held by other state agencies. Indeed, following recent discussions with 
jobcentres relating to recent labour market developments and performance, 
the Employment Regions discovered that delays in necessary data being made 
available to jobindsats necessitated a further round of discussions because 
when the updated information became available to the portal, it revealed 
important developments.
Accurate collection and inputting of performance-related data to jobindsats 
is tied to the payment structure detailed in the contracting and re-contracting 
procedures with providers. As each provider is contractually required to input 
all relevant customer and activity data directly into jobindsats, jobcentres and 
the Employment Regions can see the details of measures offered to each 
referred customer, as well as the progress of each customer whilst registered 
with the provider. The key informant interviewed for this study believes that 
as the data input by providers can be viewed and assessed on a monthly 
basis, this has been a significant contributory factor in the tangible reduction 
in cases of ‘creaming’ or ‘parking’ of customers by providers.
 
Netherlands
The Dutch PES, the Central Organisation for Work and Income (CWI), is a 
public statutory organisation which delivers services related to work and 
income. The CWI system includes the employee insurance agency (UWV) 
and the municipalities (a large spectrum). The tasks of CWI are: registration 
of (non-working) job seekers and their profiling; increasing labour market 
transparency by providing information to job seekers and employers and job 
mediation. Further, CWI checks the entitlement of clients to an unemployment 
or social assistance benefit and refers them to the appropriate benefit agency 
(the Social Security Agency or municipalities).
CWI now differentiates between two broad groups of job seekers: those who 
are capable of finding a job (with some assistance) and those who cannot. 
Current policy in relation to job seekers is based on the tenet that they 
are responsible for their own future. CWI and the other support agencies 
and services are designed to help the jobseeker meet their particular needs 
– albeit under the general legislative framework relating to citizens’ rights  
and responsibilities. 
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CWI draws up a jobseeker’s agreement with each customer shortly after the 
first claim stage. This agreement details the industry or job sought by the 
customer and also includes details of what CWI (and other services) can offer 
in relation to securing the preferred job. The agreement is then reviewed 
after three months and if the jobseeker is still unemployed, the measures to 
be taken or support offered can be altered. The customer must be prepared 
to undertake more intensive assistance and measures should their spell of 
unemployment continue and, under a new piece of legislation just enacted, 
if that period extends to one year the jobseeker must accept any reasonable 
job offer. This new legislation came into effect on 1 July 2009.
CWI has also developed particular job seeking services (and performance 
targets) relating to certain priority groups – namely, young people, older 
job seekers, and long-term asylum seekers granted leave to stay in the 
Netherlands. In respect of older job seekers, recent targets have been set to 
move an additional 30,000 into work. This has led to the establishment of 
dedicated ‘job coaches’ at CWI.
Individual job coaches can input administrative data in relation to an individual 
jobseeker into a central database. This database holds benefit registration 
data as well as information relating to the jobseeker’s agreement and the 
types of services being accessed by the jobseeker, and is based on CWI’s 
administrative systems.
Collected customer data can be disaggregated down to individual job coach 
level, and then to office, regional- and national-level. The balance scorecard 
system is composed of the key performance indicators and was until 
recently monitored fortnightly by the CWI Board of Directors. CWI operates 
a transparent scorecard system where Management Information (MI) is 
available to all relevant and authorised personnel. It is the figures relating 
to the scorecard that form the basis of analysis by the CWI Planning Control 
Department.
Currently, the internal control and check system relating to the input of 
customer-related data is a cause for concern for CWI. Indeed, they have made 
enquiries as to whether they could establish an integrated database (or data 
‘warehouse’) with related agencies. It is hoped that the recent amalgamation 
with UWV will provide the opportunity to establish such a data warehouse.
At CWI, performance management is strongly focused on outflow of benefit 
claimants. Outflow of other job seekers is not a part of the performance 
measurement system. With regard to prevention, only outflow before transfer 
of the completed benefit dossier to UWV and the relevant municipal body is 
measured. In respect of those job seekers for whom a completed benefit 
dossier has been handed to UWV and the responsible municipal body, CWI 
measures outflow before these job seekers reach the threshold of six months 
registered. Outflow from the registration is thus measured. Outflow in the
Continued
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direction of employment is an ambition of CWI but is not yet measured due 
to technical problems.
With regard to the supply side, the performance measurement at CWI is 
focused on the number of vacancies notified by employers in expectation 
of direct assistance in their recruitment efforts and on the number of filled 
vacancies of that kind. In recent years CWI has exceeded its target in relation 
to this measure.
CWI is also in ongoing attempts to be an effective channel for market 
transparency in the sense that job seekers and employers can meet and find 
each other via a self-service system. Performance indicators are operated with 
regard to CWI’s internet site: number of vacancies entered and number of 
jobseeker CVs available on the site. Also, the number of site hits.
CWI also measures client satisfaction (concerning jobseeker clients, 
unemployed benefit claimants, employers). CWI also measures satisfaction 
of other providers of intermediary services with whom it co-operates. 
Furthermore, CWI – as the entry office to most of the unemployed clients 
of the Work and Income system (approximately 80 per cent) – measures 
timeliness and degree of completeness of benefit claim dossiers that are 
passed on, for a final decision, to UWV and the municipal bodies.
The local employment offices are ranked according to their performance. On 
the basis of regression analyses, the influence of various exogenous factors 
on local performance are filtered out, resulting in a ranking that can more 
reliably be linked to efforts made, to good management and to service 
methods chosen. All the various performance indicators are put together in a 
‘balanced scorecard’.
Until 1 January 2009, local managers were offered performance incentives in 
the form of bonuses to reward performance of five per cent or more above 
target; and individual employees could also receive bonuses for ‘more than 
excellent’ performance. However, these incentives are currently under review.
Although commissioned private sector providers are awarded autonomy in 
relation to the forms and types of services and support they offer to referred 
job seekers, they are contractually bound (via the mechanism of advance 
and end payments) by the overall rationale of assisting job seekers into the 
labour market (Struyven and Steurs, 2005). The model can be characterised 
as distinctly outcome-focused under the central tenet of ‘less cure, less 
pay’. Also, despite the prevalence of private sector providers and job search 
organisations, there has been a move in recent years whereby individual job 
coaches can organize some short-term specific training without referring the 
jobseeker to one of the private sector providers. For example, the training for 
a forklift driver takes two weeks and job coaches can arrange for a jobseeker 
to access this training direct.
Continued
Case study Public Employment Services
42
The system of external commissioning has drawn some criticism from CWI, 
according to the key informant, because evidence of some duplication of 
services and some issues with the training/services offered by some private 
sector providers has arisen. The key informant argues that the CWI/UWV 
amalgamation should result in the Public Employment Services (PES) taking a 
much more direct steering role in relation to the form and type of assistance 
made available by the providers to the job seekers.
 
Germany
Germany classifies job seekers into four groups:
1 ‘market clients’ who need no support since they are expected to find a 
new job rapidly; 
2 those who need support with motivation and job-search strategies; 
3 those with skills deficits or other obstacles that need specific measures; 
and 
4 clients who are not considered placeable within the next 12 months (.24). 
Data is collected in Germany through the use of administrative datasets and 
through the collection of data from job seekers by PES advisers. These datasets 
enable the tracking of individual transitions and destinations, such as from 
benefits into different categories of employment and a data warehouse has 
been established for this purpose. Researchers are encouraged to make use 
of this data (with appropriate data protection safeguards) for labour market 
analysis. Performance is measured and analysed down to the level of individual 
jobcentres with the central performance measure being off-flows into 
employment. However, this performance indicator is analysed with reference 
to contextual indicators which allow individual jobcentre performance to 
be assessed against comparator jobcentres facing similar labour market 
conditions. This enables fair comparison but also applies a competitive logic 
to performance assessment. In addition, outcome performance can be 
combined with output measures (e.g. take-up of various types of programmes 
and programme expenditure) and benefit duration measures.
After the Hartz reforms of the PES, much emphasis is placed in Germany 
on commissioning support for the unemployed from private sector Personal 
Service Agencies who are paid a basic contract payment in addition to 
outcome and sustainability payment which are paid when individuals are 
placed into work and then when they sustain it for six months. The initial 
evaluations of these reforms suggest that referral to the private provision 
(which can be triggered after six weeks unemployment at the behest of the 
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individual) has been widely taken up. However, they also show that outcome 
results have been disappointing with only eight per cent of cases entering 
employment and only half of those remaining in work after six months. 
Private providers view the placement and sustainability payments (EUR 1,000 
each) as too low to incentivise intensive work with harder to help clients, and 
they must also prove that they were responsible for the job entries. Evaluation 
conclusions have been that the system is ineffective and inefficient.
 
Austria
Priority customer groups are selected and defined on an annual basis 
through discussions in the PES Board which has tripartite representation 
from government, employers and trade unions. These discussions are 
informed through a detailed assessment of performance over the previous 
year, supported by input from research organisations that typically use data 
from the well developed Datawarehouse which enables detailed longitudinal 
analysis of the experiences of different customer groups in the labour market 
and how this is influenced by PES interventions.
Data is collated in the Datawarehouse through the integration of a number 
of large scale official administrative datasets, importantly including the PES’s 
own administrative data collection system and the social security system 
which tracks transitions in an out of employment. Individual Advisers in local 
jobcentres are able to update this in real time but there are safeguards and 
cross-checks in the system that identify where there are inconsistencies in 
individual records shown by the different datasets.
The Datawarehouse is widely regarded as having robust and high quality data 
and there is therefore a strong degree of confidence in it. By linking several 
government datasets together it also enables longitudinal analysis on the basis 
of both individuals and groups over a period dating back to the mid 1990s. This 
can be used for both performance analysis and detailed econometric analyses 
of labour market performance. This analysis is undertaken both in-house and 
by external research organisations. It is technically feasible for all users to 
see all data. However, safeguards are in place and most users of the system 
are only able to map performance of the PES down to regional and office 
level. Individual managers however, are able to compare the performance of 
individual Advisers. Performance bonuses are paid to individuals and there is 
a strong culture of responsiveness to the performance measurement regime.
There have been pilot projects to extend the performance measurement 
approach to external providers. However, these have only proved to be 
partially successful and have resulted in suspicion of ‘creaming and parking’ 
behaviour. Further work is needed to support the roll-out of the system to 
providers in the future. 
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Switzerland
The main disaggregation between customer groups in the Swiss PES 
performance measurement arrangements is on the basis of long-term and 
short-term unemployment with the emphasis being on the prevention of 
longer-term unemployment. However, there is a great deal of flexibility and 
autonomy at the Cantonal level and as such some Cantons may prioritise 
other groups, by agreement with the national confederation.
The data used in the Swiss PES performance measurement framework 
appears to be solely of an administrative nature. It is analysed using a complex 
econometric model which combines a range of outcome indicators related 
to unemployment duration, unemployment cycling and the reduction of 
long-term unemployment. These combined indicators are then adjusted 
for a range of contextual factors including local labour market conditions, 
seasonal demand variations and the impact of cross-border workers. This 
system is regarded by some as effective in understanding the links between 
organisational activities and performance but this appears to be a matter of 
some debate, especially given the relatively small ‘market share’ of the Swiss PES.
The Swiss PES is highly decentralised with both regional and local 
unemployment offices. The regional offices also have a national association 
which acts as a link to the national PES structure. In addition, there are many 
employer- and employee- based private unemployment insurance funds and 
independent private sector placement agencies which act independently of 
the PES. While there is a substantial literature looking at the performance of 
the Swiss PES and its decentralised Regional Employment Offices, there is a 
general tendency not to compare performance with private placement agencies.
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7 Conclusions
The review of evidence on performance measurement in public employment 
services aimed to identify what performance measures and targets are used across 
Europe and the extent to which these might be learned from by Public Employment 
Services (PES) like Jobcentre Plus. Key insights from the theoretical literature and 
use of performance measurement elsewhere in the world is drawn on below 
to establish some core elements of good practice in public employment service 
performance measurement. Unfortunately, one of the objectives – to consider 
evidence about the use of performance measurement by private and voluntary 
employment service providers – was not met because there is insufficient publicly 
available evidence on this issue. While this was expected at the outset, it still 
constitutes a major gap in the available research literature.
7.1 General principles
The theoretical material reviewed on performance measurement suggested that 
the following lessons might be learned in terms of the general principles that good 
practice public employment service performance measurement might follow:
• Performance measurement should be based on robust data – especially ensuring 
that there are no biases or problems associated with the collection and collation 
of data which undermine its suitability as a basis for decision-making. Here a 
crucial issue is related to trust. It is not only essential that data is robust; managers, 
decision-makers and staff need also to believe that it is robust. Without that 
confidence the operational utility of performance measures is undermined. This 
might be seen in the case of Jobcentre Plus in the way that some managers have 
historically lacked confidence in the Job Outcome Target (JOT) measure (Nunn 
et	al., 2007b: p26,45,89) as a guide for operational decision-making because of 
the significant proportion of outcomes that are not captured as a result of the 
particular way in which data is currently collected against the target (Adams et	
al., 2008). This is despite JOT picking up a greater proportion of outcomes than 
the previous Job Entry Target (JET) measure, although under JET it was much 
more difficult to assess outcomes that weren’t being captured. A significant 
difference between the JET and JOT measurement systems is that data on which 
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JOT is based is collected independently by an external agency – Her Majesty’s 
Revenue & Customs (HMRC). This brings some advantages, for example costs 
(see below) and validation of outcomes, but it may also contribute to lack of 
trust in the data where managers know that not all outcomes will be captured 
and linked back to Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) systems. 
• Decision-making requires data which is both comprehensive and timely – 
not all data needs to be fully comprehensive and there are cases where data 
available with a lag is still useful. However, the relationship between these issues 
and decision-making requirements needs to be firmly established at the outset 
to ensure that collected data is suited to the purposes for which it will be used. 
Concerns over the timeliness of data were raised when the JOT target was first 
introduced into Jobcentre Plus in several pilot Districts early in 2005, since it 
introduced long delays for performance data that had previously been more 
immediately available (Johnson and Nunn, 2005). It was always envisaged that 
JOT would need to be supported by output measures to enable operational 
managers to manage performance (Nunn and Kelsey, 2007).
• The relative cost and benefit of performance measurement and the collection 
of data need to be carefully assessed – the collection of performance data is 
often costly and this needs to be consciously balanced against considerations 
of the benefits associated with this activity. By using data captured by HMRC 
for other purposes, JOT represents a particularly cost effective measure of job 
outcomes for DWP.
• Performance measurement needs to avoid generating perverse incentives – 
it is important that the operational and behavioural incentives that are generated 
by performance measures are fully aligned with strategic objectives. This issue 
is frequently raised in evidence on the role of performance measurement in 
PES. Performance measures and targets can sometimes lead to ‘creaming’ and 
‘parking’ of customers and the general suggestion is that targeting of incentives 
and longer-term outcome measures may help to avoid this.
• The design of performance measures and considerations of incentive effects 
needs to bear in mind variation at different levels of analysis – some 
performance measures operate differently at different organisational levels. As 
such it is important to ensure that measures and targets operate consistently and 
without perverse incentives at all organisational levels. This generally requires 
a framework for cascading measures and targets organisational levels in ways 
that are coherent and serve to focus collective efforts rather than fragment them.
As DWP, working with Jobcentre Plus, develops and reviews its approach to 
performance measurement on an ongoing basis, these general principles will 
need to be considered to ensure that performance measures are appropriate and 
well designed.
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7.2 Performance measurement and  
 management approach
It is important to align the use of performance measures and targets with the 
overall management philosophy. In this context, outcome-focused management 
and performance measurement is seen as compatible with devolved managerial 
autonomy over inputs and processes and incompatible with rigid process controls. 
Alternatively, strong centralised control is seen as compatible with strong process 
controls, measures and targets but incompatible with holding organisational sub-
units responsible for outcome performance levels, since in that model they have 
insufficient control of processes and inputs to warrant this. As such, the review 
found that strong outcome-focused targets were more appropriate in management 
approaches which emphasise local level autonomy, this often being the case in 
countries with strongly decentralised political and democratic systems. This does 
not mean that inputs, processes and outcomes should not all be measured, it may 
simply influence which are associated with targets and at what level responsibility 
for those targets should reside. In the case of Jobcentre Plus, its high level targets 
structure represents a ‘mixed economy’ of outcome, service and process measures, 
capturing different elements of the business. This approach is intended to provide 
a signal of core process (for example, through the Interventions Delivery Target 
(IDT)) while at the same time recognising and rewarding flexibility in labour market 
delivery, including effective partnership working, through JOT.
Considerations of the alignment of management approach and context with 
performance measurement may be significant for Jobcentre Plus in the future 
as a result of two contemporary trends in labour market policy. The first sees a 
greater emphasis on autonomy for front-line Jobcentre Plus staff, in the form of 
the Flexible New Deal and Adviser Discretion Pilots. The second sees an enhanced 
role for a range of local-level stakeholders in tackling employment and promoting 
competitiveness, through, for example, City Strategy Pathfinders, Employment and 
Skills Boards and City Regions. Both of these developments, may ultimately mean 
that an increased degree of local and operational autonomy for the design and 
delivery of interventions is necessary and performance measurement may need 
to be adapted to reflect this. The movement toward more localised democratic 
accountability may also mean increased local level scrutiny for performance and 
setting of performance targets.
7.3 Performance measurement frameworks
There is a substantial management literature which advocates the organisaton of 
performance measures within frameworks to help to establish causality between 
organisational activities and outcomes. Such frameworks include Balanced 
Scorecards and Performance Prisms. There is also a discernible trend in the literature 
to identify second and third generation variants of these frameworks which do 
not only combine measures to create a more holistic impression of performance, 
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but also seek to draw out greater degrees of attribution in relation to causality and 
map the production of relatively intangible outcomes. These frameworks tend to 
include a distinction between input, output and outcome measures. This distinction 
provides a useful means of categorising the types of performance measure used 
in PES. The emphasis on less tangible outcome measures or measures for which 
there is a less clear causal chain of influence, in addition to more directly influenced 
outcomes, is also useful for thinking about PES performance measurement.
Table 7.1 shows a typology of performance measures, categorised by inputs, 
process measures, outputs and outcomes. Input measures include measures of 
spending and staff resource. Few PES appeared to include measures of inputs 
in their performance measurement activities and frameworks but there are clear 
reasons to think that there are causal relationships between inputs and outcomes 
and therefore an appropriate performance measurement framework might include 
these. For instance, it is plausible to suggest that greater resource in terms of 
staff hours or programme spending will impact progressively and positively on the 
volume of outputs produced and the extent to which these are conducted within 
appropriate timescales. However, the progressive nature of this relationship is not 
smooth and there will be a point after which the benefit to cost ratio of additional 
inputs begins to break down. It is also possible to produce excess inputs which will 
not be required on the demand side for conversion into outputs. Further, excessive 
inputs may drive excessive outputs (see below). As such, indicators and evidence 
on the relationship between inputs and outputs ought to be studied over time to 
establish where such points in the relationships might lie.
Outputs include services delivered to employers in terms of vacancy registration 
and more active measures delivered to different types of jobseeker such as referrals 
to training provision or activation interviews such as Work Focused Interviews. It 
is plausible to suggest that, like inputs and outputs, there is again a positive and 
progressive relationship between outputs and outcomes. The volume of and speed 
with which interventions are delivered are likely to impact upon the achievement 
of outcomes such as off-flows from unemployment benefits. However, again this 
relationship is not linear or constant. It is possible to over-produce outputs with little 
social welfare gain because of deadweight, displacement and substitution effects. 
Effectively, some people may be referred to support that they do not need to get 
a job and will get a job regardless of whether they receive an intervention or not 
(and this will vary for the different types of intervention). Additionally, individuals 
may find work as a direct result of receiving an intervention but this may have 
no positive aggregate impact because it displaces an alternative jobseeker who 
would have otherwise moved into that job. In other cases, employers benefiting 
from customers receiving interventions may gain an advantage and crowd-out 
other employers who would have otherwise recruited (and in places that may have 
an anti-competitiveness impact). Again, continual analysis of the relationships 
between these sets of indicators would yield more reliable assumptions about 
these relationships and the point at which marginal benefits begin to decline.
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In many countries, and in the European Employment Strategy (EES) indicators, 
there is a differentiation between different types of outputs (see Section 5.2.1) 
and different types of outcome (see Section 5.3.2). Where possible, in technical, 
administrative and cost terms, this is beneficial because it helps to understand 
the relationship between different types of intervention and different types of 
outcome. This clearly moves performance measurement away from a more simple 
understanding of volumes of activity to outcomes to one based on types of activity. 
For example, understanding the types of outcome (e.g. employment generally or 
permanent/sustained employment) that result from types of output (e.g. specific 
types of programme or training referral) would help to identify ‘what works’ for 
different types of customer in different circumstances. Clearly from a management 
perspective this has huge interpretive benefits, especially when placed within the 
context of the type of mixed-methods performance review suggested below. The 
precision of this data could be further enhanced were it available to sub-national 
levels of analysis where this would allow more targeted analysis and exploration 
of particularly well functioning or poorly functioning examples of different types 
of intervention to investigate the precise causal mechanisms at work, shifting the 
emphasis to a strong link between evaluation and performance measurement 
(Sanderson, 2001). 
Table 7.1 A typology of PES performance measures
Input measures
Output 
measures
Process 
quality 
measures
Intermediate 
outcome 
measures
Final outcome 
measures
• Staff hours in different 
roles
• Spending on staff
• Spending on 
programmes
• Office numbers
• Spending on 
compliance and 
processing
• Vacancy 
registration
• Interviews 
completed
• Referrals 
to training 
or other 
support
• Penetration 
measures
• Individual 
plan 
completion
• Placement 
into work 
trials
• Sanctions
• Assessment 
of interviews 
or plans
• Customer 
satisfaction 
surveys
• Employer 
satisfaction 
surveys
• General 
off-flow 
measures
• Specific 
off-flow 
measures
• Penetration 
measures
• Benefit 
duration 
measures
• Vacancy 
outcome 
measures
• Hybrid 
measures
• Employment 
rate
• Unemployment 
rate
• Inactivity
• Productivity
• Long-term 
wages/
employment 
history of 
beneficiaries
 
Acknowledging the importance of less tangible or responsive indicators, outcome 
measures in Table 7.1 have been separated into intermediate and final outcomes. 
From the point of view of PES, ‘final outcomes’ are closely related to overall policy 
objectives such as increasing employment and the quality of employment. These 
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can be tracked by outcome indicators of general labour market trends and help to 
focus attention on long-term strategic objectives. However, these measures alone 
are problematic because PES only affect these types of indicators at the margins 
and over the long-term. As such, PES need ‘intermediate outcome’ indicators 
which are more closely related to PES inputs and outputs. These types of outcome 
might include off-flows from benefit where a PES intervention is evident and may 
relate these to wider but short-term labour market trends such as all off-flows 
from benefits in the same period. For instance, in this example off-flows linked 
to a PES intervention could be measured separately and as a proportion of all off-
flows, thereby addressing organisational contribution to observed labour market 
trends, helping to account for issues associated with deadweight.
Jobcentre Plus already has a series of different types of performance indicator, 
including process, output and outcome indicators. It would be relatively easy to 
place these into a similar framework, such as a logic model or strategy map. 
Augmenting existing measures with linked input, output and outcome measures 
may be more difficult. However, the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study 
(WPLS) is similar in nature to some of the underpinning datasets in the Austrian 
and Danish Data Warehousing approaches and therefore offers some potential to 
develop more sophisticated performance measures which allow specific outcomes 
to be related to particular types of output. Clearly, this sort of development would 
be costly, however and would need to be developed over the medium- to long-
term against appropriate assessments of cost and benefit.
7.4 Commentary, performance review and 
 organisational learning
The emphasis in the literature on performance measurement on causality and 
mixing qualitative and qualitative measures is replicated in some PES where 
the presentation of quantitative performance data is contextualised with a 
more qualitative commentary which explores and explains apparent measured 
performance. This helps to balance the data on which decisions are made. Even if 
this sort of commentary isn’t formally in place, the literature on decision-making 
and information suggests that this type of qualitative input does influence decisions 
but in more opaque ways. In addition, it is desirable to fully understand causal 
relationships in decision-making. The establishment of a causal framework should 
help with this. However, the literature on organisational learning suggests that 
there is a need to build in regular reviews of these causal frameworks, drawing on 
available performance and other information, in two distinct but related respects. 
Firstly, reviewing data in this way helps to ensure that activity and interventions 
are being implemented in the right way (i.e. single loop learning). This is likely 
to involve the use of qualitative evaluation, research and impact assessment-
type evidence to augment performance data and is also likely to identify gaps 
in the available qualitative and performance data on an ongoing basis. It would 
therefore need to include reference to, and estimation of, the achievement of 
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relatively intangible benefits from organisational activity covering the full range 
of policy goals (e.g. aggregate health and well-being resulting from employment 
outcomes).
Second, more fundamental reviews should help to question the validity of the 
assumed relationships between inputs, outputs and outcomes (i.e. double-loop 
learning). This may suggest the need for reviews on an annual and a multi-year 
basis to provide input into annual reports and reporting over public spending 
review periods. Some element of both single and double-loop learning should be 
present at both annual and multi-year reviews. Both types of review should result 
in the development of an explanatory commentary to underpin performance data. 
This process would be helpful in shaping management and leadership thinking 
and help to shape wider understanding (within and outside the PES organisation) 
of the role and performance of the PES in relation to the labour market and 
overarching policy goals.
In the case of Jobcentre Plus such commentaries might draw together the results 
of the large number of research, survey and evaluation projects commissioned by 
DWP and Jobcentre Plus alongside performance data to develop contextualised and 
explanatory commentaries on Jobcentre Plus performance. These commentaries 
might be prepared on an annual basis and on a more comprehensive basis on a 
three-year basis to coincide with the Comprehensive Spending Review schedule. 
Such commentaries would need to broadly explain performance but also need 
to clearly demonstrate the contribution that the organisation makes to achieving 
Public Service Agreement (PSA) targets.
Conclusions
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Appendix A  
Approaches to performance 
measurement
Definitional issues: What is performance measurement?
Performance measurement is closely associated with performance management 
(Audit Commission, 2000a: 5) and the central focus of this review is the intersection 
between the two. While performance management might include a range of 
management responsibilities, down to managing the performance of individual 
members of staff through very soft and arbitrary collection of information (such 
as unstructured observed performance in the workplace) (Treasury, 2001; Centre 
for Business Performance, 2006: 3), the focus here is on the measurement and 
management of whole organisation performance.
Performance measurement arises from the management literature. Though some 
approaches such as the DuPont Pyramid extend back to the development of major 
modern industrial corporations in the early years of the 20th century, particularly 
in the US,6 performance measurement is particularly associated with the notion of 
Management by Objectives (MBO) which was first put forward by Drucker (1955) 
in the 1950s. The essence of MBO is that senior management set objectives to 
be measured by quantitative targets, with associated performance indicators 
designed to ensure that these are achieved but allow considerable operational 
flexibility and autonomy over the ways in which organisational units, teams and 
individuals attempt to achieve these goals (Mosley et	al., 2001:3-4).
6 For instance, the development of industrial corporations such as DuPont, 
Standard Oil and Ford brought with it the need to establish mechanisms for 
control of workflow, different aspects of production and quality and the rise 
of new corporate managerial occupational roles to do this in large multi-site 
and often multi-national companies.
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Performance measurement is the subject of many different definitions (Centre for 
Business Performance, 2006: p4-5). Neely et	al., (1995: p80) define performance 
management as: ‘the	process	of	quantifying	the	efficiency	and	effectiveness	of	
action’. Mackie suggests that: 
‘Organisational	 performance	 management	 in	 a	 government	 context	
is	 therefore	 the	 activities	 of	 government	 or	 its	 agencies	 in	 planning,	
implementing,	reviewing,	evaluating	and	reporting,	the	effectiveness	of	its	
policies,	programmes	and	projects.’
(Mackie, 2008:3)
They then suggest that there are three distinct ways in which this process can 
be approached: First, it can be approached from the perspective of individual 
measures which indicate performance on a single set of criteria, often on the basis 
of product or service quality, time, cost or throughput. Second, they suggest that 
it can be approached from a more systemic perspective where individual measures 
are placed in some form of analytical framework designed to understand the 
relationship between different types of information. The most famous example of 
this sort of systemic perspective is the widely adopted Balanced Scorecard approach 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1992). Third, they suggest that performance measurement 
can be understood from the point of view of how the performance measurement 
system (e.g. a balanced scorecard) interacts with the wider context, whether that 
be an internal organisational context or an external stakeholder or market context. 
Kennerley and Neely (2001:145) also identify a fourth constituent part to any 
performance measurement framework: ‘a	supporting	infrastructure	that	enables	
data	to	be	acquired,	collated,	sorted,	analysed,	interpreted	and	disseminated’. 
Mackie (2008) suggests that there are differences in the role of operational 
and strategic controls through the use of performance management. Strategic 
controls and measures relate to the overall performance of the organisation, while 
operational controls ‘measure	activities	within	sub-units	of	an	organisation	and	
usually	cover	a	shorter	time	period	than	strategic	controls’ (3). He also suggests 
that performance management can be exercised on an intra-organisational basis 
and an extra-organisational basis. The former refers to internal management 
processes while the latter is related to processes of governance and political 
accountability (2).
Mackie (2008:6-11) also uses Hicks and Gullett’s earlier (1981) differentiation 
between different sorts of management controls to suggest that organisational 
performance management can be used in one or all of three distinct ways:
• pre-controls – these include strategic and operational plans in which objectives 
and performance measures are set. This helps to guide actions and behaviours and 
establish a sense of shared objectives and clarity of purpose within an organisation;
• concurrent controls – involve the regular reporting of information regarding 
performance against established objectives and targets. They might include 
‘dashboards’ of performance indicators, traffic light reporting systems and 
balanced scorecards;
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• post-controls – involves reviewing achievements over a particular period of time 
(e.g. a year or a strategy implementation cycle) and reflecting on the causes of 
successes and failures. It often involves the use of more qualitative information 
such as evaluation or consultative type evidence. Examples here might be 
evaluation programmes or the Best Value Review process which was introduced 
into English local government in early part of the current decade.
Like many others (Audit Commission, 2000a; 2000b) Mackie suggests that all 
three types of control must be included in an holistic performance management 
system. This exhortation links with the literature on organisational learning. Over 
the last three decades a substantial body of literature has been produced on the 
issue of ‘organisational learning’ and ‘learning organisations’ (Easterby-Smith and 
Araujo, 1999; Elkjaer, 2004). For instance McGill et	al., (1992) define the process 
of organisational learning as:
‘...the	 ability	 of	 an	 organisation	 to	 gain	 insight	 and	 understanding	 from	
experience	through	experimentation,	observation,	analysis,	and	a	willingness	
to	examine	both	successes	and	failures.’
The basis for much of this literature is in the work of Argyris and Schön (Argyris 
and Schon, 1978) and Senge (Senge, 1992) who identify the role of proving and 
disproving initial causal assumptions in the process of learning. Here, performance 
management can be used to indicate whether strategic assumptions about the 
role of linkages between inputs, outputs and outcomes are correct or require 
adaptation. To both Argyris and Schön and Senge this learning can take different 
forms and be used to adjust relatively minor operational assumptions (e.g. related 
to policy or management implementation) or much more significant strategic ones 
(e.g. related to the design of policy in the first place). This is Argyris and Schön’s 
famous distinction between single- and double-loop learning. The former relates 
to error detection in implementation and making relatively simple corrections. It 
focuses on the question ‘are we doing things right?’. By contrast, double-loop 
learning involves much more fundamental questioning of established assumptions 
and promotes error detection and correction in ways that involve changing the 
underlying norms, policies, objectives and practices. Here the question that one is 
faced with is: ‘are we doing the right things?’: 
‘When	the	error	detected	and	corrected	permits	the	organisation	to	carry	
on	its	present	policies	or	achieve	its	present	objectives,	then	that	error	and	
correction	 processes	 single-loop	 learning.	 Single-loop	 learning	 is	 like	 a	
thermostat	that	learns	when	it	is	too	hot	or	too	cold	and	turns	the	heat	on	or	
off.	The	thermostat	can	perform	this	task	because	it	can	receive	information	
(the	 temperature	 of	 the	 room)	 and	 take	 corrective	 action.	 Double-loop	
learning	occurs	when	error	is	detected	and	corrected	in	ways	that	involve	the	
modification	of	an	organisation’s	underlying	norms,	policies	and	objectives.’
(Argyris and Schon, 1978:2)
The relationship between performance measurement and performance 
management is often variable. Performance management is the full range of 
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managerial actions that connect information to management decision-making. 
At the most ambiguous and unconscious level the very collection of data against 
one or another measure adds some managerial emphasis to a particular set of 
actions and activities which are associated with it. At a more conscious level, 
managers can set targets and objectives whose achievement can be assessed using 
performance measures and incentivised by rewards and/or sanctions (Centre for 
Business Performance, 2006: 5). In various ways though, the aim of performance 
management is to relate the measurement of performance information to activities 
designed to meet the organisation’s goals and objectives.
Performance management systems
Designing performance measures
There is a variety of guidance and good practice style guides available for 
establishing and designing performance measures and indicators (see, for 
example, Audit Commission, 2000b; 2000a; Kennerley and Mason, 2008). Such 
guides frequently include a large number of criteria which can be used to establish 
robust performance indicators and targets. Typically these include relevance to 
strategic objectives, clarity of indicators and their definitions to ensure ease of use. 
The Audit Commission also suggests that indicators need to provide timely and 
useable information and avoid several common pitfalls. These include avoiding 
generating perverse incentives and ensuring that indicators provide information 
that is attributable to those who are responsible for the relevant activity. In 
common with others, the Audit Commission also recommends that targets which 
are associated with particular indicators are Specific, Measurable, Achievable, 
Relevant and Time-bound or SMART (Audit Commission, 2000a; 2000b). The 
2001 joint Treasury, Cabinet Office, Audit Commission, National Audit Office and 
Office for National Statistics publication,	 Choosing	 the	 Right	 Fabric suggested 
that performance measures should be relevant, attributable, well-defined, timely, 
reliable, comparable and verifiable (Treasury, 2001). 
Neely et	 al., (Neely et	 al., 1997:1136-51) review the literature on design of 
performance measures, identifying 22 common recommendations which they 
helpfully summarise in a ten point framework. This is set out in Box A.1 and is 
used to suggest what information is needed to establish a balanced performance 
measure. Neely et	al., (1997) then go on to suggest that each measure needs to 
be tested in both theory and practice to ensure its credibility and suitability.
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Box A.1 Neely et al.’s ten element framework to ensure 
  appropriate performance measure design
1. Measure – The title of the measure should be clear, understandable 
and unambiguous.
2. Purpose – The rationale underpinning the measure should be clear and 
widely understood.
3. Relates to – The measure needs to clearly relate to identifiable business 
objectives of the organisation, to reduce measurement for measurement’s sake.
4. Target – Targets need to establish expected levels of performance, but this 
needs to be established in the light of the relevant context. In a competitive 
context a target which sets expected levels of performance which is below 
that of other competitors will result in failure, even if it is met. Targets which 
overestimate possible performance in the context may lead to demoralisation 
or inappropriate management diagnosis of performance problems.
5. Formula – This relates to the specific ways in which performance measures 
are constructed. This needs to anticipate behavioural reactions and the types 
of information that might be generated by the measure. In both cases, care 
needs to be given to ensuring that specific design issues do not result in 
perverse behaviour or data which is not robust or usable for the purpose of 
the measure.
6. Frequency – This needs to ensure consistency with the availability of 
meaningful data and the pattern of relevant business or performance cycles 
and to ensure that feedback on levels of performance is timely to ensure that 
adjustments can be made.
7. Who measures – The design of a performance measure should identify 
who measures performance.
8. Source of data – This relates to the availability and consistency of the 
data by which performance is to be measured. If the collection or generation 
of data is uneven or of inconsistent quality then the measure may need to 
be understood in a particular way or it may simply not be an appropriate 
indicator of performance.
9. Who acts on the data – The person who is to act on the data should be identified.
10. What do they do – While it may not be possible to identify in advance 
what the appropriate management response to particular performance data 
might be, it is possible to identify what management process will be used to 
decide on an appropriate response and this should be built into the design of 
performance measures at the outset, to ensure that there is a response and to 
build confidence and transparency among key stakeholders about how this 
will be agreed.
(Neely et	al., 1997:1136-51)
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Performance measurement frameworks and  
understanding causality
Much of the literature on performance management highlights the importance of 
using performance management and measurement to better understand causal 
chains and linkages (Centre for Business Audit Commission 2000a; Centre for 
Business Performance 2006: 11). This has led to the establishment of a variety 
of tailored and ‘off the peg’ frameworks which attempt to structure the process 
of generating an holistic set of performance measures to assess organisational 
performance (Kennerley and Neely, 2001:145-155; Rouse and Putterill, 2003:791-
5). Among these perhaps the Balanced Scorecard is the most widely publicised, 
though this itself emerged from a critique of earlier attempts at mostly financially-
oriented performance measurement frameworks such as the DuPont Pyramid 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1992:71; Kennerley and Neely, 2001:146; Paranjape et	al., 
2006:5). The Balanced Scorecard presents performance information representing 
four dimensions of organisational performance, which incorporate financial 
and cost measures but also include a range of additional measures related to 
customers, internal processes, and innovation and learning, which are typically 
expressed collectively as four sets of questions (Kaplan and Norton, 1992:72):
• How do customers see us? (Customer perspective.)
• What must we excel at? (Internal perspective.)
• Can we continue to improve and create value? (Innovation and learning 
perspective.)
• How do we look to shareholders? (Financial perspective.)
The Balanced Scorecard is not without its detractors, however (Bourn, 2005; 
Paranjape et	al., 2006), and a range of alternative systems and frameworks are 
also promoted, such as the European Framework for Quality Management (EFQM), 
the Performance Measurement Matrix and the Performance Measurement Prism. 
The Performance Measurement Matrix includes cost, ‘non-cost’, internal and 
external measures to present a broad picture of performance (Keegan et	 al., 
1989; Neely et	al., 1997:146). The Performance Prism is promoted by Kennerley 
and Neely (2001) and is focused on tailoring performance management to the 
objective of generating stakeholder value and includes five distinct perspectives 
on performance:
• Stakeholder satisfaction – who are our key stakeholders and what do they want 
and need?
• Strategies – what strategies do we have to put in place to satisfy the wants and 
needs of these key stakeholders?
• Processes – what critical processes do we need to operate and enhance these 
processes?
• Capabilities – what capabilities do we need to operate and enhance these 
processes?
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• Stakeholder contribution – what contributions do we require from our 
stakeholders if we are to maintain and develop these capabilities?
Neely et	al., (2003) suggest that these frameworks are first generation approaches 
to performance management and are notable for being relatively static and not 
providing an automatic causal association between measures. They, thus, identify 
a second generation of performance measurement framework. For instance, the 
original proponents of the Balanced Scorecard have more recently advocated 
strategy maps as a means of not just maintaining a wide range of indicators of 
organisational performance but integrating indicators in such a way as they show 
the relationship between organisational activity and success and therefore, also 
link with, and inform, organisational strategy:
‘Strategy	 maps	 show	 the	 cause-and-effect	 links	 by	 which	 specific	
improvements	create	desired	outcomes	–	for	example,	how	faster	process-
cycle	 times	 and	 enhanced	 employee	 capabilities	 will	 increase	 retention	
of	 customers	 and	 thus	 increase	 a	 company’s	 revenues…From	 a	 larger	
perspective,	strategy	maps	show	an	organisation	will	convert	 its	 initiatives	
and	resources.’
(Kaplan and Norton, 2000: 168)
Neely et	al., (2003) also identify an evolution of their own Performance Prism as 
a second generation performance measurement framework which incorporates 
risk/failure and success maps and the IC Navigator model promoted by Roos and 
Pike7. Neely et	al., (2003) go on to suggest that a third generation of performance 
measurement framework is required to link non-financial and intangible value 
generation to the cash flow implications of these.
Performance is usually measured by reference to inputs, outputs or outcomes, 
depending on the managerial approach in use. For instance, a tighter managerial 
approach which leaves little room for autonomy over actual behaviour may focus 
on inputs. A slightly more relaxed managerial approach may allow more freedom 
but still determine what the key causal chains in operation are. Here the focus 
might be on outputs. A more relaxed managerial approach still might focus only 
on some specific outcomes and leave considerable autonomy for organisations, 
groups and individuals to determine the causal relationship between inputs, 
outputs and outcomes. In the context of Public Employment Services (PES), these 
usually constitute some mix of interventions such as interviews with job seekers 
(inputs), outputs such as numbers of job seekers who engage in job search or 
submit applications for vacancies and outcomes such as the numbers of job 
seekers who find work. The precise definition of how these differ from one 
another though, is often complex, especially when determining between outputs 
and outcomes. For instance, some (Grubb 2004: 358) ignore the output category 
and distinguish instead between different types of outcomes, where ‘intermediate 
7 This paper is (Pike and Roos, 2001). The paper could not be sourced 
independently for inclusion in the review. however.
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outcomes’ measure relatively short-term outcomes such as off-flows from benefits 
where longer-term ‘final outcome’ indicators focus on measures such as long-
term earnings. Again, depending on the managerial approach being used, one or 
more of these types of measures might be employed.
Implementing and embedding performance management 
frameworks
Bourne (2005) suggests that while there has been a wide array of research on 
designing performance measurement and management systems, there has been 
comparatively little focus on implementing and embedding systems. In fact, 
he suggests that a large number, perhaps even the majority, of performance 
measurement systems ultimately fail to be implemented successfully. Bourne’s 
research suggested that the factors which were cited by organisations who 
embarked on establishing a new performance measurement system and completed 
the process as the reasons for continuing included the level of senior management 
commitment, alignment of the process with core managerial objectives and the 
sense of benefit that came from the project at an early stage. Where implementation 
failed, a lack of senior level commitment or changing organisational priorities were 
identified. In either case, the quality of project management and coordination in 
the process of embedding the system was also mentioned. 
Problems with the use of performance management  
and measurement
Perverse incentives
Bouckaert and Peters (Bouckaert and Peters, 2002) identify a range of perverse 
incentives that might arise from poorly designed performance measurement.
Performance measures can sometimes generate inappropriate behaviour because 
of the way that they are linked to incentive structures whether these be formal or 
informal (Grizzle, 2002). For instance, where capturing performance is dependent 
on the existence of an intervention, individuals and organisations have an incentive 
to generate unnecessary interventions in order to claim performance ‘points’. This 
was the case for instance in the Job Entry Target (JET) system in the UK PES, which 
was replaced in April 2006. Under pressure to increase measured performance, 
front-line staff and managers would occasionally generate an unnecessary 
intervention, such as a small cash payment to a jobseeker who had found work of 
their own accord. These small payments were intended to help people who could 
not otherwise take up a job opportunity, to do so, perhaps by paying for initial 
transport to work or upfront costs such as specialist clothing. In these instances 
though, these payments were not needed and were used solely for the purposes 
of ensuring an outcome could be captured. It therefore generated waste in the 
payments themselves and in the administration required and led to low quality 
information which served as a poor guide to assessing the contribution of the PES 
to employment flows (Johnson and Nunn, 2005).
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The way in which performance measurement is linked to incentive structures can 
produce behavioural results known as ‘creaming’ and ‘parking’. Here incentives 
linked to performance data create a pressure for actors in the system (be they 
individuals or organisational units) to focus their attention on ‘easy wins’ (i.e. 
creaming) whereas more challenging problems are ignored because they are 
considered to be too difficult to resolve (i.e. parking). There are noted examples of 
this sort of behaviour in PES where incentive structures associated with performance 
measures lead easy to place customers to be the focus of attention while more 
difficult to place customers are effectively ignored (Bruttel, 2004:16-17; Bruttel, 
2005). This is perverse in view of the normal parameters of policy goals because 
it is usually thought that easier to place job seekers will find a job with or without 
PES support and it is therefore those with the most profound barriers to work 
that require and would benefit most from PES support. Creaming and parking is 
generally thought to be a more important danger where contracts with private 
or other providers emphasise payments for results (Struyven and Steurs, 2005). 
However, it is recognised that this is also a risk for Jobcentre Plus, given the very 
strong target driven culture within the business. 
Costs
Bouckaert and Peters (2002) argue that the costs associated with producing 
performance information are often opaque and are infrequently cited in discussions 
of performance measurement. However, they draw attention to the fact that the 
costs associated with performance measurement are often immediate while the 
benefits of it are reaped only over the longer term and are frequently uncertain or 
unquantifiable in advance.
Negative externalities
A number of negative externalities may be generated by the behaviour which is 
generated by rewards and incentives in performance management regimes. For 
instance, in a framework where actors are encouraged to generate output of a 
desired service and outcomes, there may be a general level of demand for those 
outputs and services which is unaffected by their supply. When that point is passed, 
generation of additional outputs simply results in costs associated with producing 
them and with measuring them without any additional benefits. A labour market 
example relates to the level of demand for labour in the economy. If aggregate 
demand for labour is not determined by the level of supply then employment 
services which stimulate supply of labour beyond the level of aggregate demand 
simply result in competition between providers to achieve the same outcomes 
rather than generating new and additional outcomes. In such a context, the costs 
of providing the services and measuring performance rise above achieved benefits 
(Grubb, 2004:363).
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As Grubb also shows these sorts of problems are frequently addressed in evaluations 
of active labour market programmes (ALMPs) where methodological approaches 
are devised to control for deadweight, substitution and displacement.8
Balance and breadth
Neely et	 al., (1997:1113-1135) argue that perverse behaviour is not always 
generated by inappropriate performance indicators but by a lack of forethought 
about the behavioural implications that might result from particular indicators, 
benchmarks or targets. Rather, they argue that it is important to ensure balance 
in the design and range of indicators used and that definitions and methods of 
calculation and levels of target are important in generating specific outcomes. 
They go on to identify a framework for establishing particular measures. 
Joint measures and targets
It is widely noted in the literature that it is often difficult for organisations to develop 
performance measures and targets that apply to more than one organisation 
(Mackie, 2008:7). Indeed, research with central government departments has 
indicated that they have found it difficult to negotiate Public Service Agreement 
targets which are contributed to by more than one Government department 
(National Audit Office 2001:2). 
Poor use of performance information
Other critics suggest simply that one of the pitfalls of performance measurement 
is that its results are inappropriately or insufficiently used in the policy-making, 
implementation and management process. For instance, Hatry (2002) suggests 
that performance information is frequently not well integrated into the decision-
making and planning process and that management tools are insufficiently used 
or used in a confused manner. 
The role of performance management in the public sector
It is acknowledged that the role of performance management in the private 
sector differs to that in the public sector where there is no financial bottom line 
to act as an outcome measure (Micheli and Kennerley, 2005:125). In the public 
8 Deadweight relates to performance captured as an output/outcome of 
an intervention but which would have happened in any event without the 
intervention. Substitution relates to outcomes that appear to result from 
the intervention but where outcomes elsewhere reduce as a result of this. 
So for example, where an employer recruits the beneficiaries of a particular 
employment programme but reduces recruitment elsewhere to compensate 
for this. Displacement refers to a similar impact to substitution but relates 
to where this behaviour is split among several actors. In the labour market 
example a single employer may recruit more as a result of a particular 
intervention but others are crowded out, for instance by increased competition.
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sector, performance management is linked to the application of new management 
techniques such as the New Public Management (NPM) (Dunleavy, 1994; OECD, 
1994), which have been widely applied in developed countries over the last two or 
three decades. In this context, performance management and measurement has been 
both a means of achieving reform and itself an objective of that reform (Osborne 
and Gabler, 1992). The application of the NPM has largely coexisted with attempts 
by the State to reduce its responsibility for the direct provision of public services and 
the increasing reliance, instead, on ensuring that these services are provided by a 
range of arms length agencies and contractors (Sanderson, 2001: 297-9).
The current Government has also used performance management as a tool for 
improving public service quality. The approach has varied according to perceptions 
about the quality of existing services and commitment of public sector managers 
and staff to policy and improvement agenda. So, in the initial phase of public sector 
reform under the present Government there was a strong emphasis on targets 
and audit, this has gradually slackened with more autonomy offered to frontline 
managers about policy implementation and accordingly how to performance 
manage it, though the expectation that performance management will be used 
remains strong (Audit Commission, 2008:22-4). 
In this context, performance management provides a variety of different roles:
• citizen accountability – here the focus is on engaging with the public and 
enabling them to have oversight of the quality of public service provision and 
its performance, through the pressure that they are able to place on elected 
politicians (Treasury, 2001:4; Lee, 2004);
• political accountability – here the focus is on politicians ensuring accountability 
of service provision. This function of performance management is often adopted 
where there is some form of institutional separation between delivery and 
political decision-making, such as in the case of agencification or privatisation 
(Sanderson, 2001). The questions being posed and answered by performance 
management systems are related to whether services are doing what politicians 
wanted of them and how well they are doing this. Variation from expectations 
may then lead to political decisions over policy and contractual decisions;
• management accountability – clearly management requires information to inform 
decisions over resource allocation, investment decisions, changes to service 
models (including quality standards and procedures) and staff training. This 
can be the case within unified delivery structures as well as more decentralised 
arrangements including partial contracting out or the establishment of quasi-
market conditions even within a public system. Here the focus is on rewarding 
innovation and successful implementation, spreading good practice and 
adjusting inputs in response to changing contexts and causal assumptions 
(Mackie, 2008:3);
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• consumer accountability – in some contexts public service users are offered some 
choice over the service or provider that they use, often with the assumption that 
the availability of performance information might encourage them to act like a 
consumer in a market. The result of this, in theory, is that provider behaviour is 
disciplined by market-type pressures and those that provide successful and high 
quality interventions are rewarded by payments which follow the customer while 
those that do not attract sufficient customers are disciplined and may ultimately 
leave the service provision system or market. Here the focus is on providing 
information about the types of outcomes that service users or ‘customers’ 
may require. Examples of this include the publication of data on public sector 
performance as introduced in John Major’s Citizen Charter (Doern, 1993).
In actual fact, the majority of performance management systems are usually 
designed to fulfil several of these functions at once (Mosley et	al., 2001:96).
Micheli and Kennerley (Micheli and Kennerley, 2005) review a range of different 
performance management frameworks in the public sector and conclude that 
the adoption of performance measurement and management is widespread and 
involves multiple designs. They also conclude that context and purpose need to be 
kept in mind and that the implementation of performance management can be 
problematic in the sense of changing the nature of the service in such a way as its 
outcome focus means that some intrinsic value inherent in the way in which the 
service interacted with the service user is lost.
Box A.2 A taxonomy of performance management
Inputs – Resources used in the process of delivering an output.
Outputs – The immediate result of activities. This is often recorded as volumes 
of results such as the numbers of people using a particular service or being 
helped in a specific way.
Outcomes – The ultimate impact of a policy. This is often much harder to 
measure, is much more ambiguous or becomes apparent over a much longer 
time frame than outcomes. The relationship between inputs, outputs and 
outcome is often difficult to establish directly as a result of the number of 
additional intervening variables that might have a causal influence on the outcome.
Targets – A specific level of performance that an organisation, part of an 
organisation or an individual wants to achieve, often associated with specific 
indicator or measure.
Benchmarks – Are a performance measure or indicator which is used to 
compare (usually numerical or quantitative) levels of performance between 
individuals or organisational units. These may or may not have a target status, 
i.e. that a particular level of performance is expected to be achieved.
Continued
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Box A.2 Continued
Perverse incentive – Sometimes the rewards generated for different types 
of behaviour can lead individuals or groups to ‘game’ with performance 
information, creating unintended consequences, costs, generating negative 
outcomes for particular groups or leading to some worthwhile activities being 
de-prioritised.
The importance of context in designing performance 
management systems
Institutional context
The institutional context for performance management of employment services 
is important because it sets the parameters for the design of performance 
management and it also helps to identify and understand the purpose to which 
performance management might be put.
One part of the relevant institutional context is the overall approach to performance 
management in UK government. The approach used in the UK has developed 
over time, from the first introduction of John Major’s Citizen Charter, through to 
the tight use of centrally defined performance targets, audit and inspection in the 
early years of the present Government to the existing position (Audit Commission, 
2008:22-24). Since 1998, the overall approach used has a number of layers 
which cascade central Government policy objectives established as part of the 
Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) process down to individual Government 
departments, and then from them down to their Departmental Public Bodies, 
contractors and local delivery organisations. Public Service Agreements set out 
overall Government policy objectives which are funded as part of the CSR-Public 
Service Agreement (PSA) process over a three-year period. In relation to the 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), these currently include employment 
opportunity and well-being in later life. The performance management framework 
used by Jobcentre Plus must therefore respond to these PSAs. Various guidance 
documents published by central Government and its agencies advocates that 
performance objectives starting with PSAs be cascaded not just to organisations 
but down to individual level through individual performance and development 
appraisals and reviews (Treasury, 2001:7).
A second part of the institutional context which is relevant for the performance 
management of PES in the UK relates to the policy approach to service delivery. Over 
many years there has been a gradual shift toward increasing the role of the private 
and voluntary sector in delivering employment services in the UK, whether this be 
specific aspects of contracted provision or the more comprehensive approach to 
the use of the private sector in pilot programmes such as Employment Zones or the 
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new Flexible New Deal. The specifics of the UK context are discussed in Chapter 3 
but what is important to note is that the extent of direct delivery on the one hand 
or contracted delivery on the other will determine the roles to which performance 
management is put. In the case of direct delivery, performance management is 
about an internal management process, whether this be management by control 
or management by objectives. In the case of contracted out provision, performance 
management clearly plays a part in contract management processes, however, 
these might be structured.
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Appendix B 
Performance measurement in 
Public Employment Services
The role of Public Employment Services in the labour market
Public Employment Services (PES) have several roles in the labour market which 
in theory ought to improve its effectiveness, mainly in relation to matching 
labour supply and demand. First, in their passive role, they help to address the 
information problem. The information problem relates to asymmetric information 
and quality uncertainty. In the first instance, demand may not be able to come 
together with supply simply because employers do not know how to engage with 
available and suitable workers and vice versa. Here PES have an important role in 
collecting and publicising vacancy data. In a more active role, they can then begin 
to ‘match’ supply to demand by collecting information from unemployed workers 
and specifically directing them to suitable jobs. They can also help unemployed job 
seekers to find work by coaching them in job search activity. 
Progressively more active strategies by PES include increasing the available 
supply of labour and its fit with demand by addressing the employability of 
unemployed workers and by activating relatively inactive groups through training 
and motivational measures (confidence building, coaching, conditionality 
and sanctions). Finally, they may help to deal with quality uncertainty through 
building employer confidence in specific groups of recruits where they go through 
employability programmes, training or pre-selection.
Evidence on the additionality offered by PES active labour market programmes 
(ALMP) programmes appears to be mixed but there is some evidence that such 
policies have had some impacts, though estimations of the scale of these vary 
widely (Boone and Van Ours 2004; Tergeist and Grubb, 2006; Koning, 2007). 
What may be notable about these studies though is that they were all conducted 
in relation to the application of ALMPs in a period of economic growth. It might 
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be expected that ALMPs and the role of the PES in general would create additional 
outcomes in such a period where the challenge is expanding the supply of labour 
to meet increasing demand. It may be more difficult to suggest that this is the case 
in more challenging economic circumstances where available and employable 
labour power is readily available.
Cross-country studies of performance measurement in 
public employment services
Cross-country studies of the application of performance measurement in PES are 
relatively few. One such study is that by Mosley et	al., (2001). They undertook a 
survey of all 15 members of the European Union and Norway to assess the extent 
and nature of take-up of Management by objective (MBO). The results of the 
survey suggested that take-up of MBO was widespread throughout Europe and 
that full take-up was present in ten of the 189 PES surveyed and a further four 
member states’ PES had adopted elements of MBO. They also investigated the 
implementation issues associated with MBO in more depth in a smaller number 
of case study countries, including Austria, France, Great Britain and Sweden and 
related these findings to the management literature on MBO. They found that 
prerequisites for successful MBO included a strong level of senior management 
and political commitment and some degree of relative organisational autonomy 
of the PES from political control. Examples of problems caused by a lack of this 
autonomy included the British case study where frequent introduction of new 
initiatives (the example provided is that of the New Deal) outside the performance 
planning cycle hampered the success achieved by MBO. The study also found, 
in line with some of the theoretical literature they cite, that MBO is not entirely 
compatible with a large number of centralised rules and regulations governing 
service delivery as this hinders autonomy and innovation in attempts to meet 
stretching targets. 
Mosley et	 al., (2001) also suggest that MBO entails costs as well as benefits 
such as those associated with the collection, collation and interpretation of 
management and outcome data and that if handled inappropriately the setting 
of quantitative indicators can lead to ‘gaming’ with performance information. 
The research suggested that the design of performance measures and targets is 
both crucial and very challenging. While it is relatively easy to concur that targets 
should be stretching yet achievable, many PES reported difficulties with ensuring 
that indicators and targets were designed in such a way as to measure appropriate 
behaviour. Particular attention was given to timescales with the conclusion being 
that a combination of longer-term strategic objectives and targets combined 
with shorter-term annual targets helped to broker an appropriate balance. On 
this dimension, the Mosley and colleagues were again critical of the British case 
study, suggesting that frequent and large changes in organisational objectives and 
performance measures were ‘unnecessarily	disruptive	for	PES	operations’ (p.95). 
9 The survey included all three Belgian PES.
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The research did not draw any firm conclusions about the relative performance 
of either centralised or decentralised management structures, other than that 
the performance measurement system in place needs to fit with this institutional 
structure. Importantly though Mosley et	al., do indicate that problems of ‘moral 
hazard’ and gaming with performance management are likely to be more 
prevalent in highly centralised and controlling institutional structures and that the 
costs associated with trying to iron out these problems through further centralised 
control were likely to be prohibitive. The more appropriate response, they argue, 
is to attempt to generate staff commitment to performance measures and targets 
(p 96).
In conclusion, Mosley et	al., argue that performance measurement in PES needs 
to be structured according to ‘good practice’ which they define according to a 
range of criteria.
Box B.1 Mosley et al.’s good practice suggestions for PES 
  performance measurement
• Use of a limited number of clear and understandable targets.
• Providing employee participation to guarantee the commitment of regional 
and local PES staff to the performance management system.
• Reduction in the density and complexity of administrative information 
system for monitoring progress toward targets.
• Fair and transparent procedures for assessing and rewarding performance.
• Complementary quality management approaches.
(Mosley et	al., 2001:96)
Finally, they suggest a number of qualifications to the use of performance 
measurement. They suggest that while achievement of target levels needs to be 
taken seriously, it should not be seen as the only management consideration and 
qualitative assessment of the reasons why targets are achieved and not achieved 
needs to be undertaken and as such there is a need for quantitative targets to be 
balanced by quality assessment and evaluation (p 97).
Other research has looked at the principles underpinning the organisation and 
design of PES performance management, especially as it relates to institutional 
structure and the extent of contracting-out of the delivery of employment services 
in the system. For instance, Grubb (2004) presents a detailed analysis of a variety 
of different approaches and places emphasis on four main possible institutional 
settings. These include (p 356):
• traditional hierarchical management – here the emphasis is on centralised 
command and control with standardised practices and perhaps operational 
manuals containing rules and regulations about the precise ways in which 
services are to be delivered. The scope for using performance measurement 
as a tool to encourage autonomy and innovation is limited and performance 
measures are usually part of the same top-down approach;
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• continuous re-contracting – here there is a purchaser-provider split with the 
PES taking the role of purchaser and commissioner of services. Performance 
measurement provides the means of assessing the contribution of a range of 
different and competing providers to desirable outcomes and may form one 
part of the judgement about how contracts are re-let in the future, with less 
successful contractors replaced by more successful ones. Contract payments are 
fixed within the lifetime of the contract and are related to the volume of work 
undertaken (e.g. number of beneficiaries);
• pay-for-results – here there is no fixed payment for volume of work but 
payments are decided instead by reference to outcome data. Where a provider 
is successful with its client group (e.g. having a higher re-employment rate) 
then the payments are more generous. Where a provider is less successful they 
are simply paid less. In this context providers bid to be able to provide a service 
which may involve an initial payment from the provider to the PES or vice versa 
depending on context. Then within the contract, providers have autonomy over 
their activities which are designed to maximise outcome payments; 
• purchase of services by clients – here payments follow individual customers 
who have choices over which employment services they can use. Performance 
information may be one part of the information on which customers make 
their judgement.
Grubb pays particular attention to the role of marrying outcome performance 
indicators to social welfare. However, he is critical of both placements (e.g. 
off-flows from benefits where there is some evidence of a PES interaction) and 
employment spell data (e.g. average time on benefits) because, he argues, they 
both create perverse incentives, either to generate short-term placements into 
employment or for ‘creaming’ and ‘parking’ behaviour:
‘...short-term	placements,	which	do	not	reduce	unemployment	levels	in	the	
longer-term	because	 the	 clients	 re-enter	 unemployment	 soon	 afterwards,	
are	rewarded.’
(Grubb, 2004:358)
He acknowledges that many OECD countries use additional performance indicators 
(including linked to payment or reward structures) to partially correct for these 
perverse incentives such as sliding scale rewards based either on the difficulty of 
placing particular groups of job seekers or the duration of the job placement or a 
combination of both. However, he is critical of the rather arbitrary nature of the 
scales and cut-off points used in these measures and reward structures (e.g. three- 
month cut-off periods for claiming job placement incentive payments) (p 359). 
In place of these hybrid measurement regimes Grubb advocates a much longer-
term and more purely outcome- (rather than output or intermediate outcome) 
based measurement approach. Citing the example of evaluations of US welfare 
programmes which report on longer-term measures of total earnings for five years 
following the intervention, employment and benefit recipiency rates among the 
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cohort he suggests that ‘long-term	measurement	of	outcomes	may	be	essential	
if	performance	management	arrangements	are	not	to	create	a	bias	toward	using	
strategies	that	achieve	only	short-term	outcomes’ (p359). Without such measures, 
he argues that the rewards resulting from or management emphasis lent to the 
achievement of the best social outcomes (‘stable,	long-term	returns	to	work,	by	
persons	who	would	otherwise	have	remained	unemployed	or	left	the	labour	force’ 
(p360)) will be too low.
Grubb advocates some form of social welfare cost-benefit appraisal in which 
outcome measures are based on an estimation of monetary value for instance 
in the form of an estimation of the ‘savings	in	benefit	costs,	plus	the	increase	in	
tax	receipts	 levied	on	wages’ (p360). However, two key problems are identified 
with this because benefit transfers are not real Government spending and as 
such the direct contribution of reduced benefit payments cannot be assumed 
simply to result in an increase in social welfare equivalent to the sum saved on 
benefit payments minus that spent on the respective employment programme. In 
addition, because for some people the problems and negative impacts (and costs) 
of employment are significant and mean that social welfare is only increased by a 
fraction of their total earnings.
In addition, Grubb argues against weighting performance results for or against 
particular types of client group. Because harder-to-help unemployed people are 
frequently on the boundary of being declared as unfit to work (i.e. should be 
in receipt of inactive benefits with no requirement to look for or be willing to 
engage in work as a condition for receiving benefits) the assumption that placing 
these people into work has a higher social benefit is incorrect. In fact, because of 
the problems that they may face in sustaining work, the social welfare increase 
associated with them moving from unemployment to employment may be less 
than for an easier to place individual. However, this does not imply that providers 
(whether these be contractors or parts of the PES) will be equally rewarded by the 
performance measures Grubb suggests. This is because easy to place clients will 
be likely to find work in any event so the incentive is still to assist harder-to-help 
clients because it is here that the greatest change in social welfare/performance 
is likely to be generated (p361). However, this is in contradiction with the general 
assumptions about performance measurement and payment structures, even 
where disproportionate rewards are applied to those who genuinely need additional 
help (for example, see Bruttel, 2004; Bruttel, 2005; Struyven and Steurs, 2005). 
Indeed, some private contractors have adopted the practice of passing structured 
incentives onto clients in order to reward them for finding work unassisted where 
this is possible (Bruttel, 2005:397).
In addition, Grubb advocates a number of other additional components of a final 
outcome measure. These include hourly rather than total wages. Assuming that 
wages are related to both the quality of employment on the one hand and the 
social welfare generated, then wages are an appropriate additional indicator of the 
type of outcomes being generated. However, a total earnings indicator is fallible 
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here because it measures not just the relative quality of different employment 
but the numbers of hours worked. Hourly pay corrects for this and is, therefore, 
a more appropriate measure. While he does not make the distinction, Grubb’s 
final two components are not outcome indicators per	se but qualitative measures 
of service delivery (or process) quality such as customer satisfaction surveys and 
audits of the use and uptake of particular types of services such as face-to-face 
contact on ‘drop-in’.
The Public Employment Benchmarking project began with funding from the 
European Commission through the European Heads of Public Employment Services 
in 2002. From 2005 onwards the group developed a more formal approach in two 
projects to strengthen the approach to developing common indicators and then 
benchmarking between the participating partners (Lehner et	al., 2005; Synthesis 
Forschung and OSB Consulting, 2005; 2007). These projects initially resulted in 
a list of 11 performance indicators (see Table B.1), though the list has now been 
reduced to seven. These are used for the measurement of PES performance and 
for benchmarking performance between the 16 participating members (Box B.2).
Box B.2 Participating members in the European PES 
  Benchmarking Project
 Austria Ireland
 Belgium – Brussels Latvia
 Belgium – Flanders Lithuania
 Croatia Netherlands
 Finland Slovakia
 France Slovenia
 Germany Sweden
 Hungary Switzerland
http://www.pes-benchmarking.eu/english/members.asp?IdPageLv=210
The initial 11 indicators included outcome, output and input indicators as detailed 
in Table B.1.
10 Some outputs from this project list Jobcentre Plus as a member, but the 
current website list of members does not include the UK.
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Table B.1 PES performance indicator project initial indicators
Goal Indicator
1 Aiming at a successful 
transition from 
unemployment to 
employment
How many unemployed people manage to make a transition 
to a new job (as a percentage of all unemployed within a given 
time period)?
2 Taking a special interest 
that the transition to 
employment takes place 
before unemployment lasts 
very long
How many unemployed people manage to make the transition 
to a new job before being unemployed for more than six 
months (as percentage of all people leaving unemployment to 
employment within a given time period)?
3 Being focused on 
transitions from measures  
to employment
How many people who participated in training activities for job 
seekers manage to get a job within six months (as a percentage 
of all people leaving a training activity within a given time 
period)?
4 Transition to a new job 
after a notice of separation 
has been served, but before 
drawing unemployment 
benefits
How many employees who get a notice of separation by their 
employer manage to move on to a new job without drawing 
unemployment benefits (as a percentage of all separations 
within a given time period)?
5 Opening access to a large 
share of vacancies through 
the PES information system
How many notices of vacancies are accessible through the 
PES information system (as a percentage of all new vacancies 
opening up within a given time period)?
6 Making sure that 
registered vacancies are 
filled
For how many vacancies posted with the PES is a candidate 
found successfully (as a percentage of all vacancies posted with 
the PES within a given time period)?
7 Making sure that filling a 
registered vacancy will not 
take long
For how many vacancies posted with the PES is a candidate 
found successfully within a month (as a percentage of all PES 
vacancies de-registered within a given time period)?
8 Achieving customer 
satisfaction
How many customers of the PES are »satisfied« as opposed to 
»unsatisfied« (as a percentage of all customers)?
9A Implementing best 
practice information 
technology
How many CVs are accessible through the PES homepage (as a 
percentage of the labour force within a given time period)?
9B Implementing best 
practice information 
technology
How many notices of vacancies are accessible through the PES 
homepage (as a percentage of all vacancies which get posted 
with the PES within a given time period)?
10 Designing a service 
oriented organisational 
architecture
How many people of the PES staff are involved in serving 
customers on a personal level (as a percentage of the total staff 
number)?
11 Providing sufficient 
resources (in terms of time) 
for service activities
How many minutes (per year, per customer) can be spent on 
serving a specific customer?
Source: (Synthesis Forschung and OSB Consulting, 2004).
The research and outputs of these groups has considered in-depth issues related 
to data collection and operational definitions and measurement, considering the 
benefits and weaknesses of specific indicators. These have now been reduced 
to seven. Brief details of the seven indicators’ strengths and weaknesses are 
presented in Table B.2.
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Table B.2 Benchmark performance indicators for the PES 
 Benchmarking Project
No. Indicator Strength Weakness
Q1 Transition from 
unemployment to 
employment
Captures key outcome 
data
Variation in what is 
counted as employment/ 
unemployment
Q2 Rapid transition from 
unemployment to 
employment
Consensus that rapid 
re-engagement is positive 
and a key role of the PES
Not clear that all groups 
benefit if pushed back 
into work too quickly and 
if this simply measures 
deadweight and creates 
revolving door
Q3 Transition from training 
measures to employment
Addresses controversy 
regarding the role of 
training
Does not address 
sustainability of 
employment. Which is 
a key issue re: role of 
training
Q4 Opening access to a 
large share of vacancies 
through the PES 
information system
Reflects PES role in 
information problems
Results hard to observe, 
incentivises costly 
behaviour, difficult to 
define vacancies
Q5 Vacancies filled Relates to suitability of 
submissions
Not solely PES 
responsibility – employers
Q6 Achieving satisfaction 
of Job seekers and 
employers
Clear role for customer 
satisfaction in service 
organisation
Reflects a range of factors, 
including expectations
Q7
Source: (OSB Consulting and Synthesis Forschung 2007).
The PES Benchmarking Project has also attempted to take account of the external 
context facing employment service providers. The project developed a series 
of context variables which are used to contextualise and locate benchmarked 
performance between different national PES with an understanding of the 
domestic labour market context that they face. These context variables include 
indicators of general labour market performance (unemployment rate, persistence 
of unemployment as a ratio of unemployment), indicators of workload (from 
customers and from the working-age population generally expressed as 
a relationship to the numbers of PES staff) and an indicator of relative inputs 
(expressed as the proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) spent on ALMPs). 
The rationale offered for these variables is that they all collectively help to explain 
the difficulty of achieving outcomes for the PES concerned (Synthesis Forschung 
and OSB Consulting, 2008). 
In addition the PES benchmarking project is linked to the European Employment 
Strategy (EES) indicators which have been under continual development since 
2002 to fit the changing requirements of the EES. The EES indicators include a wide 
range of final outcome indicators concerned with wider labour market trends. 
However, they also include measures which link more directly to the activities 
of PES. For instance, these include measures which incorporate some output 
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indicator for instance of activation interventions or employment services such as 
beneficiaries of counselling activities, training as well as outcome indicators of off-
flows into employment and transitions into training. Other measures incorporate 
input indicators such as PES staff numbers. Nearly all these indicators are related 
to other wider labour market indicators such as numbers of unemployed or 
particular categories of the unemployed stock (such as age groups or duration 
of unemployment). The measures also incorporate indicators of the quality of 
employment such as off-flows to work into different pay bands or contract types.
Box B.3 European Employment Strategy Indicators
 
19.M2 Preventative services. National sources
Share of young/adult unemployed becoming unemployed in month X, still 
unemployed in month X+6/12, and not having benefited from intensive 
counselling and job-search assistance. (LMP category 1) [target value 0%=full 
compliance]
Method: B*/A. In addition, on a voluntary basis, B*/(B*+C*)
A = In-flow into unemployment in month X
B* = Persons still unemployed in month X+6/12 months who did not receive 
intensive counselling and job-search assistance
C* = Persons still unemployed in month X+6/12 months who received 
intensive counselling and job-search assistance
No data on this is reported for the UK
 
19.M3 New start (a). National sources
Share of young/adult unemployed becoming unemployed in month X, still 
unemployed in month X+6/12, and not having been offered a new start in 
the form of training, retraining, work experience, a job or other employability 
measure. (New start = a job or LMP categories 2-7) [target value 0%=full 
compliance]
Method: B/A. In addition, on a voluntary basis, B/(B+C)
A = In-flow into unemployment in month X
B = Persons still unemployed in month X+6/12 months who did not receive 
a New Start
C = Persons still unemployed in month X+6/12 months who received a New 
Start but still unemployed
No data on this is reported for the UK
Continued
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Box B.3 Continued
 
19.M4 Activation of long-term unemployed. Sources national and LMP
Stock of participants in an active measures (cat 2 -7) that were previously 
long-term registered unemployed divided by the stock of long-term registered 
unemployed plus the stock of participants in active measures that were 
previously long-term and whose unemployment registration is interrupted by 
an active measure. Long-term unemployed = 12+months for adults (25+) and 
six+ months for youth (<25).
Some data is reported on this for the UK
 
19.A2 Activation Source LMP
Number of participants in LMP measures (training, retraining, work experience 
or other employability measure)/in assisted activation programmes divided by 
the number of persons wanting to work (LFS unemployed plus labour reserve).
Some data is reported on this for the UK
 
19.A3 Activation of registered unemployed Source LMP
Stock of participants in active measures (training, retraining, work experience 
or other employability measure) that were previously registered unemployed 
divided by the stock of registered unemployed plus the stock of participants 
in active measures that were previously registered unemployed and whose 
unemployment registration is interrupted by participation in an active measure.
No data on this is reported for any EU member state
 
19.A4 New start (b). National sources
Share of young/adult unemployed becoming unemployed in month X, still 
unemployed in month X+6/12, and not having been offered a new start in 
the form of training, retraining, work experience, a job or other employability 
measure. (New start = a job or LMP categories 1-7) [target value 0%=full 
compliance]
Method: B/A. In addition, on a voluntary basis, B/(B+C)
A = In-flow into unemployment in month X
B = Persons still unemployed in month X+6/12 months who did not receive 
a New Start
Continued
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Box B.3 Continued
 
C = Persons still unemployed in month X+6/12 months who received a New 
Start but still unemployed
Source: National data
No data on this is reported for the UK
 
19.A5 Transitions into employment/training. Source SILC
Transitions of unemployed people into employment and training from year n 
to year n+1.
No data on this is reported for the UK
 
19.A6 Follow-up of participants in active measures. National sources
1. Rate of in-flow of LMP participants into employment (three or six months 
after participation in a measure)
2. Rate of return of LMP participants into unemployment (three or six months 
after participation in a measure)
No data on this is reported for the UK
 
19.A7 LMP expenditure. Source LMP
LMP expenditure as % of GDP
Data is reported on this for the UK
 
19.A8 LMP expenditure per person wanting to work. Source LMP
Expenditure on LMP divided by the number of persons wanting to work (LFS 
unemployed plus labour reserve)
Data is reported on this for the UK
Sources: Indicator details: (European Commission, 2007b) Reporting of data: 
(European Commission, 2008b). 
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Appendix C  
Overview of international PES 
performance measurement 
European Union member states
Austria
Description	of	performance	management	system	in	place
Austria has experienced strong economic growth over recent years with real 
GDP growth being slightly above that of the rest of the Euro-area (Eurostat: 
Real GDP Growth). In this context employment growth continued up to 2007 
when it was over 71 per cent (Eurostat: Employment Rate) and unemployment 
was among the lowest in the European Union (EU) at just under 4.5 per cent 
(Eurostat: Unemployment rate). The priority of the Government elected in 2007 
was to ensure full adoption of the Lisbon Strategy, including policies to strengthen 
competitiveness through investment in research and development and social 
policy reform to implement Flexicurity. While the current global economic crisis 
has impacted on growth forecasts, growth is still projected to be positive and 
above the EU average and the employment rate is projected to stabilise rather 
than decline (Government_of_Austria, 2008:13-15).
Austria’s labour market policy aims to secure not only growth in employment but 
strengthening of the quality of work. This is reflected in an objective to increase 
‘good	work’ ‘characterized	by	fair	salaries,	 job	security,	equal	payment	for	men	
and	women,	 health	 protection	 and	 prevention	 of	 accidents	 in	 the	workplace,	
reconciliation	of	work	and	family	life	and	a	sufficient	range	of	jobs’ (Government_
of_Austria, 2007:7). This has been accompanied by a rapid growth in public 
spending on active labour market programmes (ALMPs) since 2000 which have 
been heavily training based rather than having the work-first focus seen in the 
UK (Federal_Ministry_of_Economics_and_Labour 2005; Government_of_Austria, 
2007; Meager, 2008:8). 
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The Austrian Public Employment Service (PES) – the Arbeitsmarktservice Osterreich 
AMS – which is a semi-autonomous government agency (similar to Jobcentre 
Plus) adopted Management by objective (MBO) in the mid-1990s (Mosley et	
al., 2001:30). AMS’ approach to performance is also very well documented. In 
particular the development of Austria’s labour market Data Warehouse project 
has been the subject of several reports (e.g. Mahringer, 2004) and detailed 
documentation is available (Buzek et	al., 2004)11. The Data Warehouse collates 
data from a number of different national government data sets and offers access 
to a vast range of labour market and organisational performance indicators, some 
of which are available to all AMS employees (Federal_Ministry_of_Economics_
and_Labour, 2005:50). The Data Warehouse provides a sophisticated tool for 
monitoring labour market developments generally as well as detailed (and deep) 
information on participation in, and outcomes of, labour market interventions. 
This includes social insurance records which contain individualised characteristics 
(such as age and gender) and relevant labour market and educational histories 
(e.g. qualifications, previous labour market interventions and employment), with 
some of this data going back to the mid-1990s. The quality and nature of the data 
allows follow-up monitoring of the impact of the full range of different labour 
market interventions as different groups of beneficiaries can be tracked for several 
years after an intervention to explore employment histories and wages, though 
there are some limitations and problems with such analyses (Mahringer, 2004:8). 
The Data Warehouse also allows monitoring of wider labour market and firm level 
indicators which arise out of data from social security records. These analytical 
uses of the Data Warehouse are grouped into three categories by the AMS: (1) 
Outcome monitoring of PES interventions; (2) Career monitoring of particular 
social groups and the whole labour market (e.g. trends in employment, quality 
and types of employment etc); and (3) enterprise monitoring of firm structure and 
patterns in firm structures in the economy (Federal_Ministry_of_Economics_and_
Labour, 2005:51).
The Data Warehouse is both a general labour market information system and it 
feeds into the specific performance measurement framework used by AMS. In 
contrast to many countries there is a wealth of information on previous indicators 
and targets used in Austria by AMS. However, the consultation response from the 
AMS suggests that the following indicator/targets are in use currently:
• prevent in-flow of younger unemployed (under 25 years) into longer 
unemployment (six months);
• transfer into jobs of older unemployed (men over 50, women over 45) within six 
months of unemployment;
• prevent in-flow of younger unemployed (under 25 years) into longer 
unemployment (six months);
• transfer into jobs of older unemployed (men over 50, women over 45) within six 
months of unemployment;
11 This documentation is cited by (Mahringer 2004) but could not be sourced 
in time for this review.
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• prevent in-flow of all unemployed into longer-term unemployment (12 months); 
• transfer of people with barriers to labour market participation into employment;
• transfer into jobs of women after a child care break;
• transfer rate into jobs after training courses of unemployed persons;
• number of vacancies registered with the PES;
• number of vacancies with a certain qualification level registered with the PES.
There is an existing paper on the potential for transferability of the Data Warehouse 
approach to the UK (Lissenburgh, 2004).
Strengths	of	performance	management	system	in	place
The PES respondent to the consultation suggested that the Data Warehouse and 
performance management system is regarded as ‘quite effective’ in understanding 
PES performance. The main strengths of the Data Warehouse identified by the PES 
in the consultation include:
• the system is linked to MBO and to operational management and performance 
control;
• the data is available and accessible to all staff;
• many results are measured by external data (social security data).
In addition to this, the indicators used are intended to ensure that the focus is not 
just on generating employment outcomes but that these are quality outcomes.
Weaknesses	of	performance	management	system	in	place
The response to the PES consultation suggested that weaknesses were mainly 
technical and related to the complexity of data linking and IT issues. Such problems 
are also corroborated by other external research (Mahringer, 2004).
Sources
Buzek, A., H. et	 al., (2004). Labour	 Market	 Monitoring	 based	 on	 the	 Data	
Warehouse	of	the	Public	Employment	Service. BMWA, Government of Austria.
Federal_Ministry_of_Economics_and_Labour (2005).	 Labour	market	 and	 labour	
market	policy	in	Austria. F. M. o. E. a. Labour, Government of Austria.
Government_of_Austria (2007). Austrian	 Reform	 Programme	 for	 Growth	 and	
Jobs	2nd	Implementation	Report	2007. F. Chancery, Government of Austria.
Government_of_Austria (2008). Second	Austrian	Reform	Programme	for	Growth	
and	Jobs:	2008	–	2010, Government of Austria.
Lissenburgh, S. (2004). Data	Warehouse	Monitoring	 in	 the	 Public	 Employment	
Service:	Austria:	Statements	and	Comments.	Mutual Learning Project: Peer Review 
Paper Volume, DOI: 
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Mahringer, H. (2004). Data	Warehouse	(DWH)	Monitoring	in	the	Public	Employment	
Service	(PES). Mutual Learning Project: Discussion Paper Volume, DOI: 
Meager, N. (2008). The	Role	of	Training	and	Skills	Development	in	Active	Labour	
Market	Policies. IES Working Paper Volume, 27 DOI: 
Mosley, H., H. et	 al., (2001). Management	 by	 Objectives	 in	 European	 Public	
Employment	Services. Discussion Paper. Berlin, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fur 
Sozialforschung: 164.
Belgium
Description	of	performance	management	system	in	place
Consecutive reforms have brought the Belgian federal state structure to a point 
where labour law and social security (legislation, organisation, financing and 
administration) are a federal matter, whereas the regions are responsible for 
territorial matters such as economy and employment (e.g. ALMPs) and, as a 
consequence, also for labour mediation and the PES. Belgium cannot be considered 
as one labour market as important differences exist not only between the regions 
in employment and unemployment rates, but also in the characteristics of labour 
supply and demand (Bogaerts, 2007).
Following the institutional reforms, Belgium is now comprised of three 
Communities: the Flemish Community, the French Community, and the German-
speaking Community. The formation of these three Communities gave subsequent 
rise to three corresponding Regions: The Flemish Region, the Brussels-Capital 
Region and the Walloon Region (Vadoorne and De Witte, 2000). There are now 
four regional PES organisations: the VDAB in Flanders; le FOREM in Wallonia; 
the ADG in the German-speaking area; and the Actiris (formerly ORBEM-BGDA) 
in Brussels.
Actiris monitors, on a monthly basis, the in-flow of job vacancies, the number of 
vacancies filled, the number of cancelled vacancies, and the number of vacancies 
available at the end of the month. VDAB monitors, on a monthly basis, all ‘regular 
job’ vacancies, vacancies received from agencies for temporary work, and the 
employment measures AMI (active service efforts to fill the vacancies) and from 
Jobmanager (an online self-service vacancy service) (Synthesis Forschung, 2008).
The Flemish government provides funding to the VDAB. Within the framework 
of a management agreement that VDAB signs with the Flemish government, the 
assignments of the VDAB are evaluated by means of a number of parameters. 
These parameters are either objectives (a fixed standard) or monitoring indicators 
(no standards are fixed but parameters are important in terms of the management 
agreement). Among the objectives/parameters enshrined in the VDAB Management 
Agreement 2005-09 are:
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• Parameter 4: results of job vacancy service (objective – result);
• Parameter 5: job offer and transparency on the job vacancy market (objective – 
volume);
• Parameter 6: filling of job vacancies (objective – result);
• Parameter 11: VDAB-activation percentage for long-term job seekers (objective 
– result);
• Parameter 12: outflow from unemployment after finishing a pathway (objective 
– result);
• Parameter 13: outflow to work after finishing a pathway (objective – result);
• Parameter 17: representation of ‘potential’ groups in new recruitments and in 
the total number of employees (objective – volume).
From 2002, le FOREM has developed a strategy of ‘joint management’ of the 
labour market. Following a regional decree on the approval of private placement 
agencies in 2003, this legal reform had necessitated an efficient, mutual co-
operation between the PES and private agencies. Since then le FOREM has been 
re-shaped in order to only administer and implement non-market activities, whilst 
its market activities have been handed over to a private company (TRACE interim). 
In this new context, le FOREM is the overall co-ordinator of the different public 
and private actors in the field of offering services to job seekers and employers.
Le FOREM’s five-year management contract was signed in 2006. The objectives 
enshrined in this contract are outlined in successive annual activity plans (called 
‘Synergies’). The monitoring of the management contract’s objectives and targets 
is overseen by a monthly managing board who consider output indicators linked 
to activities and services. The main targets of the management contract are that:
• by 2010, le FOREM will have to manage a volume of 100,000 registered 
vacancies per year, which represents an increased volume of 15 per cent in 
comparison with the volume in 2005, and will have to disseminate 200,000 
individual vacancies;
• in respect of training, le FOREM will have to support a minimum of 23,000 job 
seekers in its managed centres, around 6,000 job seekers in its skills centres and 
around 5,500 people in its open learning centres, which represents an increase 
of 20 per cent. The number of workers to be trained will have to increase to 
a volume of 8,200 in the managed centres and 16,000 in the skills centres, 
representing a growth of 23 per cent (PES Monitor, 2009).
Strengths	of	performance	management	system	in	place
No literature or comments on the strengths of the performance measurement 
framework were found.
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Weaknesses	of	performance	management	system	in	place
No literature or comments on the weaknesses of the performance management 
system were found.
Planned	changes
No literature or comments on planned changes to the performance management 
framework were found.
Sources
Bogaerts, K. (2007). Peer	Review:	Basic	Income	Support	for	Jobseekers, Belgium 
http://www.mutual-learning-employment.net/pdf/DE%2007/Belgium_DE_07.pdf
Vadoorne, J. and De Witte, H. (2000). Outplacement/Replacement	Interventions	
(WP1): Country Review from Belgium Leuven: Katholieke Universiteit
Synthesis (2008). Measurement	 Procedures	 of	 Performance	
Indicators Q1-Q7 Blue Paper 02 http://www.ams.at/-docs/001_
technicalnotes2measurementprocedures_080607.pdf
Mosley, H., Schütz, H. & Breyer, N. (2001). Management	 by	 Objectives	 in	
European	 Public	 Employment	 Services Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für 
Sozialforschung
PES Monitor (2009). Le	Forem http://www.pesmonitor.eu/Database/
PES Monitor (2009). Flemish	Public	Employment	Service http://www.pesmonitor.
eu/Database/
Bulgaria
Description	of	performance	measurement	system	in	place
Bulgaria experienced the steepest decline in employment in the state sector of 
the countries in transition between 1990 and 1994. Unemployment also soared 
during this period of radical economic restructuring, mainly among people with 
low basic skills or education. Such high unemployment rates, particularly in terms 
of the long-term unemployed, led to the introduction of the ‘From social assistance 
to employment’ (FSATE) programme in 2002 (Godfrey 1997).
The Ministry of Labour and Social Policy is responsible for setting priorities and 
determining target beneficiaries of the programme and the Bulgarian employment 
agency’s website identifies these priority groups as:
• the long-term unemployed;
• youth without experience, education and profession;
• individuals with low educational level, or without qualifications and education; 
• the disabled;
• the elderly unemployed (above 50 years old).
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Furthermore, the agency’s main objectives were:
• an increase in adaptability of disadvantaged groups with the aim of improving 
their labour market integration;
• employment sustention and increase.
In addition to the FSATE programme, the ‘Overcoming Poverty’ programme was 
implemented in 2005 (European Employment Observatory, 2005). This had the 
specific aim of providing literacy and vocational training, subsidised employment 
and self-employment for residents of the 13 poorest municipalities in Bulgaria. 
It included approaches for young people, the long-term unemployed with 
low levels of education and without qualifications and ethnic minorities. The 
selection of those to be employed under the programme was to be carried out 
by Labour Office Directorates (LODs). Target groups that were identified by the 
LODs were: the unemployed in receipt of social assistance payments; the long-
term unemployed; unemployed people with primary level education or below or 
without qualifications; and people who have classified themselves as illiterate. 
Within these groups, women over 50, men over 55 and young people up to 29 
were given priority.
Strengths	of	performance	management	system	in	place
No data found.
Weaknesses	of	performance	management	system	in	place
No data found.
Planned	changes
No data found.
Sources
European Employment Observatory Review, Spring 2005.
European Employment Observatory Review, Spring 2006.
Godfrey, M. and Richards, P. (1997). Employment	 Policies	 and	 Programmes	 in	
Central	and	Eastern	Europe. Geneva: International Labour Office.
http://www.az.government.bg/eng/internal_en.asp?CatID=12/05&WA=Projects/
Programmes.htm (Bulgarian Employment Agency website).
Cyprus
Description	of	performance	management	system	in	place
The labour market in Cyprus is considered to be functioning well with a low 
unemployment level, though it has risen slightly in recent years. Cyprus joined 
the EU in 2004 and integration into the European Employment Strategy (EES) 
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has meant some changes to employment policies, including the development of 
a National Action Plan for employment (Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance 
(Cyprus) 2004). There have also been moves towards the transformation of Public 
Employment Services (PES) into a flexible and decentralised system. This involved 
upgrading district labour offices and setting up new local labour offices during 
2007. Other measures included the expansion of the labour offices network to 
facilitate the access of clients, the introduction of self-service facilities and the 
provision of individualised services for active support (Planning Bureau (Cyprus), 
2007).
In terms of their accountability, district labour offices are expected to submit 
monthly reports to headquarters. These include quantitative and qualitative 
information on labour market trends in their district, e.g. in-flows of unemployed 
and vacancies. This information is evaluated by an employment observatory unit 
both for the purpose of monitoring developments in the labour market as well as 
for evaluating the performance of each district. There is no headline performance 
indicator of off-flows.
The European Commission’s PES Monitor notes that the service of employment 
counselling has also been introduced recently, with the goal of assisting clients 
in formulating and modifying an employability plan. This may include remedial 
education, work experience, specialized skill training, job placement and related 
screening and supportive services. The PES Monitor report for Cyprus also refers 
to the PES’s aim to provide a comprehensive and effective personalised service 
for the support and monitoring of the unemployed or new entrants to the labour 
market. This aim is to be achieved by the following measures:
• developing and modernising the PES network with the gradual geographical 
dispersion of local Employment Centres;
• specialising and training the personnel of the PES in their new object of 
operation;
• developing methods and tools for providing quality services to customers and a 
more personalised approach to job seekers and those who belong to vulnerable 
social groups, to employers and the balancing of labour demand and labour 
supply;
• developing a statistical system for the monitoring of flows to and from 
employment, upgrading the existing software system and introducing a new 
one, if necessary, as well as enriching services with new modern methodological 
tools;
• supporting technical activities for the implementation of the project and 
preparing expert and technical studies relevant to the objectives and needs of 
the PES.
The PES Monitor report also identifies special target groups who are entitled to 
employment counselling. These groups are: the disabled; people with severe 
health problems, people who receive social welfare allowance; single mothers; 
and drug addicts.
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Strengths	of	performance	management	system	in	place
No literature or comments on the strengths of the performance measurement 
framework were found.
Weaknesses	of	performance	management	system	in	place
No literature or comments on the weaknesses of the performance measurement 
framework were found.
Planned	changes
Under the priority of increasing flexibility in the labour market, the Cypriot 
Department of Labour states its aim to enhance and modernise PES. This will 
involve the provision of a decentralised service which provides personalised and 
specialised services to specific categories of people.
Sources
Cyprus Department of Labour Employment Policy (2008).
CyprusNet on ‘Cyprus Labor’ – http://www.cyprusnet.com/article_cyprus-labor
eInclusion@EU, ICT and Flexible Work and Retirement Schemes. Legislative and 
regulatory framework (Cyprus): 
http://www.einclusion-eu.org/ShowCase.asp?CaseTitleID=797&CaseID=2401&M
enuID=191
Planning Bureau (2007). National Reform Programme of Cyprus. Progress Report 
October 2007.
Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance (2004) National Action Plan for Employment 
2004-2006.
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/employment_strategy/nap_2004/
nap2004cy_en.pdf
Czech Republic
Description	of	performance	management	system	in	place
The economy of the Czech Republic has grown rapidly over the last decade, 
with success marked by the country being the first to ‘graduate’ from its status 
as a transition country in the eyes of the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development. GDP growth has tended to surge ahead of other Accession 
countries and the Euro-Area (Eurostat), and was particularly strong after 2005 
(Government_of_Czech_Republic 2006). Since 2000 economic performance has 
been increasingly driven by strong export performance and resulting increases in 
Foreign Direct Investment rather than domestic demand (Government_of_Czech_
Republic 2008), suggesting that despite strong performance thus far, economic 
contraction in the country’s export markets may hit growth in the near future. 
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Employment has also been toward the upper ranges of the Accession countries 
and while the unemployment rate has fluctuated it was comparatively low at just 
under 4.5 per cent in 2007-08 and the number of vacancies registered with the 
PES began to increase, suggesting a tightening labour market (Government_of_
Czech_Republic, 2008: 64-5), though it should be noted that under Czech law 
employers are obliged to register vacancies and there are punitive sanctions if this 
is not done (Kalužná, 2008: 6). 
During 2007 the Czech Government implemented a new Labour Code which 
liberalised and reduced some aspects of employment regulation with the intention 
of promoting a more flexible labour market. The government has also simplified the 
benefits system, at the same time introducing activation measures and incentives 
and sanctions, through unemployment benefit levels, to encourage active job 
search among the unemployed (Government_of_Czech_Republic, 2006:35-7). 
This is set against a noted problem of a large proportion of the potential workforce 
being registered as inactive (Kalužná, 2008: 6). The PES is currently a department 
of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs though there have been several debates 
about the development of an agency type structure and the merger of employment 
services and benefits administration. The failure to implement these measures, 
resulted at least in part, from the objections of municipalities that reform would 
centralise administrative functions and power with detrimental effect. In the past 
it has also been noted that a lack of coordination between central policy design 
and local implementation has resulted in low levels of coherence in the delivery 
of employment services. The national government has attempted to remedy this 
more recently by appointing regional officials to act as a link between national 
policy and local implementation and the establishment of detailed controls and 
performance measures. However, these appear to be based on input/output 
measures rather than outcome measures. For instance, input measures include 
detailed prescriptions for the proportion of devolved budget resource that must 
be dedicated to the different priority groups and output measures relate to the 
achievement of this in the sense of percentage of job seekers from particular 
groups participating in specific interventions (Kalužná, 2008: 16-17).
The response from the PES and national expert to our consultation confirmed this 
position. However, data reported in external reviews suggests that detailed input/
output data such as number of specific interventions and even some intermediate 
outcome data such as placements into work is collected and this source also reports 
efforts to better understand the destinations of off-flows from benefits other than 
to work and off-flows to work without a PES intervention (Kalužná, 2008).
The target beneficiary groups are set out nationally and are reported in the Lisbon 
Strategy National Reform Programme (Government_of_Czech_Republic 2008: 
66) where final outcome indicators (employment rate) are also set:
• overall employment rate of 70 per cent; 
• female employment rate of 60 per cent; and
• elderly workers (aged 55 to 65) employment rate of 50 per cent.
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Evidence from elsewhere (PES_Monitor 2007) suggests that the following are also 
target groups for the PES:
• parents returning to work after maternity leave or parental leave;
• young job seekers under age 25;
• persons with health limitations;
• persons over age 50;
• the long-term unemployed.
Strengths	of	performance	management	system	in	place
No literature or comments on the strengths of the performance measurement 
framework were found.
Weaknesses	of	performance	management	system	in	place
No literature or comments on the strengths of the performance measurement 
framework were found.
Planned	changes
No literature or comments on planned changes to the performance measurement 
framework were found.
Sources
Government_of_Czech_Republic (2006). Implementation	Report	2006:	National	
Lisbon	 Programme	 2005-2008 (National Reform Programme of the Czech 
Republic). Prague, Government of the Czech Republic.
Government_of_Czech_Republic (2008). National	 Reform	 Programme	 of	 the	
Czech	Republic	2008-2010. Prague, Government of the Czech Republic.
Kalužná, D. (2008). Main	Features	of	the	Public	Employment	Service	in	the	Czech	
Republic. OECD Social Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 74. 
Paris, OECD.
PES_Monitor (2007). PES Monitor Database Country Report: Czech Republic, PES 
Monitor.
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Denmark
Description	of	performance	management	system	in	place
Employment services in Denmark underwent reorganisation in 2007, with the 
establishment of jobcentres to be responsible for both local authority (municipality) 
and central government employment programmes. The reform included the 
merging of two previous agencies in the area: the local authority employment 
services and the PES, but the amalgamation was not carried out uniformly. Two 
different models of organisation were agreed upon, with different degrees 
of integration between the local authority functions and the state functions 
(Eskelinen, 2008).
A central element in the employment service reform has been the introduction 
of new tools for planning, managing and monitoring employment measures. 
These tools are intended to have two purposes: one is to support the jobcentres 
in planning their employment measures; the other is to ensure accountability. 
The tools are intended to reflect and support the new management strategy, 
which focuses on outcomes rather than activities. The main tools that have been 
introduced are: 
• Performance Audit – each year the municipalities and the state must carry out 
a performance audit of each jobcentre’s overall employment efforts and the 
division of responsibilities between the municipality and state levels. The audit 
includes effects and outcomes of the given jobcentre’s activities compared with 
other jobcentres. The relevant Regional Employment Councils (there are four 
regional employment councils, which are tripartite) receive the performance 
audit for consideration and may make recommendations as part of their 
monitoring function (Danish Employment Service, 2009); 
• Employment Plan – based partly on the performance audit, and contributed to 
by Local Employment Councils that support the Regional Employment Councils, 
the employment plan is also based on the Ministry of Employment’s targets for 
the measures and the analysis reports compiled by the regional employment 
councils. Jointly supervising the jobcentres with the Regional Employment 
Councils are the four Employment Regions, who closely follow up the results 
achieved in the jobcentres by undertaking regular analyses. Each quarter, 
an analysis is conducted of the progress made in the jobcentres which have 
relatively similar framework conditions for their employment efforts.
Findings from these analyses are reviewed between the Employment Regions and 
the jobcentres biannually or quarterly. All aspects of performance, employment 
measures, and benefit-related data are supported through the use of the official 
web portal jobindsats.dk (Hendeliowitz, 2008).
The Instructions for Preparation of the Performance Audit 2009 (jobindsats, 
2009) include the headline Ministry of Employment Targets for the jobcentres. 
Each jobcentre is required to report on its performance in relation to the headline 
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targets, and address any need for improvements in their 2009 Employment Plans. 
The three employment policy priorities against which each jobcentre must improve 
its performance are: 
• the number of people unemployed for more than three continuous months 
must be reduced (measured by outflows from unemployment); 
• jobcentres must increase the number of eligible claimants being referred to the 
‘New Chance for All’ programme, with the additional target that 25 per cent of 
those currently receiving assistance or training via the scheme to have found a 
job or moved into accredited education;
• jobcentres must reduce the number of benefit claimants who are aged under 
30 (measured by outflows from unemployment).
Strengths	of	performance	management	system	in	place
A perceived advantage of the new institutional design is that it – albeit still 
formally a two-tier system – allows for much closer co-ordination and co-operation 
between the civil servants from the former PES and the social assistance branch 
of the municipalities. Thus, the competencies of the former PES staff (focused on 
the demand for labour) and the social assistance officers (focused more on the 
social problems of the individual clients) are now brought together in the new 
jobcentres (Kongshøj Madsen, 2006) (Walker and Sankey, 2008).
Weaknesses	of	performance	management	system	in	place
However, the two former organisations in the Joint Jobcentres are, to date, 
continuing their traditions in relation to the target groups with which they have 
the greatest competence; and whilst they work closely in relation to enrolment, 
the local labour market service, and the processing of claimants closest to the 
labour market, there is common staffing in these areas but still parallel practice 
(Eskelinen, 2008).
Planned	changes
No literature or comments on planned changes could be found.
Sources
Eskelinen, L. (2008). Jobcentre	 Management	 and	 Organisation:	 First-Year	
Experiences	 of	 the	 Joint	 Jobcentres	 AKF Working Paper http://wwwakf.dk/
udgivelser_en/2008/jobcentre/
Kongshøj Madsen, P. (2006). Contribution	 to	 the	 EEO	 Autumn	 Review	 2006	
‘Flexicurity’: Denmark Brussels: European Employment Observatory.
Walker, B. & Sankey, S. (2008). International	 review	 of	 effective	 governance	
arrangements	for	employment-related	initiatives DWP Research Report No 543, 
Norwich: HMSO.
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Hendeliowitz, J. (2008). Danish	 Employment	 Policy:	 National	 Target	 Setting,	
Regional	 Performance	 Management	 and	 Local	 Delivery	 Roskilde: Employment 
Region Copenhagen & Zealand.
Instructions for Preparation of Performance Audits (2009). http://www.jobindsats.
dk/graphics/Publikationer.
Estonia
Description	of	performance	management	system	in	place
The Estonian labour market has undergone profound changes over the last 
two decades. Up until 1990 the country operated a state socialist economic 
management system. Since then the country first implemented ‘big bang’ 
liberalisation of its capital, commodity and labour markets and has since instigated 
profound legislative and institutional reform as part of the process of accession 
to the EU. Immediately after liberalisation the employment rate fell but since that 
time has recovered gradually and stood at 69.5 per cent in 2007 which was higher 
than both the EU average and the average position in other Accession states. 
However, more recently the unemployment rate has begun to increase as a result 
of the general economic downturn.
Over recent years the Estonian government has begun to move to a more flexible 
labour market, reducing employment protection legislation and instead investing 
in ALMPs. In the past ALMPs were provided by the Estonian Labour Market Board 
(ELMB) and the Unemployment Insurance Fund administered benefit payments. 
The two organisations are though in the early phase of merger.
Precise details of any specific performance measurement framework used by the 
Estonian Labour Market Board were difficult to find and the consultation response 
from the Estonian PES was that no such indicators are used. However, the ELMB 
does produce an annual report in which a qualitative narrative assessment of its 
performance is offered. This focuses on general labour market information such 
as the employment and unemployment rate as well as specific data on a number 
of target vulnerable groups which are established in legislation:
• those aged 55+;
• 16-24 year olds;
• people without proficiency in Estonian;
• carers;
• long-term unemployed (six months plus for young people, 12 months plus for 
others);
• disabled people.
The review also presents data on the number of beneficiaries benefiting from 
specific services such as career counselling, labour market training, ‘work practice’, 
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‘coaching for working life’, public work, wage subsidy, business start-up subsidy 
and a support person. In addition, data on vacancies (stock and flow) are reported 
as are the number of off-flows from benefit. The ‘reemployment level’ (the number 
of people who return to work as a proportion of the total unemployed) is also 
reported and this is compared to the previous year. No details of a target level 
for any of these indicators are evident. Finally, the review reports on budgets and 
take-up of particular funding streams (e.g. those set aside for match-funding EU-
supported projects).
Much more detailed statistical information is available on the ELMB website but 
this is not available in English.
Separately to this, the Estonian government have established several relevant 
targets and indicators as part of the EES. The 2005-07 Action Plan for Growth and 
Jobs suggested that a new results-based motivation system would be introduced 
in the PES in 2006 and a ‘social information’ system would be introduced to 
improve the quality of information regarding vulnerable groups. It also established 
several relevant indicators and targets:
• number of long-term unemployed;
• share of registered unemployed participating in labour market programmes;
• share of participants in training programmes who move into employment;
• employment rate of disabled people.
The Action Plan also set target expectations for 2007. The most recent 2008 
Action Plan shifts the emphasis toward improving flexibility. The strategy therefore 
sets different targets concerned with improving rankings on external measures of 
labour market rigidity and a target associated with increasing the proportion of 
the workforce in part-time employment.
In addition to this a small number of evaluations of employment services has been 
produced but these do not appear to be available in published format in English.
Strengths	of	performance	management	system	in	place
No literature or comments on the strengths of the performance measurement 
framework were found.
Weaknesses	of	performance	management	system	in	place
No literature or comments on the weaknesses of the performance measurement 
framework were found.
Planned	changes
No literature or comments on planned changes to the performance measurement 
framework were found, but the ELMB and Unemployment Insurance Fund are 
in the process of merger which will take place in April 2009. This may mark an 
opportunity for changes to the performance measurement framework.
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Sources
Data comes from Eurostat (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pa
geid=1090,30070682,1090_33076576&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL) and 
specific data quoted is employment rate for 15-64 year olds. http://epp.eurostat.
ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=ts
iem010.
Vork, A. and Leetmaa, R. (2007). Estonian	 labour	 market:	 overview	 and	
new	 challenges, Praxis Centre for Policy Studies, Talinn: www.praxis.ee/data/
Estonianlabourmarket.pps
Government of the Republic of Estonia (2005), Action	Plan	for	Growth	and	Jobs	
2005-07, Talinn, http://www.riigikantselei.ee/failid/1.October_2005_Estonian_
Action_Plan_for_Growth_and_Jobs.pdf
Government of the Republic of Estonia (2008), Action	Plan	for	Growth	and	Jobs	
2008-11, Talinn, http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/pdf/member-states-2008-
2010-reports/2008%2010%2009%20Estonian%20Action%20Plan%202008-
2011_EN_final.pdf
Leetmaa, R. (2008), ‘Improving access to the labour market for people at its 
margins: Statements and Comments’, http://pdf.mutual-learningemployment.
net/pdf/IE08/Estonia_IE08.pdf 
Leetmaa, R. (2008), Improving	access	to	the	labour	market	for	people	at	its	margins	
Statements	 and	Comments, in Vocational	 training	 for	people	 at	 the	margin	of	
the	labour	market:	The	Individual	Learner	Plan	–	A	new	approach,	Ireland. Peer 
Review report of the Mutual Learning Programme of the European Employment 
Strategy, http://pdf.mutual-learning-employment.net/pdf/IE08/Estonia_IE08.pdf
Tööturuamet TTA, Estonian Labour Market Board (2008), Estonian	 Labour	
Market	 Board	Annual	 Report, TTA: Talinn, Estonia, http://www.tta.ee/failid/tta_
yearbook2007.pdf 
Finland
Description	of	performance	management	system	in	place
The structures of PES were overhauled between 2004 and 2007. The goal of 
this reform was to ensure the availability of labour and reduce structural 
unemployment. In order to ensure the labour supply, employment office services 
were heavily geared towards open labour market services, labour exchange and 
employer services. To support the early phase job seeker service, a profiling system 
was developed to help employment officers recognise clients facing the threat of 
prolonged unemployment. New development guidelines were also drafted in order 
to modernise the job application and employment plan. New policy guidelines for 
using job offers and job allocation more effectively and new guidelines to support 
active job seeking were drafted for employment offices (European Commission, 
2008a).
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Between 2004 and 2007, the then Ministry of Labour (MOL) divided the PES into 
two parts: one to provide job-broking services and the other services for hard-to-
reach groups. The employment offices providing the job-broking services are now 
called ‘Job Search Centres’, and together the two-part services are now termed 
‘Labour Force Service Centres’ (LAFOS). Recent evaluations commissioned by the 
Finnish Ministry of Employment have concluded that new indicators should be 
developed for monitoring the performance of service centres to measure both the 
effects on welfare and employment. Data on the changes in short- and long-term 
unemployment indicate that, thus far, the establishment of the LAFOS has had 
little effect on the number of unemployed.
There was evidence of a strengthening of positive effects in 2006, when the 
eligibility for receiving unemployment benefits was tightened and a funding 
incentive for municipalities was created for encouraging unemployed people 
in the most difficult situations to participate in activation measures (European 
Employment Observatory, 2008).
Since 2006, the Finnish Ministry of Finance requires all public sector organisations 
to implement performance measures as tools for target setting and performance 
management (Rantanen et	al., 2007). Every administrative field is responsible for 
creating its own performance criteria ‘prism/triangle of performance’ and respective 
monitoring systems. Annual performance targets for the labour administration set 
in the budget 2006 referred to indicators on the: 
• minimum numbers of jobs to be filled;
• average number of days that jobs subsequently filled were open;
• percentage of those participating in labour market training who had found 
employment two months after the training;
• maximum percentage of those unemployed three months after vocational 
labour policy adult education; and
• maximum percentage of those unemployed three months after subsidized 
employment (Salimen and Vitala, 2006).
A 2006 review of the effectiveness and operational efficiency of the PES reported 
that when developing better indicators for monitoring the employment strategy, the 
jobseeker statistics provide the primary source of management by objective (MBO) 
information system (the ‘flow-stock model’ of employment, measuring structural 
employment, recruitment problems, and so on). The main recommendations were 
that criteria of performance should be measured on the level of the employment 
office; and that knowledge management calls for active use of new monitorial 
tools, such as benchmarking and Value Driving Score Card (Nio, 2006). Currently, 
labour policy performance indicators are allocated to employment offices on the 
basis of common criteria (e.g. size of workforce, number of unemployed, number of 
vacancies, unemployment rate, and number of job seekers not easily employable). 
The underlying criteria are the combination of these factors expressed as a 
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certain weighting coefficient. The regional allocation of indicators is provisionally 
agreed upon in negotiations on performance targets and confirmed by central 
government. The quality of feedback given by job seekers and employers, via an 
annual telephone survey, is also a functional performance target.
Among the responsibilities of the 15 regional Employment and Economic 
Development Centres (TE-Centres) is to steer the work of the employment offices 
in line with MOL policy. The TE-Centres supervise the employment offices in terms 
of performance, and provide staff training and other support. The TE-Centres and 
employment offices have considerable powers of decision on matters concerning 
their own field, within the framework of management by results.
Performance targets for the TE-Centres and employment offices for 2008 carried 
the main objective of improving the viability of the labour market and the availability 
of the workforce. Among these targets were indicators referring to the:
• maximum period for which jobs are vacant;
• minimum proportion of jobs filled through the job-matching service;
• minimum proportion of labour market entries within three months of vocational 
training and employment subsidy (PES Monitor, 2009).
Among the headline performance indicators for 2009, against which the different 
LAFOS offices have individual targets, are a:
• percentage figure which the proportion of unemployment periods exceeding 
three months must not exceed; and
• minimum percentage of job seekers achieving employment following completion 
of some accredited training or subsidised work (Nio, 2006).
Strengths	of	performance	management	system	in	place
No literature or comments concerning the strength of performance management 
in place could be found.
Weaknesses	of	performance	management	system	in	place
The recent overhauling of the Finnish PES has been argued to have led to difficulties 
in instilling a management by target system to include dependable indicators. 
However, some progress can be seen to have been made in setting indicators that 
accurately reflect the activities and performance of local PES offices.
Planned	changes
Following Ministerial reforms, a process of redesigning the management by results 
has recently been introduced. The reforms are planned for the next round of 
management by results for 2009 (PES Monitor, 2009).
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Sources
European Commission (2008). The	Lisbon	Strategy	 for	Growth	and	 Jobs	–	The	
Finnish	 National	 Reform	 Programme	 2005-2008. http://www.ec.europa.eu/
growthandjobs/pdf/nrp/FI_nrp_eu.pdf
European Employment Observatory (2008) EEO Review: Spring 2008 http://www.
eu-employment-observatory.net/resources/reviews/EEOReviewSpring2008-final.
pdf
Rantanen, H., Kulmala, H.I., Lönnqvist, A. & Kujansivu, P. (2007). ‘Performance 
Measurement Systems in the Finnish Public Sector’ in International	 Journal	 of	
Public	Sector	Management Vol. 20, No. 5 pp.415-433.
Salimen, M. & Vitala, M.J. (2006). Handbook	 on	 Performance Management 
Helsinki: Ministry of Finance.
Nio, I. (2006). Measuring	Effectiveness	and	Operational	Efficiency	of	the	Finnish	
PES Blue Paper 04.
France
Description	of	performance	management	system	in	place
Responsibility for the implementation of labour market policy is highly fragmented 
in France. The main employment service institutions are National Employment 
Office (ANPE), Adult Professional Education Association (AFPA), National Union for 
Industrial and Commercial Employment (UNEDIC), and the Employment Ministry.
The MBO approach based on ex-ante policy objectives and quantitative targets 
has been used in France since 1990, and was developed in two phases: first, its 
introduction in 1990; second, by the establishment of a ‘controlling’ department 
(Direction du Controle de Géstion), where a close link was formed between the 
allocation of funds, the targets and the results (Mosley et	al., 2000). Further, since 
the formation of the controlling department, the circumstances in the regions and 
different employment service institutions have been considered in setting targets.
ANPE develops an annual programme of objectives with quantitative targets based 
on a five-year progress agreement with the French state. Changes in political 
priorities have led to changes in indicators. In recent years, ANPE’s targets have 
been set in relation to: 
• its market share of vacancies and/or placements; 
• the reduction of long-term unemployment generally and among young people 
(measured through off-flows); and 
• the referring of unemployed adults to AFPA.
Objectives for the ANPE identified in 2006 (PES Austria 2006) included a greater 
focus on the return-to-job process by using indicators of context, input and 
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outcomes. Indicators of context were specified according to particular objectives 
and were as follows:
• ‘Preventing and acting against long-term unemployment (LTU) – number of LTU 
(more than one year and two years old*); under 25 LTU (1 year)’ (p.31).
• Tackling discrimination against older workers and the disabled in the labour 
market – rate of employment of the sub-group 50/64 years old and the number 
of disabled unemployed.
• Acting against social exclusion – the number of beneficiaries of the minimum 
incomes required for social integration. 
Indicators of outcome related to:
• improvements in the return-to-work process for the long-term unemployed – 
judged by a sustainable (at least six months) exit rate at 18 months;
• the return-to-job rate of certain sub-groups – young people, the disabled, older 
workers (over 50), LTU and beneficiaries of minimum incomes. 
Indicators of inputs concerned the provision of services including guidance, 
subsidised jobs and vocational training.
A survey by AMS for the European Commission found that the French management 
information system (MIS) links performance indicators to tasks:
• improvement of services directed to job seekers and companies (task 1):
– sustainable exit (at least six months) rate at 18 months after registration;
– first exit rate at three, six and 12 months (including partial activities);
– number of filled vacancies;
– number of filled vacancies with PES candidates;
– number of job seekers by search process (accelerated, active and accompanied);
– realisation of the personalised monthly monitoring interview;
– rate of job seekers where it has been two months without proposition of 
vacancies;
– rate of registered vacancies with pre-selection from PES;
– delay of vacancies fulfilment;
• rate of vacancies registered for more than one month and without proposal of 
candidates from PES;
• visits to companies;
• specific actions for disadvantaged people (task 2):
– semi-sustainable (at least three months) exit rate for disadvantaged groups 
(disabled, over 50, beneficiaries of minimum incomes, under 25 long-term 
unemployed, very long-term unemployed);
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– number of filled vacancies with PES candidates;
– rate of registered vacancies with pre-selection from PES.
• developing coordinated services with the Assédic (in charge of insurance 
benefits) (task 3):
– time between registration in Assédic and date of the first professional 
interview at ANPE (AMS Austria, 2008).
The European PES Monitor lists the major strategic indicators in France that are 
tracked at the national level and also watched by the regions, as being:
• vacancies filled;
• vacancies filled by Positive Contact-Making;
• exits of long-term unemployed individuals, out of work for more than two years;
• exits of recipients of minimum income for social integration and special solidarity 
allowances;
• total exits before the 12th month;
• exits of job seekers age 50 and above;
• placement target for vocational platforms (number of hires);
• volumes of first exit, at six months.
*sic. This could mean the number of LTU out of work for a year and a half or more.
Strengths	of	performance	management	system	in	place
Some indicators, such as number of vacancies registered, have proved to be more 
useful than others due to being easy to understand. Another past example was 
the goal of reducing long-term unemployment which needed start-up time in the 
beginning until the establishment of the correct usage of indicators.
Weaknesses	of	performance	management	system	in	place
Indicators that have been used in the past include the ANPE’s market share of 
vacancies and placements, though this was difficult to measure reliably.
Planned	changes
The next ‘performance contract’ is to be focused on the return-to-job process 
with a more personalised and contractual approach to the relationship between 
advisers and their unemployed clients. 
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Sources
Mosley, H., Schütz, H. and Breyer, N. (2000) Operational	Objectives	and	Performance	
Indicators	in	European	Public	Employment	Services. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum 
Berlin für Sozialforschung (Research Unit Labour Market Policy and Employment).
Public Employment Service Austria (AMS) (2006). Public	Employment	Services	in	
Europe:	A	large	spectrum	of	missions.
AMS Austria (2008). Management	Information	Systems:	A	questionnaire. France. 
April 2008. AMS Austria.
http://www.pesmonitor.eu/Database/CountryReport.aspx?PES=9
Germany
Description	of	performance	management	system	in	place
Germany is a federal state and responsibility for economic development and 
employment policies is divided between the German states (Bundesländer) and 
the national government. Reforms that came into effect in January 2005 (Hartz, 
IV) now give the national PES primary responsibility for all unemployed persons 
in local jobcentres. However, local authorities still play an important role in the 
management of these jobcentres and in providing social services to all unemployed 
persons not eligible for unemployment insurance benefit (Finn et	al., 2005).
Since 1998, the German PES has undergone a major transformation influenced 
by new public management models, especially MBO, in which annual goals and 
corresponding indicators for the PES are formulated and performance monitored. 
The PES is primarily responsible not only for providing labour market statistics 
and monitoring the development of the labour market, but also for evaluating its 
own labour market programmes. However, the evaluation of the on-going Hartz 
reforms was mandated via the reform legislation and so the task of evaluation is 
the responsibility of the Labour Ministry and not by the PES own research institute, 
the IAB (Mosley, 2006).
Since 2004, the four PES Regional Directorates agree with their local jobcentres 
on performance targets based on the objectives set by the central PES. The central 
performance indicator for the jobcentres is the number of reintegrations of job 
seekers into the labour market. To minimise the effect of external variables and to 
consider regional differences in the labour market that affect the performance of 
the jobcentres, they are benchmarked against jobcentres with comparable labour 
market structures in league tables. The budget for the jobcentres is bound to 
their planned number of integrations and the performance of each jobcentre is 
monitored monthly by the Regional Directorates. In addition to these performance 
indicators, the jobcentres have to fulfil a number of quality standards for their 
standard procedures. A central data warehouse has been set up to deliver data on 
performance and procedures in each Jobcentre (Vaut, 2006; Walwei, 2005).
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(Tergeist and Grubb, 2006) state that Germany classifies job seekers into four 
groups: 
(1) ‘market clients’ who need no support since they are expected to find a new 
job rapidly;
(2) those who need support with motivation and job-search strategies;
(3) those with skills deficits or other obstacles that need specific measures; and
(4) clients who are not considered placeable within the next 12 months (p.24). 
Our consultation found that single labour offices are given targets concerning the 
‘reduction of unemployment’ and count performance indicators relating to: 
• activities (number of participants in various ALMP programmes expenditures);
• outputs (number of placements); 
• levels (numbers) of people who flow off unemployment or inactive benefits (for 
different programmes); and 
• how quickly people move off benefits (by duration of unemployment and 
duration of participation in ALMP programmes).
The European PES Monitor states that the guiding concepts of the Bundesagentur 
für Arbeit (BA) include a clear commitment to outcome-oriented management. A 
reform process began in 2002 with the goals of faster job placement and stronger 
customer orientation. Since then, the focal point has been the ‘Customer Centre,’ 
with the local Employment Agencies following a performance-oriented business 
system. With the aim of reducing differences between the agencies and also 
improving the average results for all agencies together, interregional comparisons 
have been introduced with a subdivision of agency districts into strategy types and 
comparison types.
The reform process also introduced a new set of oversight and management 
principles with the core aims of systematising the BA’s tasks clearly, within the 
bounds set by legal requirements and client expectations, and setting up an 
outcome-oriented system for management and oversight. Specific outcome 
targets are increasingly being tied to the employment service’s budget. Those 
targets are:
• minimising the duration of factual unemployment;
• optimising the outflow;
• optimising the in-flow into vocational trainings;
• enabling taking part in working life;
• enhancement of (BA‘s) employees‘ satisfaction, and motivation; and
• operative process optimising.
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Indicators connected with these targets are:
• transition to employment from unemployment;
• transition to employment before unemployment lasts long;
• transition from training measures to employment;
• opening access to a large share of vacancies through the PES information 
system;
• vacancies filled; and
• achieving customer satisfaction of job seekers and employers.
Further detail on the management of Germany’s PES comes from responses to 
a questionnaire conducted by AMS on the management information system. In 
addition to the tasks and indicators listed above are the following:
Tasks:
• successful career entry of job starters;
• participation in working life of disabled people;
• management by objectives, including target agreements for executive staff;
• benchmarking of all ten regional directorates and local PES offices.
Indicators:
• duration of unemployment of benefit recipients and non benefit recipients;
• ratio of integrations to customer potential (‘degree of integration’);
• ratio of job-to-job-integrations to customer potential job-to-job (‘degree of 
integration “job-to-job”’);
• integrations in vocational training;
• rate of application for vocational training without training position;
• rate of entries of customers of occupational rehabilitation;
• quality management index; and
• number of successfully implemented personnel development actions (AMS 
Austria 2008).
Strengths	of	performance	management	system	in	place
Tergeist and Grubb (2006) state that the introduction of contestability and quasi-
market mechanisms in Germany (along with the UK and Netherlands) has been 
a novel feature designed to facilitate the reintegration of benefit recipients 
through more intensive interventions. Furthermore, ‘Germany’s contracting-out 
programmes are currently more ambitious than the UK’s. Initial results have been 
relatively disappointing, but the reforms have not been operating for long enough 
to draw definitive conclusions about their effectiveness’ (p.4).
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Survey response – Major strengths of the system are quick reaction to LM 
imbalances, equal treatment of unemployed, long experience in ALMP.
Weaknesses	of	performance	management	system	in	place
Survey response – major weakness of the system is little response to regional 
imbalances and standardised programmes.
Planned	changes
No literature or comments on planned changes to the performance measurement 
framework were found.
Sources
Mosley, H., Schütz, H. and Breyer, N. (2000). Operational Objectives and Performance 
Indicators in European Public Employment Services. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum 
Berlin für Sozialforschung (Research Unit Labour Market Policy and Employment).
Tergeist, P. and Grubb, D. (2006). Activation Strategies and the Performance of 
Employment Services in Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
Paris: OECD.
Jacobi, L. and Kluve, J. (2006). Before and After the Hartz Reforms: The Performance 
of Active Labour Market Policy in Germany. IZA Discussion Paper No. 2100.
Konle-Seidl, R. (2004). Performance Indicators for Public Employment Services: 
Efficiency of Organizational Architecture. Nürnberg: Bundesagentur für Arbeit.
Mosley, H. (2006). Governance and evaluation of labour market policy in Germany: 
Statements and Comments. 
Greece
Description	of	performance	management	system	in	place
Public Employment Services (PES) are known as Centres for the Promotion of 
Employment (KPA).
KPAs use jobseeker profiling to assess unemployed people in order to identify 
their potential and particular needs for professional guidance. The European 
Commission (European Employment Observatory) states that KPAs classify job 
seekers into four groups: 
(1) ‘job-ready’ clients who need little support since they are considered able to 
find a new job quickly;
(2) those who need limited support (e.g. short-term training) prior to engaging in 
job search; 
(3) those with skill deficits who need intensive support; and
(4) ‘hard-to-place’ candidates who need additional services (e.g. supportive 
services for those threatened by social exclusion). 
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A preliminary evaluation of the new employment services involved, among other 
things, devising 21 indicators for assessing performance, and collecting detailed 
information on various aspects of KPAs’ day-to-day operations. Ten of these relate 
to input and output, nine to achievements (results), and two are meant to measure 
personnel effort (Karantinos 2003; Karantinos 2006).
Our survey found that the main indicator used for assessing performance is ‘PES 
penetration’. This is defined as the proportion of vacancies in the open market 
filled through the PES.
Strengths	of	performance	management	system	in	place
No literature or comments on the strengths of the performance measurement 
framework were found.
Weaknesses	of	performance	management	system	in	place
No literature or comments on the strengths of the performance measurement 
framework were found.
Planned	changes
Raising the quantity of vacancies notified to KPA and improving the vacancy-filling 
performance are among OAEDs future objectives. Evaluation of the individualised 
assistance programme (preventative services) delivered by the Centres for 
Employment Promotion (KPAs) ‘merit high priority in the Greek context’. 
The gradual development of OAED (Greek Manpower Employment Organisation) 
Management Information System (MIS), which incorporates and upgrades the 
existing applications, includes the management and monitoring of all services 
provided (Hellenic Republic Ministry of Economy and Finance, 2007).
Sources
Hellenic Republic Ministry of Economy and Finance (2007), National Reform 
Programme 2005-2008, Implementation Report 2007.
‘Greece:	Preventative	services	and	the	individualised	approach	to	unemployment	
in	Greece’, in European Commission (2006). European Employment Observatory 
Review: Spring 2006. Brussels: European Commission, Directorate-General for 
Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities.
Karantinos, D. (2006). How	 to	 govern	 and	 evaluate	 labour	 market	 policies:	
Statements	and	Comments. National Centre for Social Research (EKKE).
Karantinos, D. (2003). Jobcentre	 Plus	 Rapid	 Response	 Service:	 Statements	 and	
Comments. EKKE National Centre for Social Research.
Inserjovem and Reage Initiatives: a Preventive Approach. Executive Summary, 
2000, Portugal
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Hungary
Description	of	performance	management	system	in	place
Since the beginning of the decade Hungary has experienced generally stable and 
high rates of economic growth with annual growth in real GDP ranging between 
four and five per cent (Eurostat: Real GDP Growth). However, growth stalled in 
2007, falling to 1.1 per cent in 2007, reflecting the dampening impact of a fiscal 
stabilisation programme and the early effects of the world economic slowdown 
(European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2008c). Growth is forecast 
to be negative in 2009 (Hungarian Government, 2008:6).
Over the last decade the employment rate has been lower than elsewhere in the 
EU but has increased from around 52 per cent to just over 57 per cent in 2007 
(Eurostat: Employment rate). The unemployment rate, at about seven per cent, is 
around the EU (25) average (Eurostat: Unemployment rate). 
The system of unemployment and social insurance benefits as well as the 
organisation of PES has undergone significant reform in recent years (Dupont 
et	 al., 2004; Hungarian Government 2008; National_Employment_and_Social_
Office, 2008). The PES has also adopted ALMPs as a mechanism to divert the 
emphasis of the organisation from the administration to the activation of the 
unemployed. Tighter controls on benefit eligibility and conditionality are in the 
process of being adopted (Hungarian Government, 2008:111).
The Hungarian PES has adopted an MBO approach to performance management 
(National_Employment_and_Social_Office, 2008:55-6). The 2007 Labour Market 
Yearbook suggests that there are eight central performance indicators as part of 
this. Though these are not set out in full it appears as if the following are included:
• rate of placements into jobs (expressed as a percentage);
• rate of entrants to training (expressed as a percentage);
• rate of people existing on active measures (an intervention) and not going back 
onto the register (expressed as a percentage).
The 2006 Yearbook (Hungarian_Public_Employment_Service, 2007:17) sets out 
the nine performance indicators used in 2006/07:
• number and rate of off-flows from registered and unregistered unemployment;
• number and rate of registered job seekers (unemployed) involved in labour 
market training;
• number and development of vacancies (labour demand) reported in the given 
period (not including the demand for overseas labour);
• average duration of notified vacancies (in days);
• rate of the average number of active measure participants to the aggregate 
average number of active measure participants and job seekers (unemployed);
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• from among the former active measure participants, the rate of people no 
longer among the registered job seekers/registered unemployed three months 
after the termination of their respective programmes;
• rate of having entered the registration system six months earlier (persons 
under 25), or 12 months earlier (persons over 25), having received support 
(participation in an active measure) over that period (whether or not they were 
registered unemployed);
• percentage rate of registered job-seekers/registered unemployed people on the 
same status six months (<15) or 12 months (>25) after having received support 
(participation in an active measure);
• aggregate of the client satisfaction indices worked out under the quality 
assurance system attached to the system of key performance indicators.
Some of these indicators appear to be underpinned by a new data management 
system (BEA_Systems 2006).
In addition, the Hungarian PES maintains a system for maintaining quality in 
licensed private employment services (Borbely and Kovi, 2005).
Strengths	of	performance	management	system	in	place
The expert response to our consultation suggested that the comprehensiveness of 
the indicator set is seen as a major strength of the system in place.
Weaknesses	of	performance	management	system	in	place
The expert response to our consultation suggested that a lack of transparency 
in how the indicator set is used is a major weakness. Target levels or analyses of 
successes and failures in relation to the indicators are not available in published 
form. As such the expert respondent felt that the performance measurement 
system used in Hungary was not at all effective in helping to understand the 
impact of PES activities on the labour market.
Planned	changes
No literature or comments on planned changes in performance measurement 
framework were found.
Sources
BEA_Systems (2006) BEA	 Systems	 Case	 Study:	 Hungarian	 Public	 Employment	
Service. ZDNet White Papers Volume, DOI:
European_Bank_for_Reconstruction_and_Development (2008). Hungary: 
Economic Overview, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
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Dupont, B., et	 al., (2004). Modernisation	 Manual	 of	 the	 Hungarian	 Public	
Employment	Service, Government of Hungary.
Borbely, T. and Kovi, L. (2005). Country	 Report:	 Hungary	 –	 Public	 and	 private	
services:	Towards	a	quality	management	system. H. PES, European Union.
Hungarian_Government (2008). National Action Programme or Growth and 
Employment 2008-2010: Compiled for the European Union Lisbon Strategy, 
Hungarian Government.
Hungarian_Public_Employment_Service (2007). Labour Market Yearbook, 
Hungarian_Government.
National_Employment_and_Social_Office (2008). Hungarian PES Yearbook of 
2007, National Employment and Social Office, Hungary.
Ireland
Description	of	performance	management	system	in	place
The Irish economy has performed well over recent years, leading to high levels 
of employment, peaking in 2007. The impact of the global economic crisis has 
already started to be felt on the labour market:
By the end of September, the:
‘numbers	signing	on	the	Live	Register	were	up	42	per	cent	since	the	end	of	
2007,	with	the	unemployment	rate	rising	from	4.6	per	cent	to	6.3	per	cent	
in	the	space	of	nine	months.’	
(National_Training_and_Employment_Authority, 2008a:2)
The response from the PES to our consultation suggested that Ireland does not 
have a headline performance indicator or targets. However, the organisation does 
monitor a range of indicators, including:
• the number of job vacancies notified to the PES and filled;
• the number of people (for certain categories) placed in employment;
• the number of people who completed training programmes;
• the National Training and Employment Authority (FÁS) – Ireland’s PES – publishes 
two relevant reports where similar indicators are published. The FÁS Annual 
Report (National_Training_and_Employment_Authority, 2008c: Appendix 3) 
covers a range of indicators on ‘throughput’ which presents the number of 
beneficiaries of particular training and employment services. In addition, the: 
– number of individuals who have left the live register;
– number of individuals undertaking an FÁS interview and of these – entered 
Jobs/FÁS Programmes/Education;
– total FÁS Interviewees leaving the live register.
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The FÁS Statement of Strategy for 2006-09 sets out a comprehensive set of 
performance indicators against each of the eight goals in the strategy. Many of 
these include qualitative indicators such as evaluation evidence and indeed the 
report suggests that a greater emphasis should be placed on this sort of qualitative 
information rather than statistical performance indicators (National_Training_and_
Employment_Authority, 2006:54). Those quantitative indicators that are present 
and relevant are largely under Goal 1: Entry to the Labour Market Performance 
Measurement Indicators and include:
• percentage of registered unemployed who are on the FÁS caseload;
• numbers on FÁS training and employment programmes;
• progression and placement outcomes;
• qualification outcomes;
• completion rates;
• feedback from formal reviews of programmes and services;
• level of participant and employer satisfaction with FÁS services.
On Goal 2: Workforce development, the indicators include:
• number of employees on FÁS supported training programmes;
• number of targeted workers on FÁS supported training programmes;
• number of vacancies notified and filled;
• qualification outcomes;
• apprenticeship completion rates.
In addition to this, the Irish Labour Market Review 2007 (National_Training_and_
Employment_Authority, 2008b) also tracks a range of general labour market 
indicators such as rates and make up of employment and unemployment. Similar 
indicators are presented on a quarterly basis.
More detailed information on the construction of targets is set out in organisational 
business plans which do not appear to be published (National_Training_and_
Employment_Authority, 2006:54).
Strengths	of	performance	management	system	in	place
No data on strengths was collected.
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Weaknesses	of	performance	management	system	in	place
The PES strategy suggests dissatisfaction with quantitative indicators:
‘Quantitative	measures	of	performance	based	on	activity	 (such	as	days	of	
training),	while	still	useful,	are	of	diminished	importance,	rather,	the	quality	
of	 service	 is	 of	 greater	 importance	 to	 customers.	 The	 emphasis	 of	 FÁS’	
Performance	Measurement	Indicators	will	be	increasingly	towards	qualitative	
measures	and	this	will	require	FÁS	increasingly	to	monitor	and	gain	feedback	
from	its	various	customers.’
(National_Training_and_Employment_Authority, 2006:54).
Planned	changes
The strategy period is now nearing its end and therefore there is likely to be a new 
strategy and potentially a new set of indicators.
Sources
National_Training_and_Employment_Authority (2006). Building	on	our	Vision:	FÁS	
Statement	of	Strategy	2006-2009, National Training and Employment Authority.
National_Training_and_Employment_Authority (2008). Annual	Report	2007, Irish 
National Training and Employment Authority.
National_Training_and_Employment_Authority (2008). Labour	 Market	 Review	
2007, National Training and Employment Authority.
National_Training_and_Employment_Authority (2008). FÁS	 Quarterly	 Labour	
Market	Commentary, National Training and Employment Authority.
Italy
Description	of	performance	management	system	in	place
A process of decentralisation of Italy’s PES began in 1997 and is the prominent 
feature of service provision. It has resulted in an enhanced role for regions, provinces 
and private actors. The process of devolution has meant significant organisational 
changes, including the abolition of public monopoly on job placement towards 
a more competitive and market oriented approach and the decentralisation of 
policy planning as well as provision of services. Central government does retain a 
role in devising general guidelines and performance indicators, though monitoring 
performance is often contracted out to independent organisations (e.g. ISFOL) on 
behalf of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies (European Commission, 2006; 
Borghi and Van Berkel, 2007). 
Our survey found that a performance indicator used by the regional/local PES 
gives information on the number of activities provided to target groups (e.g. 
unemployed and inactive people, women, etc). It also highlighted that regional and 
local authorities carry out specific surveys to monitor their activities and assess the 
overall performance of the labour market. Some information is provided about the 
target groups and the activities, but a comprehensive reporting system is missing. 
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At national level, the ISFOL (National Institute for Vocational Training) carries out a 
yearly survey on the quality of PES but no quantitative data is provided.
Italy is not a member of the European PES benchmarking initiative.
Strengths	of	performance	management	system	in	place
No literature or comments on the strengths of the performance measurement 
framework were found.
Weaknesses	of	performance	management	system	in	place
No literature or comments on the weaknesses of the performance measurement 
framework were found.
Planned	changes
No literature or comments on planned changes to the performance measurement 
framework were found.
Sources
European Commission (2006). Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities 
DG Approaches of Public Employment Services (PES ) to Long Term Unemployment, 
Draft report from seminar in Budapest 22-24 March 2006.
Borghi, V. and Van Berkel R. (2007) ‘New	modes	of	governance	in	Italy	and	the	
Netherlands:	the	case	of	activation	policies’, Public Administration Vol. 85, No. 1, 
(83–101).
Latvia
Description	of	performance	management	system	in	place
Like other East European countries, the Latvian economy experienced a period of 
profound and prolonged difficulty after a rapid transition to a market economy 
in the early 1990s and experienced further difficulties as a result of the financial 
crisis in Russia in the late 1990s. However, between the end of the 1990s and 
2008 economic growth has been strong, with real GDP growth in this period 
often registering in double figures. However, over the last year the economy 
has suffered from a series of problems including slowing growth, ballooning 
inflation, skills and labour shortages resulting from out-migration of the working-
age population to other parts of the EU and a declining trade balance (European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development 2008b, Government_of_Latvia, 2008). 
Indeed, inflation problems led the Latvian government to abandon plans to move 
to the third phase of Economic and Monetary Union and so adoption of the 
Euro has been delayed to 2012 at the earliest. At the end of 2008 Latvia was 
the subject of an emergency economic stabilisation package from a consortium 
of international agencies including the IMF, the EU and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and neighbouring governments such as the 
Czech Republic (International_Monetary_Fund 2008).
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Labour market policy in recent years has seen the introduction and strengthening 
of ALMPs, with specific programmes of support, training and work placements 
targeted at young people and women after periods out of the labour market 
while caring for young children and older workers. Other measures have 
included increased workplace regulation to promote health and safety and 
equal opportunities in recruitment. The Latvian government has also responded 
to labour shortages with policies and protocols to encourage return migration 
of Latvians currently working abroad. The government has also sought to bring 
undeclared work within the formal economy and to increase the minimum 
wage (Government_of_Latvia). Indeed the large proportion of employment in 
the informal and undeclared sector is a noted problem for the Latvian economy 
(European Commission, 2007a).
In the past the Latvian PES, the State Employment Agency, tracked individual 
customers who broke contact with the Agency via a phone call. This was also 
done where an individual is referred to an intermediary agency (e.g. a training 
or job search provider) and does not re-establish contact with the Agency or 
where a customer is placed with an employer (Vanags, 2004:2). However, the 
Latvian PES was a participant in the PES benchmarking project and as such should 
now be using the 11 indicators from this project (OSB Consulting and Synthesis 
Forschung, 2007).
Strengths	of	performance	management	system	in	place
No literature or comments on the strengths of the performance measurement 
framework were found.
Weaknesses	of	performance	management	system	in	place
No literature or comments on the weaknesses of the performance measurement 
framework were found.
Planned	changes
No literature or comments on planned changes in performance measurement 
framework were found.
Sources
European_Bank_for_Reconstruction_and_Development. (2008). Latvia	Economic	
Overview. Retrieved 12 January, 2009, from http://www.ebrd.com/country/
country/latvia/econo.htm.
European_Commission (2007). Communication	 from	 the	 Commission	 to	 the	
Council:	The	Commission	Draft	of	the	Joint	Employment	Report	2007/8. European 
Commission.
International_Monetary_Fund (2008).	IMF	Executive	Board	Approves	€1.68	Billion	
(US$2.35	 Billion)	 Stand-By	 Arrangement	 for	 Latvia. Press Release No. 08/345 
23 December, 2008 IMF.
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Latvia, G. o. (2007). Report	on	Progress	in	Implementation	of	the	National	Lisbon	
Programme	for	Latvia	for	2005-08, Government of Latvia.
Government_of_Latvia (2008). Report	 on	 Progress	 in	 Implementation	 of	 the	
National	Lisbon	Programme	of	Latvia, Government of Latvia.
Vanags, A. (2004). Data Warehouse (DWH) Monitoring	in	the	Public	Employment	
Service	 (PES):	 Comments	 and	 Statements	 Latvia. M. L. Programme European 
Commission.
Lithuania
Description	of	performance	management	system	in	place
Like other Accession countries, Lithuania has experienced strong GDP growth over 
recent years, with GDP growth topping ten per cent in 2003 and remaining above 
seven per cent since then (Eurostat). While export performance has been good, 
much of economic growth has been taken up by domestic demand (Government_
of_the_Republic_of_Lithuania, 2008). Nevertheless, the employment rate at 64 
per cent in 2007 is lower than some other Accession states and the EU average. 
However, the unemployment rate has fallen dramatically since 2000/01 when it 
stood at around 16 per cent to a low of 4.3 per cent in 2007 (Eurostat). The 
level of unemployment and labour shortages has been influenced since Accession 
by economic out-migration to higher-wage economies elsewhere in the EU 
(Government_of_the_Republic_of_Lithuania, 2008: 13).
The Lithuanian PES – the Lithuanian Labour Exchange – is part of the central 
Ministry of Social Security and Labour. The PES is national in scope but operates 
a network of 46 local labour exchange offices, some of which have voluntary 
local tripartite commissions made up of employers, trade unions and local public 
authorities which advise on local level employment and unemployment issues. In 
addition to national employment services there are a series of Local Employment 
Initiatives which aim to tackle regional disparities in employment.
The consultation with the PES and country expert revealed that the PES does use 
headline performance indicators but did not reveal the details of these. However, 
the PES publishes an annual report (Lithuanian_Labour_Market_Exchange, 2007) 
and a series of performance measures are reported in this. These include general 
indicators of labour market performance:
• employment, unemployment rate;
• working age population;
• job seekers, broken down by gender;
• unemployment insurance recipients;
• percentage of job seekers ‘among the able bodied population’.
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In addition the report also reports on:
• number of job placements (by contract type);
• registered vacancies (by type);
• participation in different types of ALMP;
• Local Employment Initiative project numbers and jobs created through these;
• average duration of unemployment, in months.
None of these indicators appear to have targets attached to them, on the basis of 
the published annual report.
Information on targeting and segmentation of customer groups was not found 
during the consultation on brief literature review. However, the annual report 
does track unemployment for the following different groups:
• men;
• women;
• rural residents;
• those without vocational qualifications;
• people with no previous employment;
• under 25s and over 50s.
Strengths	of	performance	management	system	in	place
No literature or comments on the strengths of the performance measurement 
framework were found.
Weaknesses	of	performance	management	system	in	place
No literature or comments on the weaknesses of the performance measurement 
framework were found.
Planned	changes
No literature or comments on planned changes in the performance measurement 
framework were found.
Sources
Government_of_the_Republic_of_Lithuania (2008). National	 Lisbon	 Strategy	
Implementation	 Programme	 for	 2008-10. Vilnius: Government of the Republic 
of Lithuania.
Lithuanian_Labour_Market_Exchange (2007). Annual	 Report	 2007, Lithuanian 
Labour Market Exchange.
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Malta
Description	of	performance	management	system	in	place
A response to the consultation stated that Malta’s PES measures the number of 
registered unemployed people who have either been assisted to find a job or 
been placed on employment or training schemes. Data is classified by gender, 
age, and disadvantage (if any). The PES monitor notes special target groups that 
are the focus of the Employment and Training Corporation (ETC). The registered 
unemployed are initially categorised according to whether they are youth or adult 
or disadvantaged. The disadvantaged are then further categorised as either long 
term unemployed (registering for over five years), disabled, having served a prison 
sentence, or as having had a substance abuse problem.
The ETC’s strategic approach involves drawing up a three-year Business Plan based 
on the obligations deriving from strategies such as the EES and the National 
Reform Programme, The 2007-09 Business Plan’s objectives are:
1 to increase ETC’s capture of vacancies;
2 to increase ETC’s placement of job seekers in employment; 
3 to increase the number of low-skilled job seekers who undergo training in 
basic skills necessary for employability; 
4. to ensure that a personal action plan is jointly drawn up and agreed to with 
every young jobseeker within a given timeframe; 
5 to ensure that a personal action plan is jointly drawn up and agreed to with 
every adult jobseeker within a given timeframe; 
6 to ensure that each registered unemployed person is placed on an active 
measure within a given timeframe; 
7 to increase the number of disadvantaged job seekers who are put on active 
measures every year; 
8 to increase the proportion of long-term unemployed on active measures; 
9 to increase the number of non-registrants who are trained; 
10 to increase the number of persons who make use of training grants each year; 
11 to increase the number of infringements identified; 
12 to increase the number of strike-offs upheld by the National Employment 
Authority; 
13 to increase women’s share of ETC short courses; 
14 to increase women’s share of apprenticeships.
A Balanced Scorecard system is used to monitor the performance of each division 
of the ETC who indicate the targets to be reached based on the targets set in the 
Annual Operational Plan. 
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Strengths	of	performance	management	system	in	place
From the consultation – gauging the number of registered unemployed who find a 
job or who are trained is considered to be important as it shows the performance 
of the PES in terms of how it assists the unemployed to improve their employability 
and find a job. The fact that a database of all persons in employment in Malta is 
maintained also helps to determine how long they keep their job and what their 
job history is.
Weaknesses	of	performance	management	system	in	place
Although the number of unemployed people who are placed in jobs is known, it 
is not known whether they are ‘quality’ jobs. There are no means to determine 
this, though checks are made to ensure that the employer is not offering below 
statutory minimum wages when vacancies are processed. No other checks are made.
Planned	changes
According to the PES monitor report, the priority actions and targets for this year 
are the following:
• organising Basic Skills Training Programmes for persons registering for 
‘elementary’ occupations – 500 persons to attend;
• put disadvantaged job seekers on active measures – five per cent increase 
every year;
• capture job vacancies from private sector – 100 extra vacancies every year; 
• place job seekers in private sector employment – 100 extra placements 
every year; 
• detect more law infringements – 50 extra infringements detected every year; 
• win appeals brought against ETC decisions before the National Employment 
Authority – win at least 80 per cent of cases; 
• place long-term unemployed on active measures – two per cent increase 
every year; 
• draw up personal action plans for youth – for every unemployed youth by no 
later than four months of unemployment; 
• draw up of personal action plans for adults – for every unemployed adult by no 
later than six months of unemployment;
• place registrants on active measures – 50 per cent of persons who first register 
unemployed in month N are to have been offered an active measure by month 
N+9 as at N+9;
• train the registered unemployed – five per cent increase in the number of 
registered unemployed trained every year; 
• train non-registrants, i.e. the inactive – five per cent increase every year in the 
volume of non-registrants trained; 
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• increase women’s share of short courses – three per cent increase every year in 
women’s share of participation in short courses; 
• uptake of training grants – three per cent increase every year in volume of 
persons benefiting from training grants.
Sources
http://www.pesmonitor.eu/Database/CountryReport.aspx?PES=19
Netherlands
Description	of	performance	management	system	in	place
From 2002, a new structure for public employment services and social security has 
been implemented. An important part of this structure is the Central Organisation 
for Work and Income (CWI) – a public statutory body which delivers services in 
the chain of work and income. This chain includes the employee insurance agency 
(UWV) and the municipalities (a large spectrum). The tasks of CWI are: registration 
of job seekers and their profiling, increasing labour market transparency by 
providing information to job seekers and employers and job mediation. Further, 
CWI checks the entitlement of clients to an unemployment or social assistance 
benefit and refers them to the appropriate benefit agency (the Social Security 
Agency or municipalities). 
Within the Dutch context, CWI is an autonomous body of public administration. 
It operates under surveillance of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 
who also sets annual and multi-annual targets, and who provides a budget. But 
within that general framework, the operations of CWI are fully governed by its 
own Central Managing Board. This relative autonomy entails preparing the yearly 
activity plan, calculating a required budget, and executing the plans that are 
agreed with the Ministry.
Clients who are distant to the labour market and require more than the basic 
service offered by the CWI are referred to their benefit agency. The benefit agency 
must organise a reintegration pathway for the client in order to prevent them 
from becoming long-term unemployed. The benefits agencies have to outsource 
the implementation of reintegration pathways to private reintegration firms via 
public procurement. Thus, the CWI no longer has the ability to apply certain more 
intensive active measures such as wage subsidies or training. Furthermore, active 
labour market policies for social assistance beneficiaries have been decentralised 
to municipalities (Van Nes, 2004).
Each year, the CWI Managing Board presents a draft annual policy plan, plus 
budget claim, to the responsible Minister. The policy plan becomes specified in 
precise performance targets and related indicators. The reintegration activities of 
the benefit agencies are almost entirely outsourced to private reintegration firms 
who decide themselves on what kinds of services to provide to job seekers (de 
Koning, 2004). 
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The core orientation of the Dutch work and income policy is on: 1. the prevention 
of in-flow into unemployment benefit schemes; and 2. outflow as rapidly as 
possible from those benefit schemes. Each of the three implementing agencies – 
CWI, UWV and the municipalities – operates their own monitoring system.
At CWI, performance management is strongly focused on outflow of benefit 
claimants. Outflow of other job seekers is not a part of the performance 
measurement system. With regard to prevention, only outflow before transfer 
of the completed benefit dossier to UWV and the relevant municipal body is 
measured. In respect of those job seekers for whom a completed benefit dossier has 
been handed to UWV and the responsible municipal body, CWI measures outflow 
before these job seekers reach the threshold of six months registered. Outflow 
from the registration is thus measured. Outflow in the direction of employment is 
an ambition of CWI but is not yet measured due to technical problems.
With regard to the supply side, the performance measurement at CWI is focused on 
the number of vacancies notified by employers in expectation of direct assistance 
in their recruitment efforts and on the number of filled vacancies of that kind.
CWI is also in ongoing attempts to be an effective channel for market transparency 
in the sense that job seekers and employers can meet and find each other via 
a self-service system. Performance indicators are operated with regard to CWI’s 
internet site: number of vacancies entered and number of jobseeker CVs available 
on the site. Also, the number of site hits. CWI also measures client satisfaction 
(concerning jobseeker clients, unemployed benefit claimants, employers) and in 
relation to other providers of intermediary services with whom it co-operates.
Furthermore, CWI – as the entry office to most of the unemployed clients of the 
Work and Income system (approximately 80 per cent) – measures timeliness and 
degree of completeness of benefit claim dossiers that are passed on, for a final 
decision, to UWV and the municipal bodies.
The local employment offices are ranked according to their performance. On 
the basis of regression analyses, the influence of various exogenous factors on 
local performance are filtered out, resulting in a ranking that can more reliably 
be linked to efforts made, to good management and to service methods chosen. 
All the various performance indicators are put together in a ‘Balanced Scorecard’.
Strengths	of	performance	management	system	in	place
No literature or comments on the strengths of performance management in place 
could be found.
Weaknesses	of	performance	management	system	in	place
No literature or comments on the weaknesses of performance management in 
place could be found.
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Planned	changes
As the start of 2009, the CWI will cease to be a separate organisation and will 
be integrated into the UWV. Merging with UWV staff for active services (the so-
called ‘re-integration coaches’ and some other staff), CWI will become a separate 
division under the name of UWV Employment Service. At the local level, joint 
frontline offices will be run by UWV/CWI and the Municipalities.
Sources
Van Nes, P. (2004). Data	Warehouse	(DWH)	Monitoring	in	the	Public	Employment	
Service:	The	Netherlands www.biceps.org/files/LvAUS04.pdf
de Koning, J. (2004). The	 Reform	 of	 the	 Dutch	 Public	 Employment	 Service. 
Rotterdam: Erasmus University.
Poland
Description	of	performance	management	system	in	place
The Polish economy has grown strongly over recent years with annual growth 
in output exceeding 6.5 per cent in 2007 (Eurostat). While unemployment has 
begun to respond to the rate of growth it remains high at around ten per cent 
(Eurostat). Owing to labour shortages, partly the result of economic migration 
within the EU, this fuelled some price increases during 2008 (European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, 2008d). 
The Polish PES – the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy – operates a mixed 
system of national, regional and local PES services. The (circa) 350 local offices 
offer services to the public on the basis of agreed regional strategies which have 
to take into account national policy and statutory requirements (PES Monitor 
2008). Some commentators suggest that this system leads to a lack of integrated 
and shared management objectives (Grotkowska and Sztanderska 2008).
The Polish PES also addresses specific priority groups (PES Monitor, 2008):
• the unemployed under 25 years old;
• long-term unemployed or after child care break;
• the unemployed over 50 years old;
• low qualified;
• lone parents (youngest child aged under 18);
• ex-prisoners;
• disabled job seekers.
Data provided by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy to the PES monitor 
indicates that as part of the EES process Poland has adopted the following outcome 
objectives, though these are not replicated directly in the latest Lisbon National 
Reform Programme:
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• social cohesion, measured by the employment target and the unemployment rate;
• economic cohesion, measured by per capita GDP;
• spatial cohesion, measured by the time to go to the given area by plane, car 
or train.
There are also specific employment targets:
• the increase in employment and improving its quality – reaching in Q4 2008 the 
employment rate for people aged 15-64 (according to BAEL), amounting to 59 
per cent;
• the restriction of unemployment – reaching in Q4 2008 the general 
unemployment rate (according to BAEL), amounting to eight per cent;
• the improvement of the quality of human capital, taking into account the needs 
of the labour market.
Strengths	of	performance	management	system	in	place
No literature or comments on strengths of the performance measurement 
framework were found.
Weaknesses	of	performance	management	system	in	place
No literature or comments on weaknesses of the performance measurement 
framework were found other than the general comment about a lack of integration 
and coherence between the different administrative tiers and actors involved.
Planned	changes
No literature or comments on planned changes to the performance measurement 
framework were found.
Sources
Grotkowska, G. and Sztanderska, U. (2008). Labour	market	problems	and	public	
employment	services	capabilities	–	institutional	aspects. Frankfurt, Challenges for 
the Welfare State. Polish and German Reform Policies in Comparison.
Portugal
Description	of	performance	management	system	in	place
The Portuguese PES is known as the Institute for Employment and Vocational 
Training (IEFP).
A large proportion (around 45 per cent) of Portugal’s unemployed population are 
long-term unemployed. Approaches to this problem have been based on increasing 
employability, promoting self-employment and fighting long-term unemployment 
among women. In terms of job brokerage, the placement activities of the IEFP in 
Portugal have played a much smaller role in terms of labour market turnover, than 
in most European countries (Moniz, 2007).
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The IEFP’s jobcentres follow a model with the following characteristics:
• work is centred on the needs and potential of young people and adults;
• intervention methods are preventive – to avoid long-term unemployment;
• familiarity with labour market trends and the file of registered applicants;
• interventions are both individualised and integrated (OECD, 2000). 
Other relevant guidelines refer to management by objectives and frequent 
monitoring of the centre’s activities, via the use of several indicators, meetings and 
direct daily monitoring by specialist teams. The Jobcentre carries out its work in 
line with its annual Activity Plan and budget. This is generally based on knowledge 
of the Centre’s local labour market and the Plan’s implementation is checked 
on a weekly basis in meetings between the Centre’s director and the heads of 
specialist teams.
Responses to our survey noted the 2008 Framework for Assessment and 
Accountability which set the following targets: 
1 for 85 to 90 per cent of unemployment benefits recipients to have Personal 
Employment Plans; 
2 for 70 to 80 per cent of unemployed job seekers, who are not receiving 
unemployment benefits, to have Personal Employment Plans;
3 for 75,500 to 80,000 unemployed job seekers to enter the labour market;
4 to increase the number of registered job vacancies by between five and seven 
per cent; 
5 to involve 9,000 to 10,000 disabled unemployed job seekers in employment 
and training programmes/measures; 
6 to make 35,000 to 40,000 referrals to the New Opportunities Centres Network; 
7 to involve from 20,000 to 25,000 users in a Recognition, Validation and 
Certification of Skills process;
8 to involve from 44,500 to 52,500 trainees in courses with school and 
professional certification.
There are also additional targets that provide information about the efficiency of 
the organisation and the quality of the services delivered: 
9  to implement Shared Services in the Administrative area, Financial area, 
Facilities area, Management Control area and Personnel Management area in 
Central Services and in the Alentejo Regional Delegation;
10 to decrease by ten to 15 per cent the waiting time of the users of the jobcentres; 
11 to reduce staffing in activities benefiting from shared services by five to ten per 
cent;
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12 to reduce by five to ten per cent the cost of purchasing goods and services;
13 to achieve between 40 to 50 per cent rate of utilisation of EU funds; 
14 to design an MBO model; 
15 to design and implement a new model for monitoring the satisfaction of users 
of Jobcentres and Vocational Training Centres; 
16 to design a monitoring plan, based on the Balanced Score Card; 
17 to implement a system for monitoring internal customer satisfaction; 
18 to implement a new system for handling the complaints of the users of 
Jobcentres and Vocational Training Centres;
The first eight of these targets use the following outputs/indicators:
1  number of unemployment benefits recipients covered with Personal 
Employment Plans/number of unemployed job seekers;
2  number of unemployed job seekers not receiving unemployment benefits and 
covered by Personal Employment Plans/number of unemployed job seekers, 
who are not receiving unemployment benefits;
3 number of unemployed job seekers covered by employment and training 
programmes + number of jobs created through job creation programmes + 
number of unemployed job seekers placed in the labour market;
4  number of job vacancies registered in the year (n) / number of job vacancies 
registered received in the year n-1; 
5 number of disabled unemployed job seekers involved in employment and 
training programmes/measures; 
6 number of users diagnosed and referred to a New Opportunities Centre; 
7 number of users undergoing a Recognition, Validation and Certification of 
Skills process;
8 number of trainees attending Education/Training and Apprenticeship Courses.
Strengths	of	performance	management	system	in	place
Consultation response: ‘It	is	too	soon	to	say	which	are	the	majors	strengths	and	
weaknesses	of	the	system,	as	it	was	set	up	in	2008,	and	currently	(January	2009)	
the	evaluation	of	last	year	performance	has	not	yet	been	done’.
Weaknesses	of	performance	management	system	in	place
No literature or comments on the weaknesses of the performance measurement 
framework were found.
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Planned	changes
No literature or comments on planned changes to the performance measurement 
framework were found.
Sources
OECD (2000). Labour	Market	Policies	and	the	Public	Employment	Service, Prague 
Conference, July 2000.
Inserjovem and Reage Initiatives: a	 Preventive	 Approach. Executive Summary, 
2000, Portugal, Lisbon, January 8-9, 2001.
Moniz, A.B. and Woll, T. (2007). Main	features	of	the	labour	policy	in	Portugal, IET 
Working Papers Series No. WPS02/2007. Lisbon: Research Centre on Enterprise 
and Work Innovation.
Mosley, H., Schutz, H. and Breyer, N. (2001). Management	 by	 Objectives	 in	
European	Public	Employment	Services.
European Commission (2000), The	contributions	of	the	Public	Employment	Services	
(PES)	to	local	development. European Commission, Employment and Social Affairs 
DG.
Romania
Description	of	performance	measurement	system	in	place
The labour market in Romania during the 1990s experienced an unfavourable 
economic environment, due to problems relating to post-communist privatization 
and restructuring processes. Factors such as low levels of investment and 
industrial decline contributed to the decrease of the labour demand and to the 
appearance of unemployment, especially among young people and individuals 
with low levels of education. These problems were exacerbated by the population 
ageing as a result of a decline in the birth rate and the increasing emigration of 
highly educated young people. It is thought that the unemployment rate was only 
lower than in other post communist countries, because of certain ‘disguises’ in 
the figures due to early retirements, migration towards subsistence agriculture, 
massive emigration and hidden unemployment (Magdalena and Carmen, 2007). 
Employment in agriculture makes up a significant proportion of Romania’s 
workforce, mostly in small, subsistence family farms. Much of this workforce 
faces large barriers to mobility and such disadvantaged groups were the target 
of moves by Romania’s government in 2005 to extend the scope and coverage of 
its ALMPs. The main purpose of this was to provide these groups with access to 
publicly funded vocational training with the hope that more individuals will enter 
the mainstream labour market and leave the informal economy, thus contributing 
to a rise in living standards.
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The PES monitor provides the following information on the Romanian National 
Agency for Employment’s target groups and performance indicators.
Special target groups:
• young graduates of educational institutions;
• young people at risk of marginalisation;
• Roman ethnic minority;
• persons from rural areas;
• unemployed aged over 45;
• persons with disabilities.
Performance measurement – from a table of ‘examples of performance indicators’:
• employment through NAE’s own effort;
• employment of job seekers;
• employment of registered young graduates;
• participation rate of unemployed persons in vocational training courses;
• share of unemployed persons from rural areas involved in vocational training 
courses in the average monthly stock of unemployed persons from rural areas;
• share of unemployed persons from rural areas involved in vocational training 
courses from the total number of unemployed persons involved in vocational 
training courses;
• participation rate of young long-term unemployed persons in active measures;
• participation rate of adult long-term unemployed persons in active measures.
New indicators introduced in 1997:
• share of job seekers who benefit from personalised services in the total number 
of persons registered;
• number of hours spent on visits to employers;
• share of unemployed persons who benefit from information, counselling and 
vocational guidance services in the total number of unemployed;
• employment rate of the participants in active measures after three and six 
months, respectively following the participation in an active measure;
• share of expenses for vocational training in the total expenses of the 
Unemployment Insurance Budget.
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Strengths	of	performance	management	in	place
No data found.
Weaknesses	of	performance	management	system	in	place
No data found.
Planned	changes
No data found.
Sources
European	Employment	Observatory	Review, Spring 2005.
Magdalena, V. and Carmen, G. (2007) Problems	 of	 unemployment	 in	 post-
communist	Romania, Economic and Business Administration, 1(160), pp.706-709. 
http://www.pesmonitor.eu/Database/CountryReport.aspx?PES=25
Slovakia
Description	of	performance	management	system	in	place
Slovakia experienced strong economic growth since 2000, and surging growth in 
2007 thanks mainly to rapidly increasing car production in the country. While the 
current economic crisis has negatively effected growth prospects into the future, 
the economy is still projected to grow (European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development 2008e).
Over the last decade the Slovak Republic has had a lower employment rate and 
higher unemployment rate than many other Accession countries, including its 
neighbour the Czech Republic (Eurostat: Employment Rate, Unemployment Rate). 
Despite this, long-term structural unemployment remains a problem (Slovak_
Republic 2008:28). 
The Slovak Republic was part of the PES benchmarking project and as such should 
maintain the 11 performance indicators suggested by that project (OSB Consulting 
and Synthesis Forschung, 2007). No details of other performance indicators or 
frameworks for Slovakia could be found. The PES contact did not respond to the 
consultation survey. While the expert contact did respond the response suggested 
that relevant performance indicators were listed in the ESF Operational Program 
for Employment and Social Inclusion, which is not available in English.
Strengths	of	performance	management	system	in	place
Little evidence on strengths and weaknesses could be found in time for the report. 
The expert consultation response suggested that solid data was the biggest 
strength.
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Weaknesses	of	performance	management	system	in	place
Little evidence on strengths and weaknesses could be found in time for the 
report. The expert consultation response suggested that poor use of available 
data and insufficient monitoring of post-programme employment were the main 
weaknesses.
Planned	changes
No data found.
Sources
European_Bank_for_Reconstruction_and_Development (2008). Slovakia: 
Economic Overview, EBRD.
OSB_Consulting and Synthesis_Forschung (2007). PES-Performance,	Benchmarking	
and	Good	Practice:	Overview. Vienna, OSB Consulting.
Republic_of_Slovenia (2007). Reform	Programme	for	Achieving	the	Lisbon	Strategy	
Goals	Implementation	Report	2007, Republic of Slovenia.
Slovenia
Description	of	performance	management	system	in	place
The Slovenian economy has demonstrated sustained strong growth since the 
early 1990s when it gained independence from Yugoslavia. Despite this, during 
2007-08 growth began to slow markedly and inflation began to increase, at 
least partly because of a generous mid-year wage settlement (European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development 2008a). 
The Slovenian labour market has performed well over recent years with generally 
high levels of employment and low levels of unemployment (Eurostat). Slovenia 
is currently beginning to implement measures associated with Flexicurity, as 
recommended in the European Employment Strategy (European Commission 
2007a). Slovenia is currently implementing a range of measures generally and 
specifically related to the labour market to promote the market and increase 
flexibility. These include a major privatisation programme, more conditional 
benefit regulations and real prices reductions in benefit payments. The PES is also 
undergoing a major programme of modernisation focused on the intensification 
of ALMPs and activation strategies, new forms of service provision (such as 
e-Services) and increased contracting with private sector employment service 
providers (Horvat 2006; Republic_of_Slovenia 2007). The European Commission 
has noted the large proportion of employment that takes place in the informal 
sector (European Commission 2007a) and regulating this is a focus of reform 
activity (Republic_of_Slovenia 2007).
The PES – the Employment Service of Slovenia (ESS) – is an independent public 
agency with responsibility for implementing benefit payments and job broking 
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activity associated with ALMPs. The ESS has a national remit but also regional 
and local offices. The ESS has a long history of performance measurement dating 
back to the mid-1990s. Targets used fluctuated in type from year to year in the 
1990s, but included off-flow measures as well as wider labour market outcome 
measures. In addition, the ESS also has a history of customer and employer 
satisfaction surveys (Kosir and Glazer 1999).
The consultation response from the ESS suggested that the organisation uses a 
series of performance measures to assist with the measurement and management 
of performance, to report to politicians and to provide information to the public. 
These measures – which have associated targets – include:
• levels of off-flows into jobs from unemployment and inactivity; 
• level of unemployment;
• levels of low-skilled unemployment;
• levels of unemployed people placed into public works programmes and finally 
the average time taken for an individual transition from registering unemployed 
to the completion of an individual employment action plan. 
In addition, a number of other performance indicators are also maintained, 
including:
• number of unemployed who get regular employment;
• number of unemployed who get subsidised employment;
• number of unemployed participated in employment programmes (by 
programmes);
• unemployed deleted from the register due to sanctions.
All these indicators are available by different groups of unemployed (by age 
groups, gender, and type of benefit).
Other published information suggests that these indicators, alongside more general 
labour market information, are linked together in a performance measurement 
framework which is administered using an electronic labour market information 
system using specialist software (SAS) which, among other things, allows quarterly 
and monthly tracking of off-flow levels (Cesen 2004).
Finally, Slovenia participated in the PES Benchmarking Performance project and 
so data against those eleven indicators and benchmarks is also available (OSB 
Consulting and Synthesis Forschung, 2007).
Strengths	of	performance	management	system	in	place
A 1999 workshop paper by the Director of the ESS (Kosir and Glazer, 1999) lists 
the benefits of performance measures to be:
• ‘the targets of the ESS became more concrete, easier to follow, and more 
understandable for ESS staff;
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• they serve as a stimulation for the ESS staff in all levels – activation of teams and 
individuals;
• they help to increase the effectiveness of the ESS;
• they help to identify problems in the ESS earlier;
• they help to identify what ESS activities should take priority, and the performance 
of these activities;
• they indicate the meaning and the role of the ESS on the labour market.’
The consultation response from the ESS suggested that the major strength of the 
performance measurement system used in Slovenia related to the overall approach 
used which is based on MBOs. This allows comparison of the performance of 
different functional units (such as regions/local offices) to identify stronger and 
weaker performance.
Weaknesses	of	performance	management	system	in	place
A 1999 workshop paper by the director of the ESS (Kosir and Glazer 1999) lists 
the drawbacks of performance measures to be:
• ‘it is often hard to specify the target (to be apparent, measurable, realistic, to 
act as a motivator), and the criterion to which each level must contribute to 
successfully achieve the target;
• a need to explain why targets have not been achieved – on the other hand this 
is also positive – the ESS must analyse the reasons and try to eliminate them’.
The consultation response from the ESS suggested that the major weakness of 
the performance measurement system used in Slovenia related to the difficulty in 
assessing the contribution of the PES to achieved outcomes (e.g. off-flows) in the 
context of wider and potentially more significant economic trends.
Planned	changes
No literature or comments on planned changes to the performance measurement 
framework were found.
Sources
European_Bank_for_Reconstruction_and_Development. (2008). Slovenia:	
Economic	Overview. Retrieved 12-01-2009, 2009, from http://www.ebrd.com/
country/country/slovenia/econo.htm.
European_Commission (2007). Communication	 from	 the	 Commission	 to	 the	
Council:	The	Commission	Draft	of	the	Joint	Employment	Report	2007/8, European 
Commission.
Horvat, A. (2006). The	Framework	of	Economic	and	Social	Reforms	for	Increasing	
the	Welfare	in	Slovenia.	G.	O.	f.	Growth, Republic of Slovenia.
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Kosir, D. and Glazer J. (1999). Benchmarking	as	a	strategic	tool	for	the	PES:	The	
Employment	 Service	 of	 Slovenia. WAPES/ADIR Workshop. Oslo, Employment 
Service of Slovenia.
OSB_Consulting and Synthesis_Forschung (2007). PES-Performance,	Benchmarking	
and	Good	Practice:	Overview. Vienna, OSB Consulting.
Republic_of_Slovenia (2007). Reform	Programme	for	Achieving	the	Lisbon	Strategy	
Goals	Implementation	Report	2007, Republic of Slovenia.
Spain
Description	of	performance	management	system	in	place
Although the labour market situation in Spain has improved notably in recent years, 
particularly for youth and women, the labour market is still highly segmented. The 
European Commission has outlined countering labour market fragmentation and 
enhancing access to the labour market, particularly for vulnerable groups, as key 
challenges for the Spanish labour market (Villagomez and Carbonell, 2008).
In terms of performance management, a system was introduced in 1994 as part 
of broader labour market reforms. Goals, operational objectives and indicators 
were put together in an annual programme contract between the National 
Employment Service (INEM) and the labour ministry (Ruiz 2003). In addition to 
general priorities, the 1999 National Action Plan for Employment (NAP) specified 
quantitative targets for various labour market measures. These targets were 
applied to overall participant numbers, though particularly targeted towards the 
long-term unemployed, youth, and women. It is unclear how central these goals 
and indicators were to an assessment-based management system (Mosley et	al., 
2001).
A major feature of active employment policies in Spain is the decentralization of 
employment services. While the INEM is responsible for unemployment benefits, 
each region or Autonomous Community is responsible for activation programmes. 
This has meant some diversity in active employment policies throughout the 
national territories.
The relationship between the state and the Autonomous Communities involved 
central government still being able to legislate on active and passive policies with 
funds financing active policies allocated according to jointly agreed criteria. The 
state also controlled the common information databases with definitions of a 
number of basic concepts and administrative practices being adapted to ensure 
compatibility.
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Our consultation found that Spain’s PES uses headline performance indicators for 
all of the following reasons:
• to measure labour market performance;
• to measure organisational performance;
• to help manage the organisation’s strategy and interventions;
• to provide information to the public;
• to provide information to politicians/government. 
The last of these was stated to be the primary purpose. 
Strengths	of	performance	management	system	in	place
The consultation noted that one of the system’s strengths was comparability 
among regions at national level.
Weaknesses	of	performance	management	system	in	place
A perceived weakness of the system is that it doesn’t measure the load of work.
Planned	changes
No literature or comments on planned changes to the performance measurement 
framework were found.
Sources
Villagomez, E. and Carbonell, D. (2008). Active	 Employment	 Policies	 in	 Spain	
Statements	and	Comments, Peer Review – Vocational training for people at the 
margin of the labour market: The Individual Learner Plan – A new approach, 
Ireland, 8-9 May 2008.
Mosley, H., Schutz, H. and Breyer, N. (2001). Management	 by	 Objectives	 in	
European	 Public	 Employment	 Services (revised version of Mosley, H., Schütz, 
H. and Breyer, N. (2000) Operational Objectives and Performance Indicators in 
European Public Employment Services).
Mosely, H. (2008). Decentralisation and Co-ordination: The Twin Challenges 
of Labour Market Policy. High-level conference organised by the Senate of 
the Republic, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, and the OECD LEED 
Programme, in collaboration with Isfol and Italia Lavoro. 17-19 April 2008.
Ruiz, D. (2003). Spain:	modernisation	through	regionalisation,	in	OECD, Managing	
Decentralisation:	A	New	Role	 for	 Labour	Market	 Policy. Paris: Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development.
European Commission (2000). The	contributions	of	the	Public	Employment	Services	
(PES)	 to	 local	 development. European Commission, Employment and Social 
Affairs DG.
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Sweden
Description	of	performance	management	system	in	place
Until early in 2008 the Labour Market Administration (AMV) implemented labour 
market policy on behalf of the cabinet or the Ministry of Labour, respectively. The 
AMV comprised the National Labour Market Board (AMS), 21 County Labour 
Boards (LAN), over 400 local employment offices and more than 100 employability 
institutes for vocational rehabilitation. Specific objectives or quantifiable operational 
targets of AMV were given in the government’s appropriation warrant and in 
other directives (Cook 2008).
MBO is conventionally considered to have been the main pillar of the Swedish PES 
performance management approach since the mid-1980s. The MBO system was 
consolidated and strengthened circa 2000, and supported by the introduction of 
a complementary pillar, ‘customer satisfaction’. Customer satisfaction targets are 
set by the PES itself and not by central government (Wallin 2007).
Operational targets passed down by AMV were set to county level and county 
performance measurement and indicators were based on, for example, the 
percentage of registered vacancies outflow, percentage share of training 
participants entering employment within 90 days, the number of long-term 
unemployed divided by the number of completed months of the year set 
against a target of the average monthly number of long-term unemployed to be 
below 50,000.
In addition to the frequent follow-up checks of the counties’ performance, there 
was also a final summing up of the whole year’s performance. These county 
‘exams’ were considered to be the most important form of performance review 
(Mosley et	al., 2001).
There are several headline performance indicators that carried targets for the PES 
in 2008. These include: 
• 40 per cent of those registering themselves unemployed at their local PES should 
get a job within 90 days; 
• four per cent of the long-term unemployed should each month either get a job 
or begin some form of education or training; 
• 85 per cent of employers with vacancies should receive enough applications to 
fill the vacancy; 
• 90 per cent of the registered unemployed should be satisfied with the service 
they receive from the PES; 
• 90 per cent of employers using the PES should be satisfied with the service; 
• 80 per cent of newly-registered unemployed should have an activity plan 
completed within 20 days of registration; 
• 75 per cent of unemployed should consider that their activity plan is helping 
them; eight per cent of new immigrants registered with the PES should start 
work or begin education/training each month.
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Strengths	of	performance	management	system	in	place
The Swedish PES uses a Balanced Scorecard System. The major strengths are 
considered to be that the system gives an overall balance between different 
important organisational areas and a connection between the PES vision/mission 
and indicators via strategic goals and critical success factors.
Weaknesses	of	performance	management	system	in	place
There is a view that it is difficult to establish indicators that separate the PES 
performance from external effects. Concentrating too heavily upon how many 
targets have been met, or not, can mean that considerations of what the results 
signify or how the results have been produced can become obscured. Thus it is felt 
that the PES’s own internal dialogue and competence must be as well-developed 
as the indicators.
Planned	changes
The AMV is currently being reorganized to form a new central organisation with 
employment service areas aligned with 60-80 local labour market areas with a 
central office and several local offices in each area. At the beginning of 2008 the 
AMS and LAN were to be abolished. In addition, private employment services will 
be encouraged to compete with the PES (Cook, 2008).
Sources
Mosely, H., Schütz, H. and Breyer, N. (2001). Management	 by	 Objectives	 in	
European	Public	Employment	Services Berlin: WBSR.
Wallin, T Customer	Satisfaction:	 Performance	 Indicators	 for	 Public	 Employment	
Services Yellow Paper Series 04 08 07, Stockholm: AMS.
Cook, B (2008). National,	Regional	and	Local	Employment	Policies	in	Sweden	and	
the	United	Kingdom Centre of Full Employment and Equity Working Paper No. 
08-05, Callagham, Australia: University of Newcastle.
Other European states
Norway
Description	of	performance	measurement	system	in	place
As of 2006, the former National Insurance Administration (NIA) and the 
Directorate of Labour (DOL) in Norway were merged into a single central agency 
for employment and welfare (NAV). Locally, the NAV is establishing a one-stop 
shop system together with the social services administration. This front-line service 
is intended to be run as a central-local partnership regulated by local agreements. 
Legally, the front-line service is based on a binding agreement between the central 
and local authorities laid down in local co-operation agreements. It is intended 
that the front-line service units will be in place by 2010 (Christensen, 2006).
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The management model for the new NAV is based on New Public Management 
(NPM) tools. Management-by-objective-and-results (MBOR) is a main principle 
for steering and control, and performance indicators and reporting are a main 
component of this system. It introduces the balanced score-card principle (BSC), 
focusing on multiple objectives and the relationship between tools and user 
outcomes. In addition, knowledge management and a formalized and generic 
quality-management system are applied, based on user surveys and quality 
assessments. Thus, the model is a hybrid of central NPM management tools and 
post-NPM whole-of-government features (Christensen, 2006).
Current performance targets include: at least 70 per cent of job seekers should 
leave the unemployment register and move into work; at least 60 per cent of 
lone parents with children aged between one to three years, and at least 94 per 
cent of lone parents with children aged between three to eight years, should be 
undertaking a labour market-relevant activity; 75 per cent of job seekers should 
have had a follow-up interview in the previous three months; 80 per cent of jobs 
notified by employers should receive a relevant job application from a jobseeker 
using their local employment office.
Strengths	of	performance	management	system	in	place
MBOR is a performance-management tool encompassing three main components. 
First, the leadership must formulate clear goals and targets and give subordinate 
bodies’ flexibility and discretion in their daily work. This technique is based on the 
requirement that the objectives are precise, concrete, specific and hierarchically 
structured with primary and secondary objectives followed by performance 
indicators. They must be operational, consistent and stable in order to function as 
concrete and binding criteria for evaluation. Second, subordinate agencies must 
report on results using a well-developed system of performance indicators. Emphasis 
is given to the measurement of performance and in reporting information relating 
to the functions of the agencies. Improved methods for monitoring results and for 
measuring efficiency and goal achievement are needed. This includes quantitative 
performance indicators and increased emphasis on evaluation of the functioning 
of the agencies. Third, executives must use the reported results to reward good 
performance and punish bad. Information on the results achieved is supposed 
to have consequences for resource allocation as well as how the agencies are 
organized (Christensen, 2006).
One of the main doctrines of NPM is managerial discretion combined with 
transparent targets and ex-post control by result or performance. In setting targets, 
evaluating output information and applying rewards and sanctions represents 
a specific type of regulatory system. Performance management allows a lot of 
autonomy and flexibility in the use of allocated resources and in choosing the 
means and measures (Hood, 2004).
The BSC model can in principle be characterized as a relatively top-down, strategy 
implementation tool and where there are tight coupling between objectives, 
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targets and performance indicators as well as between performance indicators and 
managerial rewards. Even though it is often regarded as a managerial innovation, 
some (Johnsen, 2006) have concluded that the BSC model in the Norwegian 
context is an extension of Drucker’s Management by Objectives model from the 
1950s originating from a classic means-end framework.
Weaknesses	of	performance	management	system	in	place
The MBOR concept is based on the principle that subordinate bodies should be 
controlled through contractual agreements, which would give greater access to 
resources when results are satisfactory, and, conversely, reduced access when the 
desired results are not achieved. Thus, MBOR is a rather complex technique that is 
likely to be complex to implement (Laegreid et	al., 2006).
Under NPM, the price public bodies have to pay for their increased freedom 
is to accept a more rigid performance-management system, which includes 
performance indicators and performance monitoring and assessment. The system 
is thus a mixed one that prescribes both centralization and decentralization, 
and it is an empirical question in which direction it will lean in practice 
(Kristiansen, 2008).
Planned	changes
No literature or comments on planned changes could be found.
Sources
Christensen, T., Fimreite, A.L. and Laegreid, P. (2006). Reform	of	the	Employment	
and	Welfare	 Administrations	 –	 The	 Challenges	 of	 Co-ordinating	Diverse	 Public	
Organisations Working Paper 14, Bergen: Stein Rokkan Centre for Social Studies.
Laegreid, P., Roness, P.G. and Rubecksen, K (2006). Performance	Management	in	
Practice:	The	Norwegian	Way	in	Financial	Accountability	&	Management Vol. 22, 
No. 3 August pp.251-270.
Hood, C. and Bevan, G. (2004). Where	Soft	Theory	Meets	Hard	Cases:	The	Limits	
of	Transparency	and	Proportionality	 in	Health	Care	Regulation Paper presented 
at ASPA Conference Transforming	Governance	 in	 a	World	Without	Boundaries 
Portland, Oregon 27-30 March.
Kristiansen, S (2008). Evaluation	of	 the	NAV	Reform	2006-2013. The Research 
Council of Norway http://www.forskningsradet.no/servlet/Satellite?cid=1158652
827798&pagename=eva-nav%2FPage%2FHovedSideEng.
Johnsen, A. and Vakkuri, J. (2006). Is	There	a	Nordic	Perspective	on	Public	Sector	
Performance	Measurement? in Financial Accountability & Management Vol. 22, 
No. 3 August pp.291-308.
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Switzerland
Description	of	performance	management	system	in	place
Detailed research into the determinants of local office placement effectiveness 
led to the introduction in 2000 of a system of rating local employment office 
performance in terms of off-benefit outcomes. This led to apparent improvements 
in local office performance with a fall in the registered unemployment rate, though 
the validity of the ratings was queried by Switzerland’s cantons (regional offices). 
Subsequently, the linking of the ratings to cantonal funding was suppressed in 
January 2003. The 2005 OECD Employment Outlook suggests that the division 
of responsibility between national and local governments in Switzerland makes 
it relatively difficult to measure impacts achieved by employment services and 
implement changes on that basis. Furthermore, it states that it is very difficult 
to measure the average performance of cantonal employment offices separately 
from the impact of other cantonal policies. For example, some cantons reduce 
the number of recipients of unemployment insurance by offering places earlier in 
the unemployment spell than other offices where social assistance beneficiaries 
are prioritised.
The current situation, according the European PES monitor, is that the cantons 
have a financial limit for providing employment and training measures for each 
job seeker. As a result, employment and training measures are chosen with greater 
care, and their impacts are carefully measured. Methods for reintegrating job 
seekers into the workforce are agreed between the cantons and the Swiss national 
confederation. Objectives are defined in terms of four results indicators relating to 
the speed and durability of the placement. The method for implementing these 
objectives is determined at cantonal level. The PES monitor provides the following 
table which states the objectives, indicators and what weighting is applied to each 
of them:
Result Indicator Weight
Rapid return to 
employment
Mean number of days for which beneficiaries whose files 
were closed, or who reached the end of their benefits 
period, collected unemployment compensation during 
the period in progress.
0.50
Prevent and 
decrease long-term 
unemployment
Number of new cases of long-term unemployment, 
divided by the number of persons who began a benefits 
period with the code 1 (= entitled) thirteen months 
earlier.
0.20
Prevent exhaustion 
of benefits, or reduce 
number of those who 
use up their benefits
Number of new cases of benefits exhausted within the 
reference month, divided by the number of persons who 
began a benefits period with the code 1 (= entitled) two 
years earlier.
0.20
Prevent re-registration 
as unemployed, or 
reduce number of 
those re-registering as 
unemployed
Number of persons re-registering in the reference month 
within four months after their removal from the rolls, 
divided by the number of persons removed from the rolls 
in the months (m-4), (m-3) or (m-2).
0.10
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A computerised benefits payment system provides raw data on these indicators 
and a range of variables is used in an econometric model to adjust the raw data 
for the following outside factors:
• the condition of the regional job market: the percentage of the active population 
that are new benefits recipients;
• seasonal industries: the percentage of new benefits recipients coming from 
seasonal industries, relative to the total new benefits recipients registered at the 
placement office;
• the percentage of new benefits recipients who have Swiss nationality, relative to 
the total new benefits recipients registered at the placement office;
• the size of the metropolitan region where the Regional Job Placement Office is 
located; and
• the percentage of cross-border workers: relative to the active population of the 
given region.
Strengths	of	performance	management	system	in	place
From the consultation: Perceived strengths are the subsidiarity of the PES (high 
market share of the private employment services) and the decentralisation (high 
autonomy of the local PES).
Other responses – the system is considered to be quite effective at enabling the 
respondent to understand the impact of their organisation’s activities on both 
levels of off-flows and on how quickly people leave benefits. This effectiveness 
was put down to the performance indicators one to three.
Weaknesses	of	performance	management	system	in	place
A perceived weakness is that the PES in Switzerland represents only a small 
percentage of the labour market. The cooperation with other social insurances 
is weak. One knows the outflows but not the durability of the outflow, neither 
where the people go.
Planned	changes
No literature or comments on planned changes to the performance measurement 
framework were found.
Sources
OECD (2005). OECD Employment Outlook 2005. Paris: Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development.
http://www.pesmonitor.eu/Database/CountryReport.aspx?PES=27
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Other developed
Canada
Description	of	performance	management	system	in	place
A prominent feature of the design and delivery of active labour market programmes 
in Canada is the asymmetrical nature of the division of responsibility between 
National Government and the various provinces. There have been two basic 
forms of Labour Market Development Agreement (LMDA) with the provinces and 
territories since 1996. These differ according to whether the provinces and territories 
assume full responsibility for the design, delivery and management of national 
employment and training service programmes or whether the national ministry 
(Human Resource and Social Development Canada) shares that responsibility.
Those reforms in the mid-1990s also aimed to broaden the range of clients eligible 
for active interventions, to increase spending on ALMPs, to ensure that clients 
became employed as quickly as possible, to ensure programme decisions were 
made at the local level and to ensure the programmes were responsive to labour 
market conditions. Success was determined by the number of clients participating 
successfully in ALMPs and also savings made in Employment Insurance (EI).
Although the federal government did allow the provinces considerable scope to 
design their programmes, policy requirements were set out in the 1996 reforms 
which included being results based, incorporating an evaluation of outcomes; 
promoting co-operation and partnership with labour market partners, and 
involving local decision-making (Wong et	al., 2002). The LMDAs contained annual 
numerical targets for clients served and savings in EI and also an accountability 
framework. The key components of performance measurement of the LMDAs were: 
• accountability framework – focusing on the short-term indicators of: clients 
employed, unpaid EI benefits and the number of active EI claimants served;
• evaluation of LMDAs – specification in the LMDAs that they should be monitored 
and assessed through an ongoing evaluation framework;
• provinces and territories are required to submit annual financial statements.
Formative evaluations were intended to investigate features of the design and 
delivery structure of the agreements. Summative evaluations were scheduled for 
the third year of the implementation of each LMDA and aimed to measure cost-
effectiveness and the longer-term impact of active labour market programmes in 
terms of helping people prepare for and maintain employment. The summative 
evaluations were expected to provide results according to a set of 11 indicators. 
These are:
• employability and integration – measured according to ‘anyone	working	in	the	
post-programme	period’. The duration of employment spells is also measured 
as is the total annual hours worked in the post-programme period;
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• self reliance/independence from government support – measured in 
terms of total and average amounts of EI and Social Assistance (SA) 
received and the number of weeks EI and SA were received in the post-
programme period. Also measures the total proportion of income that is EI 
and SA;
• economic well-being – determined by the amount of money earned from 
employment;
• quality of life – themes of satisfaction and motivation have been identified to 
measure aspects of quality of life;
• investment in human capital (skills and literacy) – education levels compared 
with the total labour force;
• employment equity/employment barriers – analysis of older/younger workers 
and those facing barriers. Also looks at the distribution of client groups compared 
to the total labour force to indicate accessibility of programmes and services;
• labour market adjustment – the extent to which ALMPs are addressing issues as 
displaced workers, skills shortages and labour mobility;
• community impacts – how ALMPs assist communities;
• EI savings – individual client usage of EI in the post-programme period;
• cost-effectiveness – determining costs associated with programme delivery and 
comparing them with impacts achieved;
• follow-up to formative evaluation/emerging issues – studying whether issues 
emerging from formative evaluations have been addressed.
Strengths	of	performance	management	system	in	place
No literature or comments on the strengths of the performance measurement 
framework were found.
Weaknesses	of	performance	management	system	in	place
No literature or comments on the weaknesses of the performance measurement 
framework were found.
Planned	changes
No literature or comments on planned changes to the performance measurement 
framework were found.
Sources
OECD (2001). Labour	Market	Policies	and	the	Public	Employment	Service,	Prague	
Conference, July 2000.
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Ging Wong, Harold Henson, and Arun Roy (2002). Predicting	 Long-Term	
Unemployment	in	Canada:	Prospects	and	Policy	Implications, in R.W. Eberts, C.J. 
O’Leary and S.A. Wandner, Targeting	Employment	Services. Kalamazoo, Michigan: 
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Rymes (2003). Canada:	 partnership	 across	 levels, in OECD, Managing	
Decentralisation:	A	New	Role	 for	 Labour	Market	 Policy. Paris: Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development.
Mosely, H. (2008). Decentralisation	 and	 Co-ordination:	 The	 Twin	 Challenges	
of	 Labour	 Market	 Policy. High-level conference organised by the Senate of 
the Republic, the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, and the OECD LEED 
Programme, in collaboration with Isfol and Italia Lavoro. 17-19 April 2008.
US
Description	of	performance	management	system	in	place
The modernisation of US workforce development programmes in the 1990s saw 
two significant policies introduced, both of which tended to prioritise returning to 
work (and therefore gaining experience) over other forms of skills development. 
The 1998 Workforce Investment Act (WIA) aimed to codify programmes, services 
and governance structures for one-stop service delivery and the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) programme involved efforts to link low 
income unemployed parents with work, and to provide benefits and supports 
to low-income working families. (Greenberg 2004) have noted how states have 
taken varying approaches to managing the relationship between TANF and WIA. 
These range from completely separate administration by different state and local 
agencies, to placing TANF and WIA under a single agency, with TANF benefits and 
services fully incorporated into the operation of the WIA one-stop system.
The WIA established indicators of performance to assess the effectiveness of state 
and local programmes, examples of which were: 
• entry into unsubsidized employment; 
• retention in unsubsidized employment six months after entry into employment;
• earnings received in unsubsidized employment six months after entry into 
employment; and 
• attaining skills for entering employment. 
Customer satisfaction indicators were also to be established in each state.
(Sol 2005) describe how federal TANF legislation established the framework for 
defining performance measures used in contracting. The law set progressively 
rising quotas for states to meet in putting welfare recipients to work. For example, 
in Chicago, the specified number of consecutive days that clients were to work 
for welfare-to-work providers to receive credit for placements increased from 
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one contract to the next. Initially, welfare-to-work providers received credit for 
placements if clients worked at minimum wage for between 30 and 90 days. 
A job retention feature was added to later contracts which required individuals 
to work for 90 consecutive or 150 non-consecutive days. These placements, 
however, were defined without specifying levels of quality of service, meaning 
that intermediaries were being rewarded for reaching placement targets at the 
lowest marginal cost. 
(Sol 2005) also found an issue with ‘creaming’ where state administrators had 
to intervene to stop welfare offices from recruiting only the clients that were 
anticipated to be the easiest to find work for. As a result community-based 
practitioners were forced to shift their programmes from favouring human capital 
development to fitting clients into available jobs.
Elsewhere, contractors had the challenge of striking the right balance between 
a limited number of performance measures which tended to create stronger 
incentives, or broadening the range of measures in order to ensure that all 
objectives were being met. (Fording 2005) note that state policymakers have 
significant freedom under TANF to craft their own approaches to public assistance 
in ways that reflect the area’s particular characteristics. This has meant a growing 
reliance on performance measurement for ensuring accountability in decentralized 
and privatized systems of service delivery. 
Wisconsin Works (W-2) is an example of one state’s TANF programme and has 
been in place since 1997. Wisconsin ended the county government monopoly 
on public assistance administration by inviting private sector agencies to compete 
for contracts to manage local-level programs. Performance-based contracting 
was also introduced as a primary mechanism for motivating and monitoring the 
performance of W-2 agencies. 
Initially, the criteria by which providers were judged were initially mostly process-
oriented (such as ratio of staff to clients, percentage of clients with an employability 
plan or client participation in a high school equivalency degree programme). The 
percentage of W-2 cases that returned to a W-2 grant after being placed in a job 
was the only outcome-oriented measure. 
A second round of contracting aimed at increasing contract performance 
requirements and monitoring with a key change being the determination of 
performance achievements by outcomes-based standards. There were five 
measures of participant outcomes – employment rate, average wage rate, two 
job retention measures, employer health insurance benefits and two programme 
process measures. The state’s priorities were reflected by assigned weighting of 
performance measures.
Four categories of performance measures were classified by the state during the 
third period of contracting. These were: 
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• priority outcomes for participants; 
• high-quality and effective case management services; 
• customer satisfaction; and 
• agency accountability. 
A fourth (2004-2005) phase saw performance budgets and standards both 
scaled back so that contract incentives were effectively retracted with the state’s 
administrative focus reverting to securing basic benefits and job placement services 
for clients.
Strengths	of	performance	management	system	in	place
W-2 is noted for its ‘dramatic effects on reducing welfare caseloads 
(Heinrich 2007).
Weaknesses	of	performance	management	system	in	place
Changes by the state in W-2 contract specifications and performance measures 
led to services providers responding by prioritizing particular performance goals 
(p.409). 
Deficiencies in programme administration and contract management meant some 
performance failures and setbacks.
Planned	changes
No literature or comments on planned changes to the performance measurement 
framework were found.
Sources
Wandner, S.A. (2002). Targeting	 employment	 services	 under	 the	 Workforce	
Investment	 Act, in	 Eberts, R.W., O’Leary, C. and Wandner, S. A. (eds.) (2002) 
Targeting Employment Services. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Eberts, R.E. (2001). Targeting	 welfare-to-work	 services	 using	 statistical	 tools, 
Employment Research, 8(3), pp.1-3.
OECD (2001). Labour	Market	Policies	and	the	Public	Employment	Service, Prague 
Conference, July 2000.
Sol, E. and Westerveld, M. (2005). Contractualism	in	Employment	Services:	a	New	
Form	of	Welfare	State	Governance.
McConnell, S. (2003). Privatization	in	Practice:	Case	Studies	of	Contracting	for	TANF	
Case	Management. Washington: Department for Health and Human Services.
Fording, R., Schram, S.F. and Soss, J. (2005). Sanctioning	outcomes	in	the	Florida	
TANF	program:	devolution,	privatization,	and	performance	management, Paper 
prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science 
Association, Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois, April 8th, 2005.
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Grubb, D. (2004). Principles	 for	 the	 performance	 management	 of	 public	
employment	services, Public Finance and Management, 4(3), 2004 pp. 352-398.
Greenberg, M., Parker, E. and Frank, A. (2004). Integrating	TANF	and	WIA	into	a	
Single	Workforce	System:	An	Analysis	of	Legal	Issues. Washington: Center for Law 
and Social Policy.
Heinrich, C.J. and Choi, Y. (2007). Performance-based	contracting	in	social	welfare	
programs, The American Review of Public Administration, 37(4), pp.409-435.
New Zealand
Description	of	performance	measurement	system	in	place
Radical changes of labour market policy in New Zealand were implemented in 
1998 with the integration of benefit administration and employment services into 
a single agency, Work and Income, and the introduction of internal targets for 
placements into stable work (lasting more than three months). In 2005, each 
client was classified by employment counsellor, local office, region, and so on, and 
performance in terms of numbers of stable employment outcomes was monitored 
at each of these levels (Johri et	al., 2004; Office for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 2005).
Now, Work and Income has become a service of the Ministry of Social Development 
(MSD). Through its policy, research and evaluation functions, MSD leads strategic 
policy development and research across the social sector, and has lead responsibility 
for social policy advice and research on individuals, children and young people, 
families and communities. From more than 170 offices around the country, MSD 
delivers services to more than one-third of all New Zealanders. It provides income 
support and employment assistance, and help for people who need access to 
education or training (Gray 2004).
MSD’s Statement of Intent for 2008-2011 includes Outcome Two in respect of 
working age people. The main outcome in relation to the employment service 
relates to ensuring that working age people are in sustainable employment 
through, for example, providing enhanced job search, work development support, 
and to improve education and training.
To demonstrate success in achieving this outcome, indicators include employment 
rates – and new measures currently under development that focus on sustainable 
employment. The performance measure relating to getting unemployed clients 
into work refers to the proportion of job-seeking clients in receipt of a main 
benefit who exit into employment, and is 35 per cent for 2008/09. Similarly, the 
proportion of job-seeking clients in receipt of a main benefit for a duration of 
six months or more, who exit into employment, is 35 per cent for 2008/09. The 
proportion of job-seeking clients who exited into employment and achieve six 
months continuous employment will be 59 per cent.
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Strengths	of	performance	management	system	in	place
No literature or comments on the strengths of performance management could 
be found.
Weaknesses	of	performance	management	system	in	place
No literature or comments on the weaknesses of performance management could 
be found.
Planned	changes
No literature or comments on planned changes could be found.
Sources
Office	for	Economic	Cooperation	and	Development (2005). Employment Outlook 
2005 Paris: OECD.
Gray, D (2005). Social	Development:	Focusing	on	Outcomes,	Monitoring	Results 
Wellington: Ministry of Social Development.
Ministry of Social Development (2008). Annual	 Report	 2007-2008 Wellington: 
Ministry of Social Development.
Johri, R., de Boer, M., Pusch, H., Ramasamy, S. and Wong, K. (2004). Evidence	
to	Date	on	the	Working	and	Effectiveness	of	ALMPs	in	New	Zealand Wellington: 
Department of Labour, Ministry of Social Development.
Ministry of Social Development (2008). Statement	of	Intent:	Outcome	Two http://
www.msd.govt.nz/about-msd-and-our-work/publications-resources/corporate/
statement-of-intent/2008/outcome-two-working-age-people.html
Australia
Description	of	performance	measurement	system	in	place
In 1998, the Australian Commonwealth Employment Service was abolished and 
replaced by the Job Network, in which practically all public employment services 
were contracted out to private or community organisations. To make way for the 
competitive employment services market, the PES’s roles of registration, eligibility 
assessment and provision of jobseeker services were amalgamated with the social 
security department’s role of administering income support, to form a single 
agency, Centrelink. 
A national vacancy database was established which could be accessed by job 
seekers through Centrelink offices, any service providers and employers. The 
country was divided into 29 labour market regions and the competitive market 
was established by calling for tenders from private, community and government 
organisations on a regional basis (Dockery, 2001).
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These changes required a new role for the PES. It has become the purchaser of 
employment services, on behalf of job seekers. It also regulates and manages 
the tendering and contracting process and maintains its policy development and 
evaluation roles. With this new structure, Australia has introduced an institutional 
structure where the government is responsible for both the referral of the eligible 
unemployed to employment services and the administration of unemployment 
benefits, while ensuring that the delivery of employment services to the unemployed 
is subject to contestability by public, private and community providers (Dar, 2003).
Centrelink now delivers services on behalf of over 20 government departments 
and agencies. Key performance indicators are outlined in the different agreements 
Centrelink has with each agency. The Job Network has also grown to a point 
where it has over 1,000 ‘service delivery points’. Job Network’s incentive structure 
includes performance-based finding that reflects the importance of job placement 
and sustainable employment. In 2002, all Job Network’s contracts were awarded on 
the basis of performance, and a star rating system was introduced. This increased 
Job Network’s focus on securing outcomes for job seekers (Labour Market Policy 
Group, 2002). This system has continued and now includes an annual publication 
of Job Network Star Ratings (Department of Education, 2008), intended as an 
information source for job seekers.
Strengths	of	performance	management	system	in	place
No literature or comments on the strengths of performance management in place 
could be found.
Weaknesses	of	performance	management	system	in	place
No literature or comments on the weaknesses of performance management could 
be found.
Planned	changes
No literature or comments on the weaknesses of performance management could 
be found.
Sources
Dockery, A.M. and Stromback, T. (2001). Devolving	Public	Employment	Services:	
Preliminary	 Assessment	 of	 the	 Australian	 Experiment in International	 Labour	
Review Vol. 140, No. 4 pp.429-451.
Dar, A & Whitehead, T (2003). Public	 Employment	 Services:	 Functions	 and	
Innovations. World Bank Employment Policy Primer http://www.worldbank.org/
labormarkets/
Labour Market Policy Group (2002). Job	 Network	 Evaluation	 Stage	 Three:	
Effectiveness	Report EPPB Report 1/2002, Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.
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Department	 of	 Education,	 Employment	 and	 Workplace	 Relations (2008). Job 
Network Star Ratings Canberra: DEEWR.
Centrelink	Communications	Division (2008). Centrelink Annual Report 2007-08 
Barton: Commonwealth of Australia.
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Appendix D 
Example case study topic 
guide
1 SELECTION AND PRIORITISATION OF CUSTOMERS
1.1 What tools/processes are used to select or prioritise particular customers? 
(if you know there is a specific tool in place, ask about this and how it 
works in practice).
1.2 What are the results of this? (i.e. what are the specific customer groups).
1.3 How successful is the tool/process in selecting customers for priority 
treatment? (in terms of accuracy/comprehensiveness etc).
1.4 Do you have the right priority groups in place (i.e. are there some that 
shouldn’t be prioritised or some that aren’t but should?)?
2 DATA COLLECTION METHODS
2.1 How is data collected for the performance management system? 
2.2 Strengths of data collection?
2.3 Weaknesses of data collection?
2.4 If designing a new system what features would you incorporate?
3 DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
3.1 How is data analysed? In particular: to what level can it and is it dis-
aggregated to and interpreted at (e.g. national, regional, local, office, 
individual etc).
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3.2 Are targets set against data and in what ways are these used (ask probing 
qs on this – how do staff/managers use and understand them).
3.3 What incentives are used against these targets?
3.4 What is the behavioural impact of the performance management system 
on managers and staff (and is there any evidence of perverse incentives)?
3.5 Who uses performance data – managers, staff, politicians, public, and 
media?
3.6 Strengths of data use/analysis/interpretation?
3.7 Weaknesses of data use/analysis/interpretation?
3.8 If designing a new system what features would you incorporate?
4 COMMISSIONING
4.1 How is the performance management system linked to the commissioning 
of programme support from other organisations?
4.2 What sort of organisations?
4.3 What sort of programme?
4.4 Payment procedures? 
4.5 Recontracting procedures?
4.6 Behavioural impacts?
4.7 Strengths of performance system in relation to commissioning?
4.8 Weaknesses of performance system in relation to commissioning?
4.9 If designing a new system what features would you incorporate?
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